



KRAKOWSKA AKADEMIA IM. ANDRZEJA FRYCZA MODRZEWSKIEGO
ANDRZEJ FRYCZ MODRZEWSKI KRAKOW UNIVERSITY

BEZPIECZEŃSTWO

TEORIA I PRAKTYKA

SECURITY

THEORY AND PRACTICE

SECURITY STRATEGIES IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY

edited by
Beata Molo, Lutz Kleinwächter

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Security strategies in times of uncertainty: Introduction

We are pleased to present our readers with this recent issue of our journal “Security. Theory and Practice”. This time, it features a vast array of studies that look at issues related to security strategies.

The Articles and Materials section opens with the article by Wulf Lapins, entitled *EU-Strategien im Wandel von Zeit und Situation*, which offers a synthetic approach to the developed and implemented strategies of the European Union. The paper by Joachim Diec *Demography as a security strategy factor in Poland and the Russian Federation* focuses on the perception of demographic security in Poland and Russia as a major facet of social and state security. The author concludes that the Polish political narrative and the declared set of state goals focus more on the social sphere, while the Russian rhetoric and politics are more state-oriented. The contemporary rebuilding of the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, covering the area of the so-called “near abroad”, has been scrutinised by Anna Jach in her article *A new “gathering of Russian lands”: Russia’s return to imperialism*. The author argues that from the very beginning, thanks to the use of the ancient Roman strategy of *divide et impera*, the Russian Federation has aimed to restore its hegemonic position on

the territory of the countries that together with it once formed the Soviet Union. Krystian Pachucki-Włosek, in his article *The Russian minority and the security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, looks at the threats related to the large Russian minority in Kazakhstan, the actions taken by the Kazakh authorities – whose main goal has been to reduce the threat by reducing Russian influence in the country – and the consequences of these activities for the participation of ethnic Kazakhs in the socio-political life of the state. The policy of the Polish government towards the hard coal mining sector in the years 2015–2021 in the context of the European Union’s climate policy and the growing demand for energy resources of the Polish economy has been analysed by Małgorzata Kamola-Cieślak in her paper *The policy of the Polish government towards the hard coal mining sector after 2015*. The article discusses the assumptions of the government mine restructuring plan until 2049. Michał Paszkowski’s article *Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of energy security in the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO)* looks at the main arguments formulated by the PiS (Law and Justice) and the PO (Civic Platform) politicians with regard to the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, based on both parties’ interviews, policy papers, and manifestos – a project aimed at diversifying the sources and directions of natural gas supplies from Russia. In her study entitled *Defence policy of the Republic of Poland in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine*, Natalia Adamczyk makes an attempt at assessing the assumptions of Poland’s defence policy and the country’s defence potential based on the modernisation schemes that are currently being implemented. The subject of Grzegorz Baziur’s article *Operation “Sluice”: The so-called migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border: an example of hybrid actions taken in the second half of 2021 as documented in the reports of the Polish Border Guard* revolves around the idea of the so-called “migration crisis”, which occurred along the Polish-Belarusian border from August to December 2021. This part of the journal ends with the article by Lutz Kleinwächter *On Germany’s security strategy at the “Zeitenwende”*, in which the author looks at Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s public announcement of a turning point in Germany’s foreign and security policy in response to Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine.

In the section *From the History*, Paulina Stępniewska-Szydłowska, in her paper *The origin of the Turkish Armed Forces: Kemalism and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic*, analyses the role and significance of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey and the principles of the Kemalism ideology in the creation of contemporary armed forces and civil-military relations in Turkey.

The *Varia* section contains an article co-authored by Patrycja Tyborowska and Katarzyna Walat entitled *Building civil society in post-1989 Poland by implementing the principle of openness of public life in non-governmental organisations in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship*, which deals with the selected issues concerning

the functioning of civil society in post-1989 Poland. In their study, the authors have attempted to show the relationship between the two basic elements of civil society – transparency in public life, i.e. access to information, and the activities of non-governmental organisations. The starting point for the considerations featured in the article are the results of surveys on the functioning of the right to access public information in non-governmental organisations operating in the Mazowieckie Region.

Varia-Forum features two articles published in WeltTrends No. 187, 2022 – August Pradetto's *Die Ukraine zwischen Neutralität und westlicher Allianz*, and Heinz Gärtner's *Österreichs Neutralität – Modell für die Ukraine?*

This issue of our journal ends with reviews of three publications (Reviews section): Parag Khanna, *Move. Das Zeitalter der Migration* (reviewed by Aleksandra Kruk), *NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives*, ed. by Michele Testoni (Adrianna Grudzińska), Frédéric Gare, Jean-Loup Samaan, *The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region* (Polina Khmilevska).

Articles



Wulf Lapins

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EU-Strategien im Wandel von Zeit und Situation

Diskutiert werden soll die schwierige EU-Rollenerweiterung vom globalen ökonomischen Akteur des aus 27 Nationalstaaten organisierten supranationalen Staatenverbundes zu einer, auch internationale Politik mitgestaltenden Macht.

Strategie in Militär und Politik

Der Begriff Strategie hat militärische Wurzeln. Er leitet sich ab vom griechischen „Stratēgós“/militärisches Amt. Generäle haben zeitlose bedeutende Militärstrategien entworfen. Sun Tsus „Kunst des Krieges“¹ oder *Vom Kriege*² des Carl von Clausewitz. Von Clausewitz stammt die bekannte strategische Achse aus den Grundbausteinen Zweck-Ziel-Mittel.³ Primat der Strategie ist hiernach der von der Politik vorgegebene Zweck, dem Ziel und Mittel als abhängige Variablen zugeordnet sind. Der politische Zweck bestimmt den Rahmen, d.h. wenn sich der Zweck ändert, müssen auch Ziel und Mittel neu bemessen, mithin seine Gültigkeit immer wieder evaluiert werden.

Der österreichische Militärwissenschaftler Wolfgang Peischel formuliert auf diesen Grundlagen: „Strategie soll für eine Fähigkeit stehen, die einerseits eher dem

¹ Sunzi, *Die Kunst des Krieges*, https://www.wrd.ch/triboni/store/Sunzi_Kunst_des_Krieges1.pdf?mthd=get&name=wrld_store1&sign=Y13iAS%2FpDd2D5JiF6GWsLQ%3D%3D&id=hyuemmxhdhaaaaaabmbb&fmt=application%2Fpdf.

² C. von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, <https://www.clausewitz-gesellschaft.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/VomKriege-a4.pdf>.

³ Ebenda, S. 3.

‘Denken‘ als dem ‘Handeln‘ zuzuordnen ist, andererseits eher der ‘Zweckfindung‘ als der ‘Planung und Umsetzung‘, sie ist ‘langfristig proaktiv/prophylaktisch‘ anstatt ‘reaktiv/symptomatisch‘ ausgerichtet und stellt damit einen Abtausch (‘Trade Off‘) zwischen kurzfristigem Erfolg und langfristiger Überlebenssicherheit“.⁴

Strategie ist eine Konzeption sui generis und kein Synonym für: Vision (Zukunftsentwurf), Mission (Auftrag/Verbreitung) oder Plan (Absicht/Vorhaben).

Die deutschen politikwissenschaftlichen Strategieforscher Joachim Raschke und Ralf Tils deuten ihren Untersuchungsgegenstand so: „Strategien sind dann alle erfolgsorientierten Konstrukte, die auf situationsübergreifenden Ziel-Mittel-Umwelt-Kalkulationen beruhen. Je nach strategischer Einheit ergeben sich kurz-, mittel- oder langfristige Strategien.“⁵ Klar erkennbar ist die Anlehnung an den preußischen Militärtheoretiker.

Politik ist ohne Strategien nicht vorstellbar, Politik ist immer auch intrinsische Strategie. Der politische Stratege Henry Kissinger definiert Strategie von der theoretischen Ebene auf internationale Politik gehoben als Triebkraft, die Macht in Politik umsetzt. Diese politische Kunst zeichnet für ihn zugleich den Staatsmann aus: “A statesman’s test is whether he can discern from the swirl of tactical decisions the true long-term interests of his country and devise an appropriate strategy for achieving them.”⁶

EU-Strategien auf dem Prüfstand

Zum 60. Jahrestag der Römischen Verträge 2017 publizierte das European Political Strategy Center eine ‘Erfolgsgeschichte Europa’: „Die Story“ Europas ist eine Geschichte über Frieden, Demokratie, Solidarität und Freiheit, aber auch eine Geschichte über Wohlstand, Gleichheit, Wohlbefinden und Nachhaltigkeit.“⁷

Mit sieben Erweiterungen, ohne Hinzuzählung der Einheit Deutschlands, beweist das integrierte Europa seine Strategiefähigkeit. Und aus Krisen lernt Brüssel, wie die Banken- und Finanzkrise 2008/9. So soll eine potenzielle Wiederholung im Euroraum mit der etablierten Strategie einer drei Säulen-Bankenunion (2014) vermieden werden. Ein erster Schritt, dem weitere folgen müssen.

Zu erinnern ist aber auch an strategische Rückschläge, Stagnationen und Misserfolge. Dazu zählen prominent die 1954 an Frankreich gescheiterte Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, De Gaulles Veto gegen den britischen EWG-Beitritt

⁴ W. Peischel, *Ist Strategie lehrbar?* In: W. Peischel (Hrsg.), *Wiener Strategie-Konferenz 2017. Strategie neu denken*, Miles-Verlag, Berlin 2018, S. 17.

⁵ J. Raschke, R. Tils, *Politische Strategie: Eine Grundlegung*, Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2013.

⁶ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1994, S. 109.

⁷ *Erfolgsgeschichte Europa. 60 Jahre gemeinsamer Fortschritte*, European Political Strategy Centre, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/assets/epsc/files/the-european-story_epsc_de_web.pdf.

1963 und seine EWG-Boycottstrategie 1965–1966 zur Verhinderung einer mehrheitlichen Entscheidung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik. Mit striktem NO verhinderte Margaret Thatcher die deutsch-französische vertiefte EU. Die Strategie enger Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und zwölf Mittelmeeranrainern/ Barcelona-Prozess von 1995 für einen Raum des Friedens, der Stabilität und des Wohlstands wurde nicht in Politik umgesetzt. Niederländische und französische ablehnende Referenden 2005 durchkreuzten den politisch-strategischen EU-Verfassungsvertrag.

Westbalkan in der strategischen Warteschleife

Die EU-Westbalkanpolitik wirkt seit einigen Jahren strategisch obdachlos. Aus heutiger Sicht wurden Bulgarien und Rumänien 2007 zu früh EU-Mitglieder. Die Westbalkanstaaten zahlen dafür die Rechnung. Brüssel mäandert zwischen rhetorisch-aktivem, aber gestaltend-passivem Politikstil. Das stellt die Rolle der Gemeinschaft als gewichtige Ordnungsmacht in der Region in Frage. Ein nachlassendes EU-Engagement mit dem Narrativ der Friedensstiftung bringt desintegrativen Kräften Zulauf und popularisiert „großalbanische“⁸ und/oder „großserbische“⁹ Denkfiguren. Und serbische wie kroatische Nationalisten lehnen offen Bosnien-Herzegowinas als Gesamtstaat ab.

Nach Kroatiens EU-Mitgliedschaft 2013 sitzen die anderen sechs regionalen Beitrittsaspiranten seit Jahren im EU-Warteraum und hoffen auf Einlösung der Zusage vom EU-Gipfel in Thessaloniki 2003: „Die EU bekräftigt, dass sie die europäische Ausrichtung der westlichen Balkanstaaten vorbehaltlos unterstützt. Die Zukunft der Balkanstaaten liegt in der Europäischen Union.“¹⁰

Den Beitrittsstillstand verantwortet der EU-Dissens der Reihenfolge von institutioneller Vertiefung und integrativer Erweiterung. Frankreich und die Niederlande betonen eine vorrangige Strukturreform (komplizierte gegenwärtige Entscheidungsprozesse) vor neuen Beitritten und kritisieren mangelnde Reformumsetzungen der Beitrittskandidaten.

Deutschland und Österreich favorisieren wegen wachsender Frustration auf dem Westbalkan hingegen eine baldige konkrete Beitrittsperspektive. Gleichwohl ist eine kohärente Strategie nicht erkennbar. Aber auch Frankreich und die

⁸ W. Lapins, E. Velija, *Suche und Versuche um nationale Größe auf dem Westbalkan – Mythen, Akteure, Implikationen*. Teil 1, „Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift“, Nr. 03/2021, S. 283–293; W. Lapins, E. Velija, *Albanischer Einheitsstaat ohne Wirkkraft – Fernziel EU ohne innovative Schubkraft*. Teil 2, „Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift“, Nr. 04/2021, S. 427–437.

⁹ W. Lapins, E. Velija, „Großserbien“ in *Geschichte und Gegenwart. Historische Konzepte und aktuelle Politik*, „WeltTrends“, Nr. 173/2021, S. 13–18.

¹⁰ Gipfeltreffen EU – Westliche Balkanstaaten (Thessaloniki, 21.06.2003), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/de/misc/76317.pdf.

Niederlande haben bislang keine Strategie der institutionellen Effizienz zur Stärkung der EU-Funktionsfähigkeit vorgelegt. Eine Steilvorlage ließ jüngst Paris ungenutzt. Die französische EU- Ratspräsidentschaft im ersten Halbjahr 2022 legt keinen Fokus auf eine strategische Reformagenda.¹¹

In das Sicherheits- und Machtvakuum des stornierten EU-Beitrittsprozesses stoßen undemokratische externe Mächte, wie China, Russland, arabischen Staaten und die Türkei mit ihren jeweiligen disparaten Interessen hinein und schaffen Fakten in sozialökonomischen, medialen und kulturell-religiösen Bereichen. Bei künftigen neuen Beitritts-Aufnahmen müssen diese berücksichtigt werden.

(K)eine strategische Partnerschaft mit Russland

Exemplarisch für diese Problematik steht die vom Europäischen Rat erarbeitete „Gemeinsame Strategie der Europäischen Union vom 4. Juni 1999 für Rußland“¹². Das Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen zwischen der EU und der Russischen Föderation vom 1. 12. 1997 wurde nun mit konkreten kooperativen Plan-schritten unterfüttert. Die Union verfolgte als „klare strategische Ziele eine stabile, offene und pluralistische Demokratie in Rußland, die rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen verpflichtet ist und der Untermauerung einer prosperierenden Marktwirtschaft dient, aus der die Menschen in Rußland und in der Europäischen Union gleichermaßen Nutzen ziehen.“ Zustimmung auch, dass „die Zukunft Rußlands wesentlicher Bestandteil der Zukunft des Kontinents und für die Europäische Union von strategischem Interesse ist.“

Russlands Antwort überreichte Ministerpräsident Putin am 22. Oktober beim Spitzentreffen mit der EU-Troika in Helsinki. Es war ein strategisches Konzept der „Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Russischen Föderation und der Europäischen Union 2000–2010“.¹³ Seine Interessen divergierten deutlich mit Kernanliegen der EU. Einige Beispiele:

Die EU erstrebte nach Ende des Kalten Krieges für die internationalen Beziehungen ein interdependentes multilaterales Ordnungsgefüge. Das Moskauer Dokument fixierte einleitend bereits die Position „der objektiven Notwendigkeit für die Bildung einer multipolaren Welt“. Die EU-Strategie betonte gemeinsame

¹¹ *Aufschwung, Stärke, Zugehörigkeit*. Das Programm der französischen EU- Ratspräsidentschaft, 1. Januar – 30 Juni 2022, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/media/j1ddlk0t/de_programme-pfue-v1-2.pdf.

¹² Gemeinsame Strategie der Europäischen Union vom 4. Juni 1999 für Rußland, Amtsblatt Nr. L 157 vom 24/06/1999, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31999E0414&from=GA>.

¹³ Стратегия развития отношений Российской Федерации с Европейским Союзом на среднесрочную перспективу (2000–2010 гг.), (Хельсинки, 22 октября 1999 года), <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901773061>.

„strategische Interessen und besondere Verantwortlichkeiten bei der Wahrung der Stabilität und Sicherheit in Europa sowie in anderen Weltregionen“. Russland hob demgegenüber hervor: „Hauptziele der Strategie bestehen darin, die nationalen Interessen zu wahren und die Rolle und Autorität Russlands in Europa und der Welt zu stärken.“ Der ihm von der EU zugesprochene „Platz in der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur“ nahm es als selbstverständlich, begriff seine Rolle aber global: „Als Weltmacht auf zwei Kontinenten muss Russland die Freiheit bewahren, seine Innen- und Außenpolitik zu bestimmen und zu führen, seinen Status und seine Vorteile eines eurasischen Staates und des größten GUS-Landes, die Unabhängigkeit von Positionen und Aktivitäten in internationalen Organisationen.“

Dem 1999 noch existenten WEU-Verteidigungsbündnis bot Moskau in seiner Strategie „Zusammenarbeit im Sicherheitsbereich (Friedenserhaltung, Krisenmanagement, verschiedene Aspekte der Begrenzung und Rüstungsreduzierung etc.), die als Gegengewicht zum NATO-Zentrismus in Europa dienen könnte“. Die EU konnte mit ihrem transatlantischen Sicherheitsverständnis das nicht akzeptieren. Die Gemeinschaft wollte in Europa auch keinen Rückfall in dominierende Einflusszonen und Regionen verminderter Autonomie. Russlands Plan war somit nicht akzeptabel, denn seine Kooperation mit der EU „sollte dazu beitragen, Russland als führende Kraft bei der Bildung eines neuen Systems zwischenstaatlicher politischer und wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen im GUS-Raum zu stärken.“ Auf den breit gefächerten „Aktionsbereich Stärkung der Bürgergesellschaft“ im EU-Dokument ging Moskau in seiner 12 Punkte umfassenden Antwort gar nicht ein. In den beiden folgenden Dekaden obsiegte sukzessive das Trennende gegenüber dem Gemeinsamen. Die erstrebte Strategische Partnerschaft deprivierte zur Strategischen Rivalität mit dem Subtext Gegnerschaft. So die EU in ihrer Global Strategy vom Juni 2019: „Russia, which remains a strategic challenge for the EU.“¹⁴

Zentralasienstrategien

Ihre Flexibilität demonstriert die EU wiederholt darin, eine nicht erfolgreiche Strategie wie den Barcelona-Prozess, in einer neu aufgelegten, ambitionierteren Strategie aufgehen zu lassen – hier in der Mittelmeer-Union von 2008.

Ein strukturell ähnliches Modell ist es, eine unergiebigere Strategie kurzerhand modifiziert mit abgeflachter Strategie fortzusetzen. Beispielhaft hierfür steht die EU-Zentralasienstrategie „für eine neue Partnerschaft“¹⁵ von 2007 und ihre

¹⁴ EU Global Strategy, 2019, S. 19, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf.

¹⁵ Die EU und Zentralasien. Strategie für eine neue Partnerschaft, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10113-2007-INIT/de/pdf>.

Fortführung als „New EU Strategy on Central Asia“¹⁶ von 2019. Brüssels erste Zentralasienkonzeption mit dem mittelfristigen Zeitrahmen bis 2013 zielte darauf, in dieser Region Reformen zu unterstützen. Damit verabschiedete sich die Gemeinschaft von ihrer bisherigen Rolle des politischen Zaungastes in einer Region mit hohem Konfliktpotenzial: Radikaler Islam, Drogenhandel, Wasserversorgung, Grenzstreitigkeiten, nichtaufgearbeitete historische Konflikte. Man wollte mit Erfahrungs- und Stabilitätstransfer auf den nachstehenden sieben Kooperationsfeldern mitgestaltenden Einfluss nehmen: 1. Demokratie, Menschenrechte, gute Regierungsführung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit; 2. Jugend, Bildung; 3. Wirtschaft, Handel, Investitionen; 4. Energie und Verkehrsinfrastruktur; 5. Umweltschutz, Wassermanagement; 6. Sicherheit und Bekämpfung gemeinsamer Bedrohungen; 7. Interkultureller Dialog.

Warum erwiesen sich die Erwartungen nicht als tragfähig? An dieser Stelle nur einige ausgewählte Defizite: Brüssel unterschätzte das Fehlen einer zentralasiatischen regionalen Identität. Die Bekenntnisse zu konsensualen und kooperativen Entwicklungen der fünf autokratisch geführten Staaten, wenngleich mit unterschiedlichem politischen Härtegrad, erwiesen sich als Deklaratorik. Das kollektive Europa besaß kein schlüssiges Konzept seiner Positionierung gegenüber den bereits in der Region etablierten Großmächten Russland und China. Moskau dominierte den Raum sicherheitspolitisch im Rahmen des Militärbündnis (Die Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit – OVKS) mit Kasachstan, Kirgistan, Usbekistan und Tadschikistan sowie ökonomisch mit der Eurasischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft aus Kasachstan, Tadschikistan und Usbekistan. Die Sicherheitsfrage im Zuge der militärisch-technischen Zusammenarbeit bestimmte sein prioritäres Interesse. Und Peking definierte die Region als Rohstoffreservoir und Energielieferant/ Erdgas über ein von ihm finanziertes Pipelinennetz von hoher Bedeutung. Weil beide Großmächte demokratische Reformen in Zentralasien ablehnten, bestand eine *win-win* Interessenkoalition mit den autoritären lokalen Herrschaftseliten, die konsequent entsprechende EU-Projekte versanden ließen.

Zum Datum der Neuauflage der EU-Zentralasienstrategie 2019 war China in der Region mit der *Belt and Road*-Initiative zum bedeutenden Handelspartner, Großinvestor und Kreditgeber aufgestiegen. Auch Russland weitete seinen Einfluss seit 2007 in der Region auf seinen angestammten Feldern – Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftspolitik – durch den Ausbau der Militärstützpunkte in Kirgistan und Tadschikistan sowie der Transformation der Eurasischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 2015 in die Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion aus. Usbekistan möchte jedoch seinen Beobachterstatus noch nicht in eine Vollmitgliedschaft überführen.

Der EU-Strategie verfolgt keine zentralasiatischen geopolitischen Ambitionen.

¹⁶ New EU Strategy on Central Asia, 17.06.2019, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf>.

Als Importeur von Energie und Rohstoffen sowie Technologieexporten positioniert sich die Gemeinschaft wie bereits 2007 jedoch als geoökonomischer Akteur, der leicht auch unbeabsichtigt damit in Interessenkollision mit Moskau und Peking geraten kann. Man darf gespannt sein, wie die regionalen machtpolitischen Eliten die Förderung ökonomischer, ökologischer und sozialer Nachhaltigkeit, als ein Schwerpunkt der neuen Strategie, in ihr inneres Stabilitätskonzept integrieren. Nachhaltigkeit setzt auf die Partizipation der Bürger und könnte diese damit politisieren, mithin auch Umwelt- und Sozialproteste auslösen. Die EU-Zentralasienstrategie 2.0 im politischen Abklingbecken wie beim Vorläufer durch ihren Stopp der autokratischen zentralasiatischen Regierungen ist also nicht ausgeschlossen.

Strategiedefizite

Schon vor dem 24. Februar 2022, dem Tag der russischen militärischen Ukraine-Invasion, befand sich die EU bereits in schwerem politischen Wasser. Fünf Beispiele: Der Europäische Rechnungshof gab am 26. Oktober 2021 in seinem Jahresbericht zum Haushaltsjahr 2020, wie bereits im Jahr zuvor, „ein sogenanntes versagtes Prüfungsurteil zu den Ausgaben ab.“¹⁷ Das bedeutete, die Wirtschaftsprüfung stellte erhebliche Mängel und Beanstandungen zur Gesetz- und Ordnungsmäßigkeit des Jahresabschlusses und der Buchführung fest. Beim Ausbruch der Corona-Pandemie im Frühjahr 2020 verfielen Mitgliedsstaaten in nationale Egoismen von einseitigen Binnengrenzkontrollen. Beim Einkauf von Impfstoffen musste die Kommission Fehler und Versäumnisse zugeben.¹⁸ Zudem schwelte der Ausstieg aus dem Rechtsstaatsgefüge der Kopenhagener Kriterien einiger EU-Mitglieder ungelöst weiter. Und die kaum zu harmonisierenden Interessen zwischen den Mitgliedern im Norden und im Süden Europas, im historischen Westen und im neuen Osten, zeigten die mangelnde Unfähigkeit zur Weltpolitik von Europäischem Rat und Europäischer Kommission.

Geopolitische EU-Kommission

Die neue EU-Kommissionspräsidentin, Ursula von der Leyen, setzte gleich zu Amtsbeginn mit Blick auf die ungelösten Probleme von Klimaveränderung,

¹⁷ *Jahresbericht: Weiterhin Fehler bei den EU-Ausgaben: Prüfer mahnen solide Verwaltung des Corona-Hilfspakets an*, Europäischer Rechnungshof, <https://www.eca.europa.eu/de/Pages/AR2020.aspx>.

¹⁸ *Kampf gegen die Pandemie. Brüssel räumt Fehler bei Impfstoffbestellung ein*, „Handelsblatt“, 14.03.2021, <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/kampf-gegen-die-pandemie-bruessel-raeumt-fehler-bei-impfstoffbestellung-ein/27003686.html>.

Digitalisierung, Asyl/Migration, EU-Erweiterung und den internationalen Ordnungswandel das Narrativ einer „geopolitischen Kommission“¹⁹. Im deutschen linksdemokratischen Analysespektrum stieß der Terminus Geopolitik auf starke Kritik.²⁰ Für ihre erste Grundsatzrede hatte sie bewusst mit dem 8. November (2019) einen historischen Vorabend und einen historischen Ort gewählt. Denn tags darauf, am 9. November, wurde 1918 in Berlin die erste Deutsche Republik ausgerufen und genau 20 Jahre später, am 9. November 1938, begannen die Nationalsozialisten mit den offenen Pogromen gegen Juden zu wüten. Der 8. November war auch der Vortag der Maueröffnung 1989.

Einer ihrer Kernsätze, mit dem außenpolitische Profilschärfe der angekündigten geopolitischen Agenda aufgezeigt werden sollte, lautete: „Europa muss auch die ‚Sprache der Macht lernen‘. Das heißt zum einen, eigene Muskeln aufbauen, wo wir uns lange auf andere stützen konnten – etwa in der Sicherheitspolitik. Zum anderen die vorhandene Kraft gezielter einsetzen, wo es um europäische Interessen geht.“²¹ Mit anderen Worten: Die EU beabsichtigt in ihrer auswärtigen Gestaltung nunmehr geschlossener, robuster und strategischer aufzutreten.

Das bedeutet einen klaren Paradigmenwechsel. Nach ihrem Selbstverständnis will die Gemeinschaft eine sanfte Macht sein, mit den Soft Power Instrumenten Recht und Regeln. Vergessen wird hierbei oft, dass sie im Rahmen ihrer Wirtschaftskraft weltweit jedoch auch effektive Standards setzt. Sie ist ein globaler Akteur sui generis. Bislang hat sie nämlich weder Wille, Anspruch oder Erfordernis aufgezeigt und auch nicht die militärischen Ressourcen für Fähigkeiten aufgebracht, als klassische *Hard Power*-Macht zu agieren. Der Hohe Vertreter der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Josep Borrell, erklärt das so: „Die EU wurde schließlich gegründet, um die Machtpolitik abzuschaffen. Sie hat für Frieden und Rechtsstaatlichkeit gesorgt, indem sie die Hard Power von der Wirtschaft, gemeinsamen Regeln und der Soft Power getrennt hat. Wir waren davon ausgegangen, dass Multilateralismus, Öffnung und Gegenseitigkeit nicht nur für unseren Kontinent, sondern auch für die Welt insgesamt das beste Modell sei. Aber die Dinge haben sich anders entwickelt. Wir sehen uns leider einer härteren

¹⁹ *Startschuss für eine „geopolitische EU-Kommission“*, 03.12.2019, Auswärtiges Amt, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik-europa-eu-kommission-/2284150>.

²⁰ M. Müller-Hennig, *Brüsseler Großmachtphantasien*, „IPG Journal: Journal für Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“, 22.11.2019, <https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/bruesseler-grossmachtphantasien-3891>.

²¹ Europa-Rede Dr. Ursula von der Leyen Gewählte Präsidentin der Europäischen Kommission 08.11.2019, Allianz Forum (Pariser Platz), Berlin, <https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/4521287/Europa-Rede+von+Dr.+Ursula+von+der+Leyen.pdf/c4e63d1e-be66-1711-63ca-13a4f0c33f6c?version=1.2&t=1573230051869>.

Wirklichkeit gegenüber, in der viele Akteure bereit sind, Gewalt einzusetzen, um ihre Ziele zu erreichen.“²²

Wenn die EU-Kommission ihre Politik unter das Postulat von Geopolitik stellt, muss sie in der Konsequenz Geostrategie betreiben. Geostrategie wird definiert als „study of the spatial distribution of land-, sea- and airpower and the relationship of these to geographical phenomena.“²³ Geostrategie fokussiert somit Politik vorrangig als Sicherheitspolitik, in die die Parameter geographische Lage des Staates, seine Partner/Bündnisse, historische Erfahrungen, das Streitkräftedispositiv, Bedrohungsanalysen, politische Kultur/öffentliche Meinung u.a. einfließen. Eine solche kohärente, konsistente und effektive EU-Geostrategie sucht man bislang vergeblich. Der russische Ukraine-Krieg könnte aber zum Auftakt einer Konzipierung führen.

Krieg in Europa – welche Strategien?

Aus vielen Puzzlestücke zusammengetragen ergibt sich heute folgendes Bild: Präsident Putin hat den Weg in den Ukraine-Krieg lange systematisch durch Ideologie und politische Kultur gepflastert.²⁴ Am 25. Februar 2022, einen Tag nach der russischen Invasion, standen sich die EU als Wirtschaftsmacht und Russland als Militärmacht antagonistisch gegenüber. An diesem Tag beschlossen die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Union auf einem Sondergipfel umfassende Sanktionsmaßnahmen gegen Russland in den Bereichen Energie, Finanzen, Transport und Visa. Die EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen betonte die einigende Stärke und beschwor mit Blick auf Präsident Putin: „Er muss und er wird scheitern.“ Das Strategieziel der Gemeinschaft besteht darin, mit der weitreichenden ökonomischen Isolation so intensiv die russische Wirtschaft zu schwächen, dass Präsident Putin die militärischen Offensiven stoppen muss.

Die russische Regierung verfolgte seit Kriegsbeginn entgegengesetzt den strategischen Zweck, im Blitzkrieg Kiew zu erobern, dort eine Marionettenregierung zu installieren, die eine sofortige bedingungslose Kapitulation („Demilitarisierung“/ Putin) ausruft. Ohne einen längeren Abnutzungskrieg sollte die gesamte Ukraine besetzt und politisch gleichgeschaltet werden. Als russisches Protektorat könnte der Kreml auf dieser Basis zusammen mit Belarus eine slawische Union/Imperium bilden, die der künftige konkurrenzlose geopolitische Machtfaktor in Europa wäre.

²² J. Borrell, *Die Sprache der Macht*, „IPG Journal: Journal für Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“, 13.02.2020, <https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/die-sprache-der-macht-4069/>.

²³ G. Parker, *Géostratégie*. In: J. O’Loughlin (Hrsg.), *Dictionary of Geopolitics*, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT 1994, S. 98.

²⁴ H. Pleines, *Putins präziser Plan*, 05.04.2022, <https://www.karenina.de/news/politik/putins-praeziser-plan/>; M. Eltchaninoff, *In Putins Kopf*, Klett-Cotta-Verlag, Stuttgart 2022.

Beide Strategien sind jedoch in ihrer Zeitdimension gescheitert:

Die EU legte am 8. April inzwischen ihr fünftes Sanktionspaket gegen Russland auf.²⁵ Man fragt sich erstaunt, warum stufenweise und nicht schon von Kriegsbeginn die eine große Sanktion beschlossen wurde? Zudem erhielt Moskau (Stand 6. April) seit dem Einmarsch für seine Energielieferungen in die EU je nach Schätzung zwischen 19,8 Milliarden Euro (Wissenschaftler) und 35 Milliarden Euro (EU-Außenbeauftragter Borrell).²⁶ Mit diesen Devisen kann der Kreml Handelsgüter in den Ländern einkaufen, die sich nicht am Sanktionsregime beteiligen.²⁷

Präsident Selenskyj ist weiter im Amt und stärkt mit seiner klugen weltweiten online-Kommunikation, den eindringlich-überzeugenden Appellen und persönlichen Mut die Verteidigungsbereitschaft und -fähigkeit der Bevölkerung und Soldaten.

Die russische Armee zog sich nach schweren Verlusten aus der Kiew-Region zurück. Sie konzentriert sich (Stand 9. April) sowohl auf die Eroberung der ostukrainischen Region Donbass wie den Südkorridor am Asowschen Meer. In der Kampfregion lagern enorme unerschlossene Gasvorkommen.²⁸ Bei Einnahme hätte Russland eine geschlossene Landverbindung zur Krim wie auch weiter zum politisch-militärisch unterstützen separatistischen de-facto-Regime in Transnistrien und zur Republik Moldova geschaffen.²⁹ Die Schifffahrtswege zwischen dem Asowschen Meer und dem Schwarzen Meer wären unter seiner Kontrolle und die Ukraine zu einem Binnenstaat degradiert. Die ukrainischen Energiereserven könnten der klandestine, geoökonomische Kriegsgrund sein.

Schlussfolgerung

Moskau offenbarte seine politisch-strategische Zielsetzung in den Sicherheitsforderungen vom 17. Dezember 2021³⁰: Die Annullierung der Nato-Osterweiterung.

²⁵ *Ukraine: EU beschließt fünftes Sanktionspaket gegen Russland*, 08.04.2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/ip_22_2332.

²⁶ *EU-Zahlung seit Kriegsbeginn. 35 Milliarden Euro für russische Energie*, 06.04.2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/weltwirtschaft/importe-energie-eu-russland-zahlungen-101.html>.

²⁷ *Experte über Öl- und Gas-Stopp. „Embargo trifft Herz der russischen Macht“*, Interview mit Janis J. Kluge, 28.03.2022, <https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/weltwirtschaft/energie-embargo-krieg-finanzierung-kluge-101.html>.

²⁸ A. Umland, *Das vergessene Potential der ukrainischen Energiereserven*, 08.11.2020, <https://ukraineverstehen.de/umland-amelin-prokip-potential-ukrainischer-energiereserven>.

²⁹ Dieses Szenario beschrieb der Verfasser bereits 2015. W. Lapins, *Wir steigen nicht wieder in denselben Fluss. Eine neue europäische Ostpolitik muss realistische Russlandpolitik sein*. Teil 2, „Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift“, Nr. 6/2015, S. 661.

³⁰ J. Schramm, *Die russische Forderung nach Sicherheitsgarantien und der Aufbau einer Sicherheitsarchitektur in Europa*, „Ost/Mag. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge des Ostinstituts Wismar“,

Der Ukraine-Krieg ist eventuell nur der Auftakt fortsetzender Aggressionen, die bisherige Norm-basierte Ordnung in Europa durch eine von Russland abhängige macht-basierte Ordnung durchzusetzen. Krieg als Zweck, Mittel und Fortsetzung der Politik müssten in einem solchen System dann stets mitgedacht werden.

Solange Moskau Nachbarschafts- und Europapolitik als Geopolitik in Kategorien von Machtglacis und Einflussphären denkt, plant und handelt, zwingt es Europa in eine konfrontative Sicherheitsordnung, die Abschreckung und robuste Sicherheit vor Russland verlangt.

Artikel 42,7 EU-Vertrag muss eine analoge militärische Beistandsverpflichtung bekommen wie Artikel 5 im Nato-Vertrag. Die EU muss hierzu Verteidigungsfähigkeiten organisieren, üben und gestalten und den europäischen Pfeiler in der Allianz stärken.

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EU-Strategien im Wandel von Zeit und Situation

Zusammenfassung

Die Europäische Union ist ein einzigartiges politisch-normatives System, grundverschieden zu historischen oder präsenten Staatsformen oder internationalen Zusammenschlüssen. Gleichwohl hat diese Union in ihrer Geschichte vielfache Strategien aufgelegt und umgesetzt. Der Europäische Rat vereinbart die politischen Zielvorstellungen und Prioritäten. Die Europäische Kommission erarbeitet eigenständig daraus die Strategien.

Schlüsselwörter: Strategie, Europäische Union, Russland, Ukraine-Krieg, Westbalkan, Zentralasien, Geopolitik

EU strategies in the course of time and situation

Abstract

The European Union is a unique political-normative system, fundamentally different from historical or present forms of government or international associations. Nonetheless, this Union has developed and implemented multiple strategies throughout its history. The European Council agrees on political directions and priorities. The European Commission independently develops the strategies from this.

Key words: strategy, European Union, Russia, Ukraine war, Western Balkans, Central Asia, geopolitics



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Demography as a security strategy factor in Poland and the Russian Federation

Introduction

The main objective of this article is to discuss the key determinants of the perception of the demographic situation of the state as a factor that impacts on its security in the Russian and Polish narratives in the context of population dynamics in the post-communist period. Demographic policies will also be taken into account as a response to the issues raised.

The relationship between demography and security problems as a theoretical concept has already been noticed in the literature of the subject. Particularly noteworthy is the quite distant collection of *Demography and National Security*, edited by Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell, the unforgettable specialists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology circle, back in 2001. In their study, they look at the relationship between national security and population dynamics, states' responses to demographic trends, or the relationship of demographic engineering to state security-related goals.¹ The collection of papers from the conference "Auswirkungen demographischer Entwicklungen auf Sicherheitsfragen" from 2007, edited by Robert Naderi, is also worth mentioning.² Some publications deal with more

¹ *Demography and National Security*, eds. M. Weiner, Sh.S. Russell, New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001.

² *Auswirkungen demographischer Entwicklungen auf Sicherheitsfragen Vorträge aus dem gleichnamigen Workshop vom 19./20. November 2007 im Bundesinstitut für*

detailed issues, such as the study by Shweta Mittal and P. Vigneswara Ilavarasan on the relationship between demographic issues and cybersecurity.³

As regards the theory of the issue subjected to scrutiny, it is of fundamental importance to distinguish between two different understandings of demographic security. On the one hand, we are dealing with social security related to the varying intensity of the feeling of insecurity among individual citizens and social groups, or individual categories of society; on the other hand, the principle at stake is the security of the state on the international arena. These understandings are characterised by differently directed vectors of political pressure. In the case of social security, the dominant perspective shifts towards decision-making centres. This movement is referred to in the system analysis as the input system and means pressure or at least the expectation of a more favourable demographic policy, most often referred to as “pro-family policy.” The demographic security of the state, in turn, is determined by the vector directed from the authorities towards society. The use of this concept expresses the expectations that citizens will take to heart the need to strengthen or even save the state in a long-term perspective and will not allow it to weaken its ability to pursue existential interests in an anarchic international environment.

In this article, due to the significant increase in threats to the stability of the international system, caused by Russia’s armed attack on Ukraine in February 2022, more emphasis has been placed on state security than on social security. Of course, it is possible to put forward a hypothesis about the interdependence of both spheres without much risk, as a socially secured state seems to be better prepared to ensure external security as well. However, it cannot be argued without hesitation that state security is a simple function of social security. If this were the case, the level of military security in Taiwan and Finland would significantly exceed the corresponding rate of North Korea or Pakistan.

Of the methodological approaches to the issue of demographic security – irrespective of the above-mentioned divergence of its understanding – at least two tendencies can and should be brought to light. In a significant number of studies, a strictly mathematical and statistical approach is dominant, which is actually an expression of an inductive procedure with synthesising conclusions. For example,

Bevölkerungsforschung, eds. R. Naderi, Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, 2009, https://www.bib.bund.de/Publikation/2009/pdf/Auswirkungen-demographischer-Entwicklungen-auf-Sicherheitsfragen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&cv=5 [accessed: 25 March 2022].

³ S. Mittal, P.V. Ilavarasan, *Demographic Factors in Cyber Security: An Empirical Study*, [in:] *Digital Transformation for a Sustainable Society in the 21st Century: 18th IFIP WG 6.11 Conference on e-Business, e-Services, and e-Society, I3E 2019, Trondheim, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings*, eds. I.O. Pappas, P. Mikalef, Y.K. Dwivedi, L. Jaccheri, J. Krogstie, M. Mäntymäki, Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 2019, pp. 667–676, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29374-1_54.

Alina Tarasova lists such demographic security factors as the net reproduction rate of the population, depopulation rate, total fertility rate, death rate, life expectancy at birth, population aging rate; balance of migration between urban and rural areas (including by gender, age, education level), number of illegal migrants, marriage and divorce rates.⁴

Some studies highlight the need for a more subject-based demographic risk study framework. For example, Richard P. Cincott distinguishes eight factors of potential demographic instability: “youth bulge,” i.e. a mass influx of young adults into the labour market, a sudden increase in the urban population, reduced access to drinking water, aging and shrinking population, high population mortality at working age, different pace of population growth within individual ethnic and religious groups, migrations, aging and declining population size, significantly higher male population than female population (just as in the case of China). However, taking into account the aforementioned factors, it is impossible to treat demographic trends as either clearly positive or destructive. Moreover, there is also no demographic doom: even fundamentally opposing trends can overlap in the same period.⁵

Other, even more in-depth studies are also possible, in which the problem or motivational factor is taken into account. This approach is exemplified by an important study by the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research in Vienna, whose author, Alexandre Sidorenko, a representative of an older generation of researchers with significant experience in the field of knowledge about the health condition of society, draws attention to many factors that actually shape demographic security that cannot be included only in the framework of statistical research. In themselves, demographic processes are, according to the author, neutral and do not constitute a direct threat to national security, while statistical data are only external indicators of processes experienced by the population. Inference aimed at ascertaining the positive or negative, threatening nature of changes taking place in society can be made on the basis of a complex social analysis, combining the study of economic phenomena with the view of demographic changes. After all, it is socio-economic phenomena – such as poverty, rural extinction, or economic decline of regions – and not the level of births, deaths or net migration that constitute major mechanisms that trigger crises and conflicts.⁶

⁴ А.А. Тарасова, “Демографическая безопасность Российской Федерации”, *NovaInfo*, т. 1, № 56, 2016, с. 165–168, <https://novainfo.ru/article/9085> [accessed: 31 March 2022].

⁵ R.P. Cincotta, “Demographic Security Comes of Age”, *ECSP Report*, issue 10, 2004, pp. 25–27.

⁶ A. Sidorenko, “Demographic transition and ‘demographic security’ in post-Soviet countries”, *Population and Economics*, issue 3(3), 2019, pp. 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.3897/popecon.3.e47236>.

Demographic realities of Poland and Russia

When the fundamental political transformation took place in Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s, the fortunes of Poland and Russia took a different course. It is true that the yoke of communism with its ideological baggage was rejected, but the result of this process was different in Poland and in Russia. Ever since the fall of communism, Poland has become a democratic state governed by the principle of the rule of law with an increasingly better-developing free market economy based mainly on the sector of more and more modern services and well-developed processing. Russia, in turn, entered the path of an inefficient oligarchic system, which, from the logic of de facto lawlessness and plutocracy, turned to an aggressive autocracy, based on the power of a new elite, derived from the power structures still rooted in the mindset of the former USSR. Despite these striking differences, the two countries were united by a disastrous tendency characteristic for the vast majority of post-communist countries: a sudden collapse in the dynamics of demographic growth.

In Poland, after 1989, as Zbigniew Strzelecki and Janusz Witkowski note, there was a fatal reversal of the positive dynamics of population growth during the communist period. While in the 1980s, the population of Poland, which was after all epitomised by an economic collapse and a negative migration balance, increased from 35.734 million to 37.340 million, the decades that came after proved that the situation was only worse. There was a significant decrease in the number of births, and since 2005 the overall population growth has been negative: -16.8 in 2005, -31.6 in 2006, -9.8 in 2007, and so on. The negative net migration still had a certain contribution to this regression, although it was not a decisive factor. The main culprit was, of course, a significant drop in the number of births: in 2001–2005 it was twice as low as in the corresponding period two decades earlier.⁷

In the last decade of the period of interest, despite the obvious improvement in the state of the economy and a significant increase in family incomes, the situation tended to deteriorate further rather than improve. In the period from June 2011 to January 2022, the population of Poland dropped from 38,526 to 38,057, the number of live births decreased from 32,800 in the first of the surveyed months up to 25,000 in the last month of the period, and the natural increase from 4,200 up to -23,500 (-7.4 people out of 1000).⁸

⁷ Z. Strzelecki, J. Witkowski, *Ewolucja rozwoju ludności Polski: przeszłość i perspektywy*, Rządowa Rada Ludnościowa, Warszawa 2009, p. 4, <https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pliki/12544900110.pdf> [accessed: 27 April 2022].

⁸ Tabl. 7. Stan i ruch naturalny ludności / Population and Vital Statistics, *Biuletyn Statystyczny*, no. 2, 2022, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/inne-opracowania/informacje-o-sytuacji-spoleszno-gospodarczej/biuletyn-statystyczny-nr-22022,4,123.html> [accessed: 20 April 2022].

It is possible to notice quite similar trends in Russia. After the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, the population dropped from 148.6 million to 146.3 million by the end of the 2000s. In the next ten years, a decline was again discernible, this time to 142.7 million. After decisive pro-demographic steps were taken by the authorities in the first years of the third decade, the population grew moderately to reach 143.7 million in 2014. After the annexation of Crimea, official Russian sources estimated the number of Russians at 146.3 million, and in the following years a further very moderate increase to 146.9 million in 2017 was recorded. However, starting in 2018, Russia's population went down again, reaching only 146.8 million, and since then this trend has deepened. As a result, in 2019, despite the annexation of Crimea, Russia was inhabited by only half a million more people than in 2000.⁹

The situation was for a long time relieved by economic migration from Central Asian countries, but it is difficult to prove to what extent the citizens of Central Asian countries settled permanently in the Russian Federation, and to what extent it was a matter of mere seasonal work. The Covid-19 pandemic and the war initiated by Russia in 2022 significantly contributed to the deepening of the demographic collapse. Understandably, at the time of preparing this text, the war losses in 2022 have not yet been included in official statistics. Another factor that is difficult to study is the population movements such as the forced resettlement of a certain number of Ukrainian civilians to the territory of the Russian Federation as a result of the opening of humanitarian corridors, and the unprecedented flight of a significant number of Russian citizens to Armenia and other neighbouring countries, and then to places that could be treated as more permanent settlement points. It was a kind migration not so much in search of better living conditions as an escape from the land of emerging darkness. The scale of this migration is difficult to estimate unequivocally since leaving Russia was associated with serious financial outlays and the abandonment of the previous lifestyle. The fugitives were therefore rather well off people with significant qualifications; people lost by the Russian state in a difficult moment. The estimations say about dozens of thousands of people, but precise data is missing; and comments on this topic are more of a speculative nature.¹⁰

However, there are some fragmentary comparisons which give a partial picture of the scale of the phenomenon. For example, the Bumaga press portal, citing both press and government sources from the first stage of migration, states that until March 20, 2022, about 14,000 people remained in Turkey three weeks after their departure. Russian citizens, by March 17, in Georgia – 12,600 (previously

⁹ “Численность населения России по данным Росстат и прогноз до 2035 года”, РосИнфоСтат, <https://rosinfostat.ru/chislennost-naseleniya> [accessed: 20 April 2022].

¹⁰ See: M. Gessen, “The Russians Fleeing Putin’s Wartime Crackdown”, *The New Yorker*, 20 March 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/28/the-russians-fleeing-putins-wartime-crackdown> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

around 64,000 Russians had arrived in Georgia, but most of them went in an undisclosed direction), and in Armenia from the beginning of the war, only until March 15, 6,500 new bank accounts were opened, the holders of which are mostly Russian citizens.¹¹

Russia barely kept a constant population due to two factors: a positive migration balance (which Poland could not boast of until the Russian invasion in February 2022, which drastically changed for the better the Polish immigration ratio) and a significant increase in life expectancy (which was also most characteristic for Poland, starting from the 1990s). The declining birth rate was the biggest problem of the Russian demography (just like the Polish one). The number of births in the years 2014–2019 was as in Table 1.

Table 1. Births in Russia (2014–2019)

Year	number of births
2014	1 942 683
2015	1 940 579
2016	1 888 729
2017	1 690 307
2018	1 604 344
2019	1 481 074

Source: “Рождаемость по данным Росстат”, Росинфостат, <https://rosinfostat.ru/rozhdaemost> [accessed: 20 April 2022].

The situation described can best be summarised as general ageing of the society with changes in its ethnic and religious structure towards the Asian population professing Islam. It is worth adding that Poland is only affected by the ageing factor, because the role of immigration that helps to save the labour market is played by Ukrainian refugees and immigrants, who fit much better into the fabric of Polish society than Tajiks or Kyrgyz people in Russia. Long-term speculations can be made about the determinants of this state of affairs, but it is certain that they elude hasty judgments. It is not true that rich, individualistic, lazy and devoid of “certain values” societies inevitably fall into a demographic trap, and poorer, hard-working and collectivist societies are characterised by “healthy” development. If that were the case, France, Britain, Germany or the Czech Republic would be plunging into a demographic collapse. However, this is not the case, as the birth rate is generally positive there, and the biggest problems are reported by the countries of the south

¹¹ Сколько россиян покинули страну с конца февраля и куда они отправились, Бумага, 21.03.2022, <https://paperpaper.ru/papernews/2022/3/21/skolko-rossiyan-pokinuli-stranu-s-kon/> [accessed: 22 March 2022].

and east of the Old Continent. This problem can be seen even more clearly on the example of the most important opponents in the modern world: the United States and China (Table 2 and 3).

Table 2. The United States birth rate (2020–2022)

Year	Birth rate / 1000	Growth rate
2022	12.012	0.090%
2021	12.001	0.090%
2020	11.990	0.090%

Source: Macrotrends, U.S. Birth Rate 1950–2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/birth-rate> [accessed: 11 April 2022].

Table 3. China birth rate (2020–2022)

Year	Birth rate / 1000	Growth rate
2022	10.902	-2.3%
2021	11.159	-2.25%
2020	11.416	-2.20%

Source: Macrotrends, China Birth Rate 1950–2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/birth-rate#:~:text=The%20current%20birth%20rate%20for,a%202.25%25%20decline%20from%202020> [accessed: 11 April 2022].

Expert level

Due to the rising awareness of the growing problem of demographic security, it has become an important topic in the academic discourse both in Poland and in Russia.

There is a significant institutional base in Poland that carries out research in demographic issues. One of them is the Institute of Statistics and Demography, a unit of the Warsaw School of Economics, whose first director was prof. Jerzy Holzer. At the University of Lodz, there is the Department of Demography, specialising in old-age issues; its first head was prof. Edward Rosset. In turn, the University of Economics in Katowice has the Department of Demography and Economic Statistics. A similar unit, the Department of Demography, operates within the Cracow University of Economics. The Department of Population Economics and Demography plays a similar role within the University of Warsaw. The Department of Statistics and Demographics is a successfully operating academic centre at the University of Economics in Poznań. Perhaps the most important role in demographic research is played by the Committee on Demographic Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, whose studies in each year of its activity highlight the important processes that have been taking place within Polish society over the last couple of years.

Clearly, one can speak of a certain institutional development of research on demography in Poland. Nevertheless, for a long time the academic community did not emphasise the relationship between demographic processes and security aspects. The research focused, for example, on mathematical modelling, adapting to new social realities, and other factors. As time passed, however, statements began to appear: if not alarmist, then at least warning. In 2011, Krzysztof Drabik, affiliated with the National Defence College, drew attention to the need to take into account the threats resulting from demographic changes and related phenomena. After all, problems such as the ageing of the society, social welfare, the changing family model, social isolation or migration affect the general perception of the modern model of life and human development. Monitoring and researching these phenomena is, therefore, an important dimension of security research.¹² Another article by Piotr Baranowski, in which the author focuses on specific aspects of demographic security related mainly to the requirements of the market and economic migration from poorer countries, deserves attention. It is right to emphasise that the immigration of low-skilled workers only in the short term solves the problems of employment levels and labour market deficits. The article places some hope in international cooperation; however, on the other hand, some of the proposed solutions, such as the promotion of outsourcing, raise doubts in the light of contemporary threats to disrupt the supply chain of goods and services.¹³

The report prepared in 2014 for the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy on the problem of low fertility in Poland, edited by Irena Kotowska, was also of great importance. In this study, a detailed analysis of the determinants of resignation from the decision to parentage was made, in particular based on the perceptions of Poles characterised by various independent variables. This publication, as in the overwhelming majority of Polish studies, discusses mainly social security as a fertility condition, ignoring the external dimension of state security.¹⁴

The growing awareness of the need to refer to a professional expert community in order to develop an effective policy to counteract demographic threats is evidenced, for example, by the parliamentary project on the establishment of the Polish Institute of Family and Demography. The Institute was devised as a public think tank, i.e. a place for research to diagnose and forecast demographic processes, where specific solutions for pro-family and demographic policy would be put forward. The project assumed that the institution, financed from the state budget,

¹² K. Drabik, "Bezpieczeństwo demograficzne – wybrane zagadnienia", *Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Sztuki Wojennej*, vol. 2011, no. 2, 2011, pp. 457–465.

¹³ P. Baranowski, "Współczesne wyzwania demograficzne jako determinanty bezpieczeństwa", *Teologia i Moralność*, vol. 12, no. 1(21), 2017, pp. 135–150, <https://doi.org/10.14746/tim.2017.21.1.8>.

¹⁴ *Niska dzietność w Polsce w kontekście percepcji Polaków. Diagnoza społeczna 2013*, ed. I.E. Kotowska, Warszawa: Centrum Rozwoju Zasobów Ludzkich, 2014.

would gather, develop and provide public authorities with information on demographic, social and cultural phenomena and processes in Poland, but also – and this was probably the real intention of the originator – with more creative functions: solution building, monitoring and evaluation, as well as formulating conclusions on family and demographic policies.¹⁵

However, the idea of establishing the Institute faced criticism from the Polish academic community. It is politicisation of the proposed institution, whose president would be nominated by the Sejm that was emphasised, as well as the failure to use the existing academic resources available in this area. One of the most critical circles towards the prospective Institute was the Committee on Demographic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, whose members excoriated the entire scheme.¹⁶ There were also defenders of the idea of the Institute who lamented the ideological attack on such an important pro-family initiative.¹⁷

In Russia, the institutional base of demographic research is by no means a blanket; however, taking into account the scale of the country, it seems proportionally slightly more modest than in Poland. Among the various research institutions, special attention should be paid to the Vishnevsky Institute of Demography (VID) as part of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (Институт демографии имени А.Г. Вишневского, Высшая Школа Экономики in February 2007). Its history as a research centre began almost 20 years earlier. VID is considered to be the ideological successor of the Centre for Human Demography and Ecology, established in 1988 within the walls of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the initiative of Anatoly G. Vishnevski (1935–1921), supported by a large group of employees of the Department of Demography of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

There were hopes associated with the establishment of the Centre that the tradition of the Demographic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, closed in 1934, would revive. Initially, the Human Demography and Ecology Centre acted as a branch of the Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the State Labour Committee of the USSR (1988–1991), then – as the Institute of Employment Problems of the Russian Academy

¹⁵ Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Poselski projekt ustawy o Polskim Instytucie Rodziny i Demografii, no. 1767, 4 November 2021, <https://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?id=F75F3BC7800548E3C125878F003D75C3> [accessed: 31 March 2022].

¹⁶ *Opinia Prezydium Komitetu Nauk Demograficznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk o Poselskim projekcie ustawy o Polskim Instytucie Rodziny i Demografii przygotowanym przez Grupę Posłów Klubu Parlamentarnego Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, Komitet Nauk Demograficznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 26 November 2021, https://knd.pan.pl/images/IRiD-Opinia_Prezidium_KND_PAN-sig.pdf [accessed: 21 April 2022].

¹⁷ See: B. Łoziński, “Kogo uwiera Instytut Rodziny?”, *Gość Niedzielny*, no. 11, 2022, pp. 44–45.

of Sciences (RAS) (1991–1993) and the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the RAS (1993–2006).

The Scientific Council “Problems of Demography and Migration of Labour Resources” operates at the RAS. However, among the universities, it is worth paying attention to Lomonosov Moscow State University, where the Department of Population is located at the Faculty of Economics, as well as the Laboratory for Demographic Development Problems, which also devotes didactic efforts to the problems of interest to us.

Of the key Russian publications on the country’s demographic security, it is worth mentioning the 2014 article by Vera Glushkova and Olga Khoreva, which highlights important aspects of security and its threats due to demographic factors. In their conclusions, the authors suggest taking urgent measures to raise the insufficient level of education of the main titular population of Russia’s ethnicity – ethnic Russians, and the very low level of education of the national Muslim contingent, strengthening, along with the religious denominations traditional for Russia, work to create a positive demographic image of the country and developing standards of self-behaviour among Russians; and, which may arouse particular controversy, the combination of professional advancement and high social status in Russia with “obligatory observance of Russian standards of behaviour in the family and society.”¹⁸

More importantly, however, this study shows some characteristic features of the evolution of Russian thinking about society. It departs from perceiving the nation as a set of independent entities, constituting the proper subject of state actions aimed at totalitarian perception. Demographic security is understood as the functioning and development of the population as such in its age, gender and ethnic parameters, its “correlation with the national interests of the state, which consist in ensuring its integrity, independence, sovereignty and maintaining the current geopolitical status.” The concept of “demographic security” can therefore be linked to the concepts of “demographic balance” and “optimal population.”¹⁹ Thus, there has been a noticeable shift towards emphasising the second meaning of demographic security, i.e. a security not so much of citizens, but of states.

Policy: declarative level

Understandably, the awareness of demographic threats had to be reflected in political rhetoric both in terms of political rivalry and specific strategies aimed at removing possible threats faced by the state and society.

¹⁸ В.Г. Глушкова, О.Б. Хорева, “Демографическая безопасность России и ее регионов: проблемы и пути их решения”, *Вестник Финансового университета*, № 3, 2014, с. 25.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

In Poland, in the post-1989 era, most of the attention to demographic issues was paid to the broadly understood right wing, especially in the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) party. Its 2019 election program expresses the conviction that it is impossible to achieve the state's development goals without overcoming the demographic crisis. This, in turn, is caused not only by strictly economic but also cultural factors, by "the lack of self-esteem, own culture [...]"; therefore, the pro-demographic policy "[...] mhas to be multilateral and take into account the cultural and political factor."²⁰

Two years later, the draft *Strategia demograficzna 2040* [Demographic Strategy 2040] was formulated in a similar vein, which was to define the assumptions of the country's demographic policy for two decades. The text of the draft Strategy clearly refers to the issue of security, often drawing attention to the existence of "long-term threats to the Republic of Poland resulting from low fertility [...]"²¹ Actually, however, also in this case, we are talking about threats in terms of social security – such as e.g. major problems of retired people with the depletion of the theoretical replacement group, the threat of a decline in labour supply – rather than geopolitical ones.

The Russian narrative on demographic security has been even more expressive, especially in the Putin era. The president himself has discussed the threats resulting from the extinction of the Russian nation on many occasions. This note was perhaps the most emphatic in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2006, when Putin not only drew attention to the fact that Russia was "losing" 700,000 inhabitants every year, and that it was necessary to combine three elements of demographic policy: lowering mortality, an effective migration policy and an increase in fertility. The details of these ideas are a lot more interesting. The president said: "Now about the most important thing. And what is most important to us? [...] The Ministry of Defence knows what is most important to us. It's really about love ... about women ... about children. It's all about the family. And about the most acute problem of contemporary Russia – demography."²² In this way, he unintentionally made it clear that the demographic issue in fact belonged to the domain of defence, and that demographic problems were, in consequence, part of the problems of the state's military potential.

The much later Putin's speech in January 2020 was echoed in a similar vein. He once again highlighted the fact that demography should be considered a field in which there is no universal, let alone narrow "departmental" solution. Each step, each new law, and each new state scheme should, therefore, be assessed primarily

²⁰ *Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2019*, Warszawa 2019, pp. 16–17.

²¹ *Strategia demograficzna 2040. Projekt*, Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Polityki Demograficznej, Ministerstwo Rodziny i Polityki Społecznej, Warszawa 2021, p. 7.

²² Президент Российской Федерации, Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации, 10.05.2006, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/23819> [accessed: 22 April 2022].

from the point of view of the highest national priority – “saving and multiplying” the Russian people.²³

The importance of the demographic factor was also emphasised by various other high-level officials, including prime ministers. It is enough to mention the declaration of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on the occasion of the inauguration of his government in early 2022, when he unequivocally mentioned the demographic problem as the first one on the list, while outlining the government’s tasks for the coming months.²⁴

Policy: Action Level

The deteriorating situation of Poland’s population was conducive to the implementation of pro-demographic assumptions, especially when they were associated with the implementation of electoral promises. While the demographic alarmist tone came closer to PiS, the first important step was taken by the liberal camp. It was an initiative of the Large Family Card. Generally, it supports families with more children (three or more) through a system of discounts and rebates. Local programs of this type were already in place in the mid 2000s; the first local card was introduced in Wrocław in 2005. The most important, however, is the nationwide Large Family Card, introduced by the government ordinance of May 2014, and then by the relevant act passed a few months later.²⁵ Cardholders are entitled to various discounts, which various entities have committed to honouring. The most important, however, are serious, statutorily guaranteed discounts on rail travel throughout the country and significant (up to 75%) discounts on the passport fee.

The Large Family Card was a step in the right direction, but it was hard to expect it to be an effective solution to the declining fertility problem. Therefore, the new government team, i.e. the alt-right bloc known as the Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right) (which brings together the most important political force – PiS party, the nationalist-populist Solidarna Polska [Solidarity Poland or: Supportive Poland] and the conservative-liberal Polska Razem [Poland Together] group) introduced a much more radical and more attractive solution for the electorate in form of the Family 500 Plus scheme. It provides for a benefit of PLN 500 per month for each

²³ *Idem*, Послание Федеральному Собранию, 15.01.2020, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_342959/ [accessed: 31 March 2022].

²⁴ “Мишустин назвал задачами нового кабинета демографию, повышение уровня жизни и рост экономики”, Интерфакс, 21.01.2020, <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/692121> [accessed: 22 April 2022].

²⁵ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 27 maja 2014 r. w sprawie szczegółowych warunków realizacji rządowego programu dla rodzin wielodzietnych, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] 2014, item 755; Ustawa z dnia 5 grudnia 2014 r. o Karcie Dużej Rodziny, Dz.U. 2014, item 1863.

child up to the age of 18. Initially, the scheme covered only the second and each subsequent child, but over time, the first child was also included.²⁶ The program began operating on 1 April 2015, after which modifications were made to it that were even more favourable for families. A number of other activities were also undertaken to improve the situation of families with children, such as, for example, the Good Start program, which offered an annual school kit for a child in the amount of PLN 300. Understandably, due to the significant increase in inflation during the rule of PiS, the real value of benefits gradually declined.

However, the implementation of these programs did not bring the expected improvement in terms of fertility growth. On the contrary, a glance at the birth rate per 1000 people shows a moderate but noticeable drop in the rate; 1950: 30.7, 1980: 19.5, 2000: 9.9, 2010: 10.7, 2014: 9.7, 2015: 9.6, 2016: 9.9, 2017: 10.5, 2018: 10.10, 2019: 9.8, 2020: 9.3, 2021: 8.7.²⁷ Yet from a purely objective perspective, it should be remembered that this decline does not have to mean that the actions taken are completely ineffective, or even less effective. Indeed, the low values of the birth rate begin in the 1990s, when the generation of the mid-1960s, following the baby boomers of the post-war era, reached the peak of reproductive age (about 25–40 years). It is even easier to understand the drop in the number of births since the end of 2010, when the group of potential parents was dominated by a generation of an unusually expressive low in the 1990s: in 2010, about 695,000 people in the age of 30 lived in Poland, while in 2020 approx. 547,000 only. Thus, the “parental base” shrank by over 22%, while the number of births in the same period dropped by not more than 14%.²⁸

The alarmist tone of the narrative around demographic issues also brought a series of actions in the Russian Federation. Since 1993, a number of legal acts have appeared that regulate the policy in this area in various ways. Presidential decrees have played a special role in this respect.²⁹ It must be admitted, however, that the legisla-

²⁶ Ustawa z dnia 11 lutego 2016 r. o pomocy państwa w wychowywaniu dzieci, Dz.U. 2016, item. 195.

²⁷ Statista, Number of live births in Poland from 1950 to 2021 (per 1,000 population), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/429152/birth-rate-in-poland> [accessed: 27 April 2022].

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Президент Российской Федерации, Указ от 15 ноября 1993 г. № 1908 О Комиссии по вопросам женщин, семьи и демографии при Президенте Российской Федерации, <http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=EXP;n=227012;dst=100101#VjuG PnSGIIyp07sb> [accessed: 22 April 2022]; *idem*, Указ от 9 октября 2007 года № 1351 Об утверждении Концепции демографической политики Российской Федерации на период до 2025 года, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/26299>; *idem*, Указ от 07 мая 2012 г. № 606 О мерах по реализации демографической политики Российской Федерации, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/35270> [accessed: 29 March 2022]; *idem*, Указ от 07 мая 2018 г. № 204 О национальных целях и стратегических задачах развития Российской Федерации на период до 2024 года, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/43027> [accessed: 14 March 2022]; *idem*, Указ О внесении изменений в перечень федеральных округов, утвержденный

tive actions of the state were not limited to propaganda, as they took very specific financial forms. The most expressive element of the demographic policy after 2000 was the Maternity Capital initiative, which generally consisted in providing parents with financial resources to be used during the child's adolescence and development. The main goals of the program are the improvement of living conditions, education for children, the creation of a capital pension for women and the purchase of goods and services intended for the social adaptation and integration of children with disabilities into society.³⁰

The program was launched on 1 January 2007. Payments at that time were made only for the second and subsequent children and amounted to 250,000 roubles per child. However, with each passing year, the value of maternal capital declined. From 2020, the program also helps the first child. In the case of families with a second child from 2020, the maternity capital is additionally increased by 155,550 roubles. For families in which a third child or other children were born after 1 January 2020, the maternity (family) capital was set at 639,431.83 roubles if the right to additional state support measures for families with children did not arise earlier.³¹

The limited nature of the programme's success intensified the work, which resulted in the presidential decree issued in May 2018, which paved the way for a broader and also more blurred National Project by the name of "Demographics." It assumes, *inter alia*, extending the life expectancy of Russians in good health, reducing the death rate of retirees in the country from 38,100 in 2017, up to 36,100 in 2024, an increase in the fertility rate from 1.62 (2017) to 1.7 by 2024, an increase in the number of citizens leading a healthy lifestyle and practicing sports from 36.8% in 2017 to 55% in 2024.³²

The effectiveness of these pro-demographic activities, as in the case of Poland, was also limited. In fact, while the birth rate per 1,000 people increased from 8.9 to 13.0 in 2000–2015, then we note another decline to 12.8 in 2020.³³ This is also illustrated by the absolute numbers (expressed in thousands): while in 2014 the population increased by 38,780 of citizens, since 2017 there has been a downward

указом Президента Российской Федерации от 13 мая 2000 года, № 849, <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201811040002> [accessed: 30 March 2022].

³⁰ Федеральный закон от 29.12.2006 г. № 256-ФЗ О дополнительных мерах государственной поддержки семей, имеющих детей, статья 7, п. 3, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/24820/page/1> [accessed: 30 March 2022].

³¹ „Материнский (семейный) капитал”, Пенсионный фонд Российской Федерации, 15.01.2021, <https://pfr.gov.ru/grazhdanam/msk/> [accessed: 22 April 2022].

³² Правительство Российской Федерации, Паспорт национального проекта «Демография», 24.12.2018, <http://static.government.ru/media/files/Z4OMjDgCaohKWaA0psu6lCekd3hwx2m.pdf> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

³³ Statista, Crude birth rate in Russia from 1840 to 2020, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1038013/crude-birth-rate-russia-1840-2020/> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

trend again, and in 2020 (mainly due to the Covid-19 pandemic) the population of Russia lost 668,730 citizens.³⁴ Therefore, there is a trend similar to the Polish one: after taking actions supporting the demographic development of the state, a relative regression kicks in. However, it is not caused directly by demographic policy errors, but by objective factors, including conditions that are rooted in several past stages of social development.

Conclusions

Summing up the observations of the attitudes of the states towards demographic security in Poland and Russia, two countries that are culturally different and to some extent conflicted, but connected by a common past in the socialist camp, one can list the most important determinants of perceiving the demographic situation of a state as a factor influencing its security. It is, first of all, the creation and academic activity of expert centres focused on various aspects of demographic security. Second, it is clear to see a significant increase in the interest in the political world and the emergence of intense and engaged narratives on demographic security. Third, there has been some legislative effort and, more importantly, a rather consistent implementation of demographic policies over a longer period of time, relying mostly on money transfers.

On the other hand, despite this multilateral commitment, it does not ultimately bring the desired results in terms of an increase in the population or at least such an increase in fertility as to contain a far-reaching demographic crisis. This is because neither the radical democratisation and liberalisation of the state (in the case of Poland), nor the increase in political stability, nor, finally, the economic growth translating in real terms into the wealth of the vast majority of citizens, significantly translated into an improvement in demographic indicators, except for an increase in life expectancy in both countries.

The determinants of this failure do not seem to be easy to define, which is why we are most likely dealing with a complex set of heterogeneous factors. Among the various possible options, it is worth noting, first of all, the lack of connection between ideology resulting in demographic policies and the individual interests of the citizen. In other words, demographic policies offer help related to bringing up children, but they do not give a sense of long-term security, that is, one that will not cease after the children reach the age of majority. Secondly, the lack of faith in the personal success of citizens and the success of the state triggered by a process probably perceived as inevitable may also be significant.

³⁴ *Idem*, Natural population increase in Russia from 1990 to 2020, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010200/natural-increase-in-russian-population/> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

In other words, it cannot be ruled out that we are dealing with a subconscious fear of achieving a point of no return. It is not only about the feeling of negligible agency or the lack of faith in the efficiency of the state. In a democratic situation, the point is not only that, after the demographic crisis, the number of children is too small to ensure sustainable development, a return to normalcy. In fact, the problem lies in the imbalance between the working-age community and older voters who are above this limit. In some countries, such as Japan, Korea or Italy, the percentage of elderly people is so significant today that it can cause the phenomenon of a kind of black hole, which absorbs objects with increasing speed as they approach the gravitational centre and gain mass by it. A significant percentage of retirees makes it necessary to provide them with a living that would be relatively acceptable to them. If this does not happen, it can be expected with a high degree of probability that the political system will be input in the form of demands for a policy more favourable to the older generation. However, because it is expensive, the state is forced to increasingly cut back on spending on behalf of the rest of society.³⁵ This younger and working part of it, due to the fact that it is too small in relation to the older generation, may interpret the existing conditions as unacceptable in the long run. Understanding the impossibility of democratic inhibition of a policy oriented mainly at voters from the group of retired people, the younger part of society is inclined to emigrate.³⁶ This causes increasing financial problems of the state, and a rapid deepening of the demographic crisis. Thus, a state determined to maintain a democratic political system must sacrifice social development for it, which is becoming a de facto regression aimed at total marginalisation of the state.

Although such a scenario is not yet discussed in Poland or in Russia, the model of politics in many areas seems to bear the features of actions oriented towards a conservative citizen, and at the same time not necessarily focused on building a personal, perspective and long-term individual existence. Finally, major differences in the processes taking place in both countries ought to be highlighted as a key point of reference for prospective studies: the Polish political narrative and the declared set of goals focus more on the social sphere, while Russian rhetoric and politics are definitely more focused on functionality, including, in particular, security, of the state, also in the military sense.

³⁵ See: S. Harper, "Economic and social implications of aging societies", *Science*, vol. 346, no. 6209, pp. 587–591.

³⁶ Comp. J. Rosłon-Żmuda, "Bezpieczeństwo społeczno-ekonomiczne Polski z perspektywy czynnika demograficznego", *Przegląd Strategiczny*, no. 1, 2013, p. 183, <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2013.1.12>.

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Demography as a security strategy factor in Poland and the Russian Federation

Abstract

The study focuses on the major perceptions of demographic security in Poland and Russia, regarded as an aspect of both social and state security. Demographics as a political topic has been increasingly more often exploited as a key theme in official narratives and practical policies. The similarities in the demographic dynamics in both countries, as well as conditional failures of demographic policies, may not necessarily result from evident mistakes, but are probably a result of a complex set of social factors, including the regularities of demographic development in the past. It is quite clear, however, that the Polish political narratives and declared set of state objectives concentrate rather on the social sphere, whereas the Russian rhetoric and policy are clearly more state oriented.

Key words: Russia, Poland, security, demography, demographics



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A new “gathering of Russian lands”: Russia’s return to imperialism

Introduction

Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Russia has considered itself one of the key decision makers of world politics, whose voice should be heard and counted by other great actors. The methods that were to convince Russia’s smaller and larger partners in the international arena were to be: a vast territory that epitomises an empire, victorious war campaigns, an active attitude of the Russian state’s leaders to shaping the balance of power at the global level, and active involvement in numerous planned international security systems. The experiences in this area, starting from the nineteenth century, have proved the effectiveness of the assumptions of Russian foreign policy.

By adopting a pro-European vector in foreign policy, Russian decision-makers automatically made efforts to become part of Western civilisation from the very beginning. Some of the concepts of the Russian balance of power that have been developed over the centuries have directly aimed at building a system in which Russia would be one of the most important actors. At the roots of this conviction was the paradigm of the European character of the “Russian Empire.” Doctrines pointing to the Eastern-Asian vector were in opposition to it. Regardless of the adopted optics, there was one goal, i.e. development and duration, followed by the return to the idea of an empire of Russia.

This article is devoted to the resurrection of the idea of imperial Russia using all the strategies, tactics, methods and instruments that will bring the Russian Federation closer to its goal. Starting from the involvement in building the security system at the international level, through the construction of the European “Russian Empire,” to the practical application of the ancient Roman strategy *divide et impera*, they fully correspond to the assumptions of contemporary Russia’s return to imperial politics. In this study an attempt has been made, at least in part, to provide legitimate answers to the questions that are troubling scholars, such as e.g. What will the Kremlin’s tactic of “gathering Russian land” be used over 30 years from now? What will its assumptions be? Where will it find the ideological foundation for its implementation? What dimension will it take in practice?

The European system of international security and Russia

Following in the footsteps of the thoughts of seventeenth century rulers from Western Europe regarding the consolidation of the international order won in wars, one needs to recall a few examples of such actions. The first attempt to balance forces in the matter of international security was the Treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which in the history of modern Europe became an order that functioned until the Napoleonic wars. It was then, for the first time in modern history, in the international forum that the rules of the security system were developed with the acceptance of the diversity of states.

The second opportunity to reconstruct international relations along with the developed standards of collective security was related to the attempt to restore the *status quo ante* after the defeat of Napoleon I Bonaparte. This task was undertaken with the beginning of the Congress of Vienna in 1814. As a result of the deliberations of this “dancing congress,” which was held from 1814 to 1815, its participants agreed on the issue of security and signed a document that went down in history under the name of the Holy Covenant (1815). Although initially the authors of this agreement were three countries – Russia, Austria, and Prussia – eventually all European countries were included in the ranks of its members, without the Papal States, the United States, Turkey, and Great Britain.

It would seem then that the agreement concluded at that time on the generally accepted principle of world equilibrium would survive for many years, becoming the foundation for the emerging new reality. However, it quickly turned out that it would be impossible. For not only the countries and nations that once tied their fortunes with Napoleonic France from the very beginning questioned the order established by the Holy Covenant. In the ranks of successive states and nations there were also those that could not imagine a return to absolutist system solutions. Not only were the position of ruling houses questioned, demands were made for the adoption

of a constitution that on the one hand would limit the power of monarchs, but also empower other social groups, allowing them to participate in state management processes. As a result of changes in the social structure and economic transformations, the postulates relating to the issue of political rights gained more and more supporters, regardless of the state or society. The dichotomy of the struggle between liberalism and conservatism triggered democratisation processes that turned out to be unstoppable.

On the other hand, the principles of the Holy Covenant relating to the issue of preventing the emergence of a hegemon among the signatory states, began to be challenged by the signatories of the agreement themselves. Unable to achieve territorial advantage in the area of the old continent, the competition for colonies began. Taking advantage of the benefits of the industrial revolution, the economies of individual countries began to be shifted onto new tracks, seeing in the development of capitalist relations primarily as an opportunity for internal modernisation of the state. The economic development was supported by activities for the development of heavy industry, including metallurgy, which would stimulate the dynamic development of the defence industry. The militarisation of the economy thus became a fact.

The determinants that favoured the militarisation of the policies of individual countries were the wars fought, so far local in nature, but as a consequence changing the balance of power both in Europe and in the world. The arms race was started to be won by those countries that had adequate raw material, human, financial and armaments resources; they initiated changes in the internal model of the functioning of society quite quickly. The events that undermined the principles of the Holy Alliance in the field of international relations turned out to be: the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Prussian-Austrian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), and the establishment of the German Empire – Second Reich (1871). However, the final blow to this alliance was the Great War (1914–1918), which, abolishing the old order, became the de facto source of a new armed conflict, also on a global scale.

The last attempt at arranging international relations, guaranteeing the maintenance of peace, was to be the Versailles-Washington Treaty (1919–1922), as a result of which not only did there be any real development of effective mechanisms for the development of international security rules. It became the nucleus of further feuds, but this time involving not only the so-called the big five, as the five powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and the United States) were called, which were to decide the fate of these smaller countries as well.¹ Their group was supplemented by all those states whose needs, expectations and ambitions were not met by the provisions of the Paris Conference in 1919, and later by the Washington Agree-

¹ M. Lenz, *Die großen Mächte: Ein Rückblick auf unser Jahrhundert*, Berlin: Pactel, 1900.

ments. The dominant tendencies of the interwar period in the field of international relations turned out to be revisionism and the policy of appeasement, which found food for the degree of influence in the form of the progressive crisis of representative democracy and the Great Economic Crisis at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. The actions taken by members of the organisation established to guard peace – the League of Nations – to develop collective security mechanisms turned out to be purely tactical ploys, which were to divert attention from the progressive process of militarisation of social, economic and political life in each country.

After the end of the hostilities brought by World War II (1939–1945), instead of concluding a global agreement on international security, the world was divided into two parts. It became possible as a result of the activity of the members of the Great Antifascist Coalition, with the deciding votes being three countries: the US, Britain and, above all, the USSR. It is as a consequence of subsequent conferences, the so-called “Big Three” agreed upon the rules that were to apply after the end of hostilities on all the fronts. Also in this case, without taking into account the opinions of other countries and nations, the post-war world was divided into spheres of influence, according to the own concept launched by the Big Three leaders.

Soon after the defeat of the Axis countries and their allies, the Yalta-Potsdam Agreement entered into force. For the post-war world, however, it did not mean peace, but another hard struggle; this time, two victorious powers – the United States and the USSR – competed for the title of “hegemon.” While the former arranged the world according to itself, taking into account the developed political and legal order deriving from the sources of democracy and humanism and guaranteeing the successful development of states and societies dependent on him, the latter implemented a policy of sovietisation towards the territories subordinated to it, striving to establish the entire area of *Pax Sovietica*. Speaking in the American city of Fulton on March 5, 1946, former British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the international order that emerged after World War II in the following way: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.”² This balance of power shaped the world and Europe for many years, because it was only in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, that the Iron Curtain ceased to divide the world.

² W. Churchill, *Sinews of Peace*, speeches delivered at 5 March 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, National Churchill Museum, <https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html> [accessed: 22 May 2022].

European "Russian Empire"

The Russian state actively participated in all the previously mentioned activities aimed at developing a new security system at the international level, starting from the Third Northern War (1700–1721). Beginning with the rule of Peter I the Great, Russia's leaders diligently implemented the assumptions of foreign policy in such a way that it would become one of the decision-makers regarding the balance of power in the forum, first of Europe, and then of the world.

After the end of the process known in historiography as the "gathering of Ruthenian land" by the Moscow tsars (Ivan III the Stern, Vasil III and Ivan IV the Terrible) around 1550, the principle was established according to which the Grand Duke of Moscow, assuming the title of "Tsar of All Russia" he made himself the self-lord of all the united Russian land. When Constantinople was conquered by the Turks in 1453, referring to the common heritage with the Byzantine Empire, the Russian tsars named themselves as Basileus' heirs, and Russia – as the continuator of the political existence and centre of religious life of Byzantium orthodoxy. Complementing this belief was the fact that it remained one and only independent Orthodox country in the world. In these circumstances, alongside the idea of "Holy Russia," the concept of Moscow, the Third Rome was born; according to it, the church of the first ancient Rome fell as a result of heresy, the second Rome – Constantinople – as a result of a betrayal of the true faith, the third Rome, which is Moscow, stands and lasts, and the fourth will be no more.³ As noted by Krakow researcher Dymitr Romanowski, this is how a concept arose not so much of a political nature as of a religious and historiosophical one. This results in a close relationship between the Church and the reality of the state, because "[...] the ruler and all powers are responsible for the Christian world [...],"⁴ whose duty is to ensure the freedom of its functioning. Such power, in the opinion of the creator of the concept, the monk Philotheus, can be described as just. Under these circumstances, what the nascent Russian state took as its foundation was the conviction that the Moscow Church remained faithful and orthodox, and that Moscow became the last Christian empire as "the Roman Empire is indestructible because the Lord was enrolled in the Roman land"⁵ became the foundation of the nascent Russian state. Well, "the declaration of Russia as the Third Rome was the form by which the young Russian state announced its allegiance to the first centuries of Christianity and general councils, and tried to make itself aware of its place in world history."⁶ As Grzegorz

³ J.H. Billington, *Ikona i topór. Historia kultury rosyjskiej*, transl. J. Hunia, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, [cop. 2008], p. 54.

⁴ D. Romanowski, *Trzeci Rzym. Rozwój rosyjskiej idei imperialnej*, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2013, p. 20.

⁵ *Послания старца Филофея*, с. 301 quoted after: *ibidem*, p. 21.

⁶ D. Romanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Pełczyński notes, in these very circumstances Russia was endowed by God himself with unique qualities. This was because she was entrusted with extraordinary tasks to fulfil. Throughout history, they have been described in various ways, but they have always been of considerable importance and concerned the happiness of not only the Russian people, but also other countries, even all people on earth.⁷

Although this concept, derived from the heritage of the Middle Ages, aimed at emphasising the rightness of the Orthodox faith and never became an official political doctrine of the Russian state, in practice it created an ideological foundation for Russian foreign policy. This was possible thanks to the enormous popularity of the concept of Moscow III Rome, which it enjoyed especially at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Anticipating the recognition of the Russian state as the heir of the Eastern Empire, the uniqueness of Moscow was thus emphasised. It happened both in the field of religious and political power. Neither in the first case nor in the second was the grievances of the tsars met with approval from the outside world. As the Krakow researcher Joachim Diec sums up this period, “what strikes the idea of Moscow – the Third Rome [...] is its similarity to perceiving the capital as a peculiar centre of the world, *axis mundi*, through the conviction of its own uniqueness, exceptionality. At the same time, however, this belief is devoid of inner certainty, no lasting peace [...]. The outside world is perceived as a threat, but also as an environment that needs to be convinced of its own superiority. Hence, a strictly monocentric doctrine constantly struggles with the awareness of the lack of recognition on the part of the international environment.”⁸

Entering the seventeenth century, the Russian tsarist empire in international relations based on three assumptions which, as practice has shown, turned out to be exceptionally long-lasting. The first was the syndrome of the “abandoned flock.” It consisted in associating the breakdown of a strong central government with various problems on the international scene. In the light of the trauma of the Time of Troubles, the departure from autocratic leadership is associated with the threat of weakening the state and, consequently, of the invasion of foreign powers. The second element shaping relations with other countries was the “Stranger” syndrome, i.e. the conviction that the state would inevitably turn out to be unsuccessful in the event of submission to external political influences. The third syndrome of the “dangerous West,” on the other hand, was based on a historical tradition referring to Alexander Nevsky’s experience of fighting against the Order of the Knights of the

⁷ G. Pełczyński, “Kilka uwag na temat specyfiki religijnej Rosji, *Studia Historica Gedanensia*, vol. VII, 2016, pp. 205–206, <https://doi.org/10.4467/23916001HG.16.010.6395>.

⁸ J. Diec, *Geostrategiczny wybór Rosji u zarania trzeciego tysiącleci*, vol. 1: “Doktryna rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej. Partnerzy najbliżsi i najdalsi”, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, [cop. 2015], pp. 37–38, <https://doi.org/10.4467/K9306.33/e/15.15.3906>.

Sword, personifying the West.⁹ All these syndromes have become a permanent feature of the Russian state's foreign policy strategies, regardless of the changing international conditions.

The decision of the Ruling Senate of 1721 to recognise Tsar Peter I Romanov as the "All-Russian Emperor" should be considered a symbolic beginning of the transformation of the Russian tsarist empire.¹⁰ The consequence was the recognition of the Russian state as an empire. Significantly, Peter accepted the title as soon as he achieved a new, imperial position for himself and his state in Europe – after the conclusion of the peace in Nystad on September 10, 1721, which ended the Third Northern War, establishing de facto Russia's supremacy over the eastern half of the continent. In response to Romanov's adoption of the title of emperor, successively, although with a certain degree of restraint, individual states recognised his title: the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Prussia (1721), Sweden (1723), the Ottoman Empire (1739), Great Britain (1742), France and Spain (1745). The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth recognised the imperial title only in 1764 on the basis of the provisions of the Convocation Sejm and the ratification of the Declaration of Russian Ministers.¹¹ In this way, the international recognition of the titles of Russia's emperors permanently introduced the Russian state into the game of great power, which did not intend to ever give up this privilege.

The Russian Empire, which functioned in the years 1721–1917, systematically enlarged its territory, mainly through constantly conducted wars. Choosing the directions of external policy – European, Eastern–Asian, the tsars who ruled the empire joined the state to new territories: Abkhazia, Alaska, the Nadamur region, Armenia, Ashgabat, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, Georgia, Bukhara, the Caucasus, Crimea, Dagestan, Finland, Poland, and the Kars region, Khabarovsk, Khiva, Merv, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Ossetia, Sakhalin, Kuryle, Samarkand, Ussuri, Vladivostok. The area was inhabited by 34 ethnic groups.¹²

As Piotr Eberhardt rightly points out, the borders of the Russian state have been unstable over the years. "The Grand Duchy of Moscow around 1500 had a population of 2,231.2 thousand km². After one hundred years (1600), the territory of the state was 8,924.8 thousand km², in 1700 – 15,060.0 thousand km². At the time

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

¹⁰ W.A. Serczyk, *Piotr I Wielki*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1977, p. 217.

¹¹ Ratyfikacja deklaracji Ministrów Rosyjskich względem tytułu: Caley Rossyi Imperatorowy, [in:] *Volumina Legum. Przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. Pijarów w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782 wydanego*, vol. 7: "Ab an. 1764 ad an. 1768", Petersburg: J. Ohryzko, 1860, pp. 95–96, <https://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/show-content/publication/edition/65269?id=65269> [accessed: 23 May 2022].

¹² J. Paxton, *Imperial Russia: A Reference Handbook*, Houndmills, Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 144–148, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230598720>.

of the death of Peter I (1725), Russia numbered 15,173.6 thousand km². At the time of the death of successive rulers, the Russian Empire grew larger and larger. At the end of the reign of Empress Anna (1740) – 16,220.9 thousand km², Elizabeth (1761) – 16,427.0 thousand km², Catherine II (1796) – 16,837.7 thousand km², Aleksandra I (1825) – 18,714.1 thousand km², Nicholas I (1855) – 20,690.9 thousand km², Alexander II (1881) – 21,436.0 thousand km².¹³ It reached its peak of power in terms of territorial range in the years 1885–1895: it had 23.7 million km² and was the third largest country in human history, after the British Empire and the Mongol Empire.¹⁴

An important issue was to base the foreign policy of the Russian Empire on solid ideological foundations, especially in the conditions of the progressive Europeanisation of the state and society. In addition to the previously mentioned one of the most fundamental for the following centuries of the existence of the Moscow state on the international scene – the theory of Moscow III Rome and the concept of Holy Russia, alive especially in the religious sphere, other strategies have emerged. They were in line not only with the established system of the state's system – self-tenure, but above all constituted the ideological justification for Russia's role as an empire. Acting in a number of other countries with the same status, over time, she became one of the main decision-makers in matters of the balance of power on the international forum, especially in the area of initiating the construction of international security.

Ideological concepts of the duration of the “Russian Empire”

Alongside the dichotomous nature of the Occidental strategy of the policy of the Russian Empire (fear of Russia, equal partner), starting with the rule of Peter I the Great, other concepts emerged that gave, if not the direction of Russia's foreign policy, at least an ideological justification for the continuity of the empire itself. Table 1 offers an outline of these paradigms.

By arranging the issues justifying the development of the “Russian Empire” over the centuries, the doctrines cited above can be characterised by the following arguments.¹⁵

¹³ P. Eberhardt, “Zmiany podziałów administracyjnych w Cesarstwie Rosyjskim, w Związku Sowieckim oraz w Federacji Rosyjskiej”, *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, vol. XLV, 2010, p. 239, note 1, http://rcin.org.pl/Content/45985/WA303_56295_A453-SzDR-R-45_Eberhardt.pdf [accessed: 23 May 2022].

¹⁴ P. Turchin, J.M. Adams, T.D. Hall, “East-West Orientation of Historical Empires”, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, pp. 222–225.

¹⁵ J. Diec, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–63.

Table 1. Ideological concepts of the duration of the Russian Empire

Name of doctrine	Author	Key characteristics
Eastern Empire	Fyodor Tiutchev (1803–1873)	Assumptions: "a) conviction of the messianic vision of Russia, and thus the ideologization of international relations; b) the necessity to fight the international Revolution, the domain of which have become the states of the European West; c) imperialism, justified by a divine mission, leading to a continuous increase in the territory of the state." (p. 42)
Pan-Slavism	Juraj Križanić (1618–1683); Nikolai Danilewski (1822–1885); Ivan Aksakov (1823–1886); Yuri Samarin (1819–1876)	Assumptions: "a) condescension – awareness of the right of Russians to speak out about the interests of other Slavic nations and the obligation to defend them; b) the belief that the rest of the world is alien and even hostile (which is clearly visible in the politics of Western countries) towards the Slavs, and Russia in particular; c) obliging all Slavs to unity; d) the right to judge and bring back on the right track those Slavic communities whose international behaviour does not fit in with the principle of Slavic solidarity." (p. 46)
Pan-Asianism	Esper Uchtomski (1861–1921)	Assumptions: "a) belief in a greater kinship of the Russian spirit with the peoples of Asia than with the West; b) the belief in the non-colonial nature of Russian expansion; c) the necessity to constantly expand the empire's geographical space as a condition for its survival (this time the expansion in the Far East variant is presented)." (p. 49)
World Revolution vs. export of the revolution from one country	Lev Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev vs. Joseph Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin	Assumptions: a) the universal triumph of communism in the world; b) an example of geopolitical monism; c) their geostrategies were different, the goal was the same; d) atheistic messianism. (pp. 53–55)
Eurasianism	Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890–1938), Piotr Sawicki (1895–1968); Lev Gumilev (1912–1992); Alexander Panarin (1940–2003); Aleksandr Dugin (1962–)	Assumptions: "a) belief in the natural, cosmically conditioned multipolarity of the international world; b) conviction about the necessity of a global restraint of the West as an aggressive and law-imposing civilisation; c) positioning Russia as an important Eurasian power pole between the European West and the East Asian world." (p. 59)

Name of doctrine	Author	Key characteristics
Brezhnev doctrine	Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982)	Assumptions: “[...] despite the international subjectivity, the states of the socialist community are entities of „limited sovereignty”, so the USSR has the right to react by force in the event of a threat to socialism in one of the barracks of the eastern camp.” (p. 60)

Source: based on: J. Diec, *Geostrategiczny wybór Rosji u zarania trzeciego tysiąclecia*, vol. 1: “Doktryna rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej. Partnerzy najbliżsi i najdalsi”, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, [cop. 2015], pp. 41–63, <https://doi.org/10.4467/K9306.33/c/15.15.3906>.

First, according to the doctrine of the Eastern Empire, there are three concepts of building an empire: Russia-1, the empire within its current borders; Russia-2, enlarged mainly by the countries of Eastern and Central Europe; Russia-3, “encompassing almost the entire Eurasian continent, excluding China, and first and foremost, the Mediterranean Sea with domestic Europe (above All with Austria and Germany).”¹⁶

Second, according to Danilewski’s Pan-Slavic concept, “it is in the interest of Russia to create the All-Slavic Union, i.e. a federation of independent states grouping all the ‘Slavic nations’, perhaps with the exception of Poles, who were most troublesome.”¹⁷ The capital of the Union was to be located in Constantinople, the liberated capital of the Orthodox Church. The project assumed the inclusion in the federation, apart from Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, as well as Greeks, Romanians and Hungarians, who would be subordinated to the Slavic element. The solution to the Polish issue was seen in the inclusion of Poles into the federation: in this way they would gain independence and protection against being absorbed by the German element, and thus would finally cease to threaten Russia. Ivan Aksakov, on the other hand, perceived the Polish element as Catholic, and thus as one that belonged to a foreign civilisation, and constituted the focus of influences that diverged from the interests of Russia and the Slavic cause. Therefore, he proposed to strive for the decatholicisation of Poles through Polish-language services in churches. He also wanted Poles to be forced beyond the Bug River in order to deprive the Belarusian and Ukrainian population of the influence of the Polish nobility.¹⁸ The third theorist referring to the analysis of the functionality of the Russian empire was Yuri Samarin, who considered it

¹⁶ В.А. Цымбурский, “Тютчев как геополитик”, *Общественные Науки и Современность*, № 6, 1995, с. 93.

¹⁷ Н.Я. Данилевский, *Россия и Европа. Взгляд на культурные и политические отношения славянского мира к германо-романскому*, Санкт-Петербург: Издательство С.-Петербургского университета, Издательство «Глаголь», 1995, с. 331.

¹⁸ И.С. Аксаков, Полное собрание сочинений, [in:] *idem*, т. 3: “Польский вопрос и западно-русское дело. Еврейский вопрос. 1860–1886. Статьи из «Дня», «Москвы», «Москвича» и «Руси»”, Москва: Типография М.Г. Волчанинова, 1886, с. 400.

necessary to free the Ruthenian people from both cultural influences and exploitation by the Polish elite, which he blamed for the distortion of the national character of the population of Western Ukrainian territories.¹⁹

Third, for the doctrinaires of the concept of pan-Asianism, "Asia has always been spiritually close to Russia, and Russia should by no means stray from its historical path."²⁰ There is a connection between the Russian and Asian understanding of absolute monarchy as a condition for maintaining unity in the situation of ruling over vast areas. Further expansion of Russia's borders is essential. Only in this way can Russia fulfil its vocation and oppose Western states, which would sooner or later strangle it through their superiority. The fate of Russia and its development are tied to Asia, and from there always came historical impulses for the development of the state.²¹

Also, the issues of building and functioning of the empire were perceived quite differently after the Bolsheviks took power. Two concepts began to compete with each other: the export of the revolution and its final victory around the globe, the creator and ardent promoter of which was Lev Trotsky vs. the conviction held by Joseph Stalin that in conditions of necessity one should reconcile with building socialism in a single state.

According to Trotsky, "socialism built in only one state would succumb to the onslaught of the world bourgeoisie. A successful revolution is a work completed, a permanent revolution,²² both qualitatively and spatially. The bourgeois revolution has to be followed by the proletarian revolution, only the victory of the proletariat will lead the masses to full socialism. In the international dimension – a revolution in one place must lead to a world revolution."²³ He did not believe in the possibility of a lasting victory for socialism in the world by exporting it from one country.

In Stalin's opinion, however, the delaying of the revolution on a global scale should not destroy the idea of creating the Soviet state. The consistently conducted foreign policy was to initiate and support the revolutionary process in other countries thanks to the capabilities of the USSR. Thus, building socialism in one state was not so much an end in itself as a means to an end.²⁴ He was inclined to build socialism in one country and to take control of other territories (preferably armed).

¹⁹ H. Głębocki, *Kresy imperium. Szkice i materiały do dziejów polityki Rosji wobec jej peryferii (XVIII–XXI wiek)*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2006, p. 159.

²⁰ Э.Э. Ухтомский, *К событиям в Китае. Об отношениях Запада и России к Востоку*, Санкт-Петербург: Паровая скоропечатня «Восток», 1900, с. V.

²¹ *Ibidem*, с. 85–87.

²² Л.Д. Троцкий, *Перманентная революция (Азбука революционера)*, Москва: Издательство АСТ, 2005, с. 432.

²³ *Idem*, *История русской революции*, т. 2, Москва: Терра, 1997, с. 338.

²⁴ И.В. Сталин, VII расширенный пленум ИККИ, [in:] *idem*, *Сочинения*, т. 9: "Декабрь 1926 – июль 1927", Москва: ОГИЗ, 1948, с. 22.

As Joachim Diec notes in the summary of these two positions, “the defeat of the USSR in world rivalry and the mass departure of societies from Marxist ideas are perfect proof that despite the apparent realism of the Stalinist doctrine of mastering the world and imposing real socialism on it, Trotsky turned out to be gloomy, but honest. a prophet of the fate of the revolution. The so-called ‘workers’ state ultimately lost in the confrontation with world capitalism, and the attempt to dominate the great camp of states ended in a disaster of a scale Russia had never experienced in its history. Nevertheless, in terms of historical consciousness, it was Stalinism that became a model of combining strong leadership and great importance on the international arena.”²⁵

The doctrine of Eurasianism, born in exile in the second decade of the twentieth century, took a completely different character at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, becoming one of the main determinants of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Referring to the overall views of its creators and supporters, it can undoubtedly be considered in the contemporary world as a discourse related to the attempt to restore the entire post-Soviet space.²⁶

The last of the doctrines labelled as “the doctrines of limited sovereignty” was devised in the second half of the twentieth century in the conditions of the process of international recognition of the balance of power in the era of Cold War rivalry. On the one hand, it brought the archetype of an inviolable sphere of influence, and on the other, the idea of international stabilisation, the division of the world into mutually controlling subsystems. At the same time, the existence of a growing influence of non-aligned states that did not fit into the bipolar system was recognised. This pact survived until the paradigms of the foreign policy of the two rival powers changed. The strategy of the USSR, based on the Brezhnev doctrine, was opposed by elected President of the United States in 1981, Ronald Reagan, who objected to the doctrine of repelling Soviet influence in all parts of the world. He used all the available instruments of influence, ranging from financial and material support, through armaments and the arms race, to the sphere of the so-called ending with soft power (mass culture). As a result, the Soviet Union found itself in a situation, as if repeated from the 1920s, when it was treated by the democratic world as a pariah. He was denied the right to be an equal partner on the international forum. The situation began to change only when Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the country in 1985.

²⁵ J. Diec, *op. cit.*, p. 54–55.

²⁶ А. Панарин, “Евразийство. За и против, вчера и сегодня (материалы «круглого стола»)”, *Вопросы Философии*, № 6, 1995, с. 11.

Divide et impera?

The basis for the revision of the current strategy of arranging a new balance of international forces was provided by the experience in the institutionalisation of international security gained over the centuries; it has always been the result of a state of war or peace between individual states, especially superpowers. Starting from the classical system of equilibrium (1648–1789), through the European concert of powers (1815–1914) and attempts to create a collective security system (1919–1939), to the evolution of the bipolar system (1945–1989), we witnessed a way of modelling the shape and nature of cooperation international in selected epochs.²⁷ Each time, the subjects of reflection were the following issues: security on a global scale and the division of spheres of influence among the most important actors of world politics.

With the collapse of the bipolar system, it seemed that the commonly binding elements of the collective security system developed over the course of the twentieth century would be a constant determinant in shaping international relations. Prohibition of the use of armed force between members, peaceful settlement of disputes, application of general principles of international relations, application of sanctions against the aggressor and making decisions on their use by appointed bodies, control and limitation of armaments, presenting the system in the form of an international organisation established on the basis of a treaty or agreement were to be treated as the foundations of a functioning multipolar system.²⁸ The unfulfilled Soviet project of arranging mutual relations on the international forum in the new conditions was the concept of the "Common European House," in which its creator, Mikhail Gorbachev, postulated a peaceful coexistence of states "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," regardless of the political and systemic or economic solutions in force in them.²⁹

However, the practice turned out to be different. From the very beginning, the multipolar system with the dominant position of one of the superpowers – the United States – was subject to criticism. These opinions were also shared by the newly established Russian state, which, in both internal and external politics, returned to the *divide et impera* strategy proven in recent years. This old Roman doctrine of "divide and rule" is also true today. Its essence comes down to seizing

²⁷ H. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja*, transl. S. Głąbiński, G. Woźniak, I. Zych, Warszawa: Philip Wilson, [cop. 1996].

²⁸ E. Cziomer, Istota i instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, [in:] *Zagrożenia i instytucje bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego*, ed. *idem*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2016, pp. 13–27; I. Popiuk-Rysińska, *Ewolucja systemu zbiorowego bezpieczeństwa Narodów Zjednoczonych po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2013, pp. 32–33.

²⁹ A. Jach, *Rosja 1991–1993. Walka o nowy kształt ustrojowy państwa*, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2011, pp. 45–46.

and consolidating power using the tactic of conflict management: when you need to control any group of people the easiest way is, at the beginning, under any pretext, to divide them, to challenge them. Later, act as a mediator and thus win over the quarrelling groups without necessarily eliminating the animosities that divide them. In the case of the Russian Federation, from the very beginning (1991), it acted as an arbiter and guarantor of peace agreements, which in turn meant that the former metropolis retained its dominance. As French researcher Alain Besançon sums up Russia's return to this strategy, the aim of the application is to restore Russian domination over an area which, in the opinion of its decision makers, belongs to the exclusive sphere of influence.³⁰ Until the leaders of the rest of the world understand this, they will pursue policies that will only benefit Russia itself.

In this case, the justification of its application is important: a growing sense of threat from the outside world. In these circumstances, one does not talk about aggression, but about preventive actions – to insure a potential attack. This “gathering of Russian land,” as opposed to the medieval concept of “gathering Ruthenian land,” is not intended solely to include neighbouring countries into the Russian state, but to make them dependent. This is in line with the tactic of vassalisation, which completely exhausts the assumptions of imperial policy towards these states.

On the other hand, the second method of consolidating Russian influence in the Eurasian area is tactics applied to countries and areas which, firstly, are of strategic importance for the Russian Federation (including geographic location, access to raw materials) and, secondly, have been considered hostile countries towards Russia. Its essence boils down to two types of actions: dividing the seized territory and then leading, through a quasi-democratic election of the inhabitants of a given area, to first proclaim sovereignty, then independence, and, consequently, final incorporation into the Russian state. This policy is not a novelty in the reality of building and consolidating the gains of the Russian empire, regardless of its political nature. Such actions were exemplified in the referenda of 1939, as a result of which the western part of Belarus and the western part of Ukraine, which were part of the Second Polish Republic, officially became part of the Soviet Union. Poland's fate was soon shared by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which, after the “voluntary” election of citizens of these countries, became part of the red empire. In the modern world, also over 30 years, we can find countries that have fallen victim to this tactic. In 1993, this fate hit Georgia, from which Abkhazia and South Ossetia were separated. The second example is Ukraine, where as a result of the Russian government's activity, Crimea was separated from it, and the two eastern provinces of Lugansk

³⁰ A. Rybińska, “Alain Besançon: ‘Tu nie chodzi o Krym. Tu chodzi o rosyjską dominację. Putin sprawdza jak daleko może się posunąć’ [NASZ WYWIAD]”, wPolityce.pl, 1 March 2014, <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/186863-alain-besancon-tu-nie-chodzi-o-krym-tu-chodzi-o-rosyjska-dominacje-putin-sprawdza-jak-daleko-moze-sie-posunac-nasz-wywiad> [accessed: 30 May 2022].

and Donetsk announced withdrawals from the Ukrainian state. While in the case of Crimea, the referendum on joining the Russian Federation was conducted immediately after the armed occupation of this territory by the Russian army (March 16, 2014), two rebellious Ukrainian republics are getting ready to carry out this act.

It is impossible not yet to pay attention to the disputed territories between the states created after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and which show the practice of applying the strategy of *divide et impera*. Examples of such situations and countries are: Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are engaged in the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, or the conflict over the Fergana Valley between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Although Russia is not actively participating on either side openly, its presence is still perceptible; very often it takes the form of a stabilisation mission in areas affected by a crisis of military operations carried out by institutions that are part of the international security system.

The adopted strategy of restoring the hegemony of the Russian metropolis over the post-Soviet area by means of the Roman motto of practicing foreign policy, regardless of the choice of instruments necessary for its implementation, does not arouse opposition, but recognition among the vast majority of citizens. It cannot be denied that the acceptance of Russian citizens results from a deeply held belief in the rightness of decision-makers' actions, strengthened by the very effective propaganda seeped in for a long time, and contained in the so-called the decalogue of a true Russian:

1. Crimea is ours.
2. Why is America allowed and Russia not?
3. If they are not afraid, they do not respect.
4. America is to blame. Always.
5. Russia "fights for peace".
6. Russia has interests in other countries and must defend these interests.
7. Sanctions will strengthen Russia (and Russians).
8. Democracy is a lie.
9. There will be strangers' spit in our face.
10. Putin is Russia.³¹

From the very beginning, the arguments cited above justified Russia's strategy of restoring and maintaining its superpower position, taking its rightful place, thus rebuilding the old hegemonic system. Table 2 presents examples of the implementation of the tactic of subjugating the countries of the so-called near abroad (the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS countries), which fully corresponds to its imperialist ambitions.

³¹ J. Prus, "10 przykazań, które powinien znać każdy mieszkaniec Rosji", *Polityka*, 22 September 2015, <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1633659,1,10-przykazan-ktore-powinien-znac-kazdy-mieszkaniec-rosji.read> [accessed: 29 May 2022].

Table 2. Examples of the implementation of the *divide et impera* principle in the so-called near abroad

Country covered by the strategy	Years	Characteristics	Result
Moldova	1991	Internal destabilisation and division of the state	Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, internal struggle for power
Georgia	1992–1993	Internal destabilisation and division of the state	Abkhazia, South Ossetia, internal struggle for power
Tajikistan	1992–1997	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Azerbaijan	1993	Internal destabilisation	Nagorno-Karabakh, the internal struggle for power
Belarus	1994	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Belarus	1996	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Uzbekistan	1999–2000	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Uzbekistan	2005	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Kyrgyzstan	2005	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Belarus	2006–2007	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Ukraine	2009	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Belarus	2010	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Kyrgyzstan	2010	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Ukraine	2014	Internal destabilisation and division of the state	People's Republic of Lugansk, Donetsk People's Republic, Crimea, internal struggle for power
Uzbekistan	2016–2018	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Armenia	2018	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Belarus	2020–2022	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Kazakhstan	2021/2022	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power
Moldova	2022	Internal destabilisation	Internal struggle for power

Source: own work.

As can be seen from the Table 2, the assumed goals were, above all, internal destabilisation at the level of interference in the internal processes of alternation of power, or, in circumstances favourable to Russia, carrying out “partitions” of states that had been classified as “hostile” states. The category of “hostile” states was given to those of the post-Soviet republics of the CIS that attempted to become independent from Russia. Thus, apart from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (which are members of the EU and NATO) and Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have also been targeted by the Russian security services. In this case, in view of the failure of the actions taken earlier to restore the system of dependence on Russia by implementing the Roman strategy of *divide et impera*, force was used. Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022 faced a much more powerful enemy, their former metropolis – the Russian Federation. Just as Georgia emerged more consolidated from this attempt, it can already be said that Ukraine will also share the fate of its predecessor.

Which does not mean the end of a number of problems that the Ukrainian authorities will have to deal with over the next long decades. An exemplification of the described strategy is included in Table 3.

Table 3. Russia’s armed actions in “hostile” states

Country covered by the strategy	Years	Characteristics	Result
Georgia	2008	Military intervention	The 5-Day War: The Partition of Georgia is Perpetuated
Ukraine	2022	Military intervention	The war since February 24, 2022 – ongoing

Source: own work.

Conclusions

Attempting to respond to the task undertaken in the study became very demanding. By no means have the results of the research presented in them become obsolete; on the contrary we can talk and write about what is happening, basing on experiences and knowledge from the past, trying to diagnose the challenges of the future.

Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Russia has considered itself one of the main decision makers of world politics, whose voice should be counted by other great actors. The methods that were to convince Russia’s smaller and larger partners in the international arena were to be: a vast territory – the empire, victorious war campaigns, the active attitude of the Russian state’s leaders to shaping the balance of power at the global level, and involvement in numerous planned international security systems. The experiences in this area, originating in the nineteenth century, have proved the effectiveness of the assumptions of Russian foreign policy.

Returning to the questions regarding the resurrection of the idea of imperial Russia, it should be stated that the Kremlin’s tactic of “claiming Russian land” adopted more than 30 years ago, despite some successes, has a short-lived character. The reasons for this state of affairs lie in the lack of acceptance at the international level, both among states-decision makers and among much smaller countries. The so-called “*rususkij mir*” (Russian: русский мир), which in practical terms implies the recognition of Russia’s hegemony in conjunction with the current practice of generating conflicts and winning them both at the internal and international level of individual states, is definitely discouraging. Russia is more and more often perceived not only as an unstable state, but even as an aggressive one. The militarisation of internal life, which is accompanied by the rebuilding of the empire also by armed forces, meets with increasing resistance. This in no way translates into recognition of the Russian state as an equal partner on the international forum, but a constant source of destabilisation.

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A new "gathering of Russian lands": Russia's return to imperialism

Abstract

This article looks at the contemporary rebuilding of the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, which covers the area of the so-called "near abroad". The choice of the tactics results from the possible influence of the Russian state in this area. Thus, in addition to using the techniques of the so-called soft power, the catalogue includes primarily those activities that enable Russian decision-makers to manage conflict. The process of 'claiming Russian land back', initiated since the collapse of the bipolar system, should be interpreted as a political imperative to return to imperial politics. The instruments for their implementation were both traditionally understood leadership in the world, when the fate of all states and nations was decided by the greatest powers, to which Russia belonged from the first half of the nineteenth century. Another very effective tool for restoring the *status quo ante* of the 'Russian empire' turned out to be the ancient Roman strategy of *divide et impera*, an approach that has made it possible, from the very beginning, for the Russian Federation to strive to restore its hegemonic position in the territory of the countries that once formed the Soviet Union with it. The inability to impose sovereignty by such a soft influence or to inspire and extinguish potential conflicts has led to the armed assertion of its rights by Russia. Consequently, the policy adopted by Russian decision-makers may not only cause an armed conflict on a large European scale, but also other artificially induced cataclysms, difficult to predict, the consequences of which will have to be handled by the future generations.

Key words: Russia, empire, "claiming Russian land back", *divide et impera*



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Russian minority and the security of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Introduction

According to the Soviet census of 1989, Russians constituted 37.4% of the population of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (i.e. 6.06 million people), whereas Kazakhs – 40.1% (i.e. 6.49 million). It was neither the highest percentage (in the Latvian SSR 37.96% of the population were of Russian origin) nor numerical (11 million in the Ukrainian SSR) of all the union republics, but it was the only case where the titular nation did not have a significant numerical advantage over a minority.¹

The effective policy, commonly known by the name of Russification, carried out during the Soviet era, led to a situation in which over 90% of ethnic Kazakhs used Russian as their mother tongue. This gave rise to certain difficulties in using Kazakh culture as a foundation for building statehood and national unity after the collapse of the USSR. Attempts at the so-called “Kazakhisation” of socio-political life met with resistance not only by Russians, but also by Russian-speaking Kazakhs, which led to the inclusion in the 1995 Constitution of a provision that recognised Russian as one of the two official languages of the country. Providing Russians with more favourable living conditions, compared to other countries in the region, where the Russian language had been relegated to the status of the language of inter-ethnic

¹ “Население СССР по данным всесоюзной переписи населения 1989 г.,” Государственный комитет СССР по статистике. Информационно-издательский центр, Москва 1990.

communication, did not prevent the emergence of separatist demands. These demands led to suspicions as to their loyalty to independent Kazakhstan. This conviction was further strengthened after the first years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, who, after consolidating the Russian diaspora, began to use it as a lobbying group for the Kremlin's policy in post-Soviet countries. Despite maintaining the official position that the Russians are part of the Kazakh nation, efforts have been made for years to limit or eliminate Russian elements from the socio-political life of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

This article seeks to provide an answer to a set of specific research questions. First, it aims to discuss the nature of the dangers of the presence of Russians in the northern part of Kazakhstan for the security of the state. Second, it looks at the impact of the presence of the Russian minority in the Kazakh territories on the evolution of the political and social system of Kazakhstan. Third, it seeks to identify the steps taken by the authorities in Nur-Sultan geared towards limiting Russian influence in the republic. Finding the answers to the above questions has been possible thanks to the analysis of the collected data and press releases, based on the application of the observational method, and by analysing the actions of Kazakhstan's political decision-makers towards the Russian minority until 1991, using the monographic method. The application of these methods has made it possible to look into the research issue in detail and to formulate relevant conclusions based on the method of synthesis and deduction.

Kazakhstan's dilemmas related to the presence of the Russian minority and its impact on the social and political life of the republic

The relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan since the 1990s, in spite of the official message about friendship and good-neighbourliness, have been epitomised by serious tensions. This has been due to the existence of a large Russian minority in the territory of Kazakhstan.

A sensitive issue in bilateral relations, which recurs quite frequently, is the undermining of the state border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. The first claims in this respect were made by then President Boris Yeltsin, at the time when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was dissolved. The decisive factor for the need to revise the border was the fact that the Russians constituted over 60% of the population in the northern *oblasts*, which was complemented by concerns about the free realisation of their own national identity in the Kazakh state.² These demands were met with a harsh response from President

² A. Chodubski, *Jednostka, naród państwo*, [in:] *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i polityce*, eds. B. Szmulik, M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2010, p. 172.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, who reminded the Kremlin that Kazakhstan, just like Russia, was a nuclear power and would use all the measures available to prevent this scenario. Kazakhstan's concerns about territorial integrity led to major uncertainty as to whether the country's authorities would sign a protocol to the Start-1 treaty, which obliges it to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Only the re-declaration on the recognition of the borders of the Kazakh SSR as the borders of independent Kazakhstan by Vice President Alexander Ruckoy during a special visit to Almaty prompted Nazarbayev to sign the above-mentioned protocol on 23 May 1992.³

The silencing of the debate on the border changes did not rule out the possibility of the Kremlin raising this issue in the future. For this reason, President Nazarbayev initiated actions aimed at eliminating the rather unfavourable attitude of representatives of the titular nation towards the Russian minority in North Kazakhstan.

The easiest strategy was to carry out an administrative reform, which consisted in joining the *oblasts* dominated by Russians with those where the Kazakh population was higher, which happened in 1997.⁴ Thanks to the inclusion of the Semipalatinsk Oblast into East Kazakhstan, the share of Russians fell from over 70% to 45%. The addition of a part of the Kokshetau District to North Kazakhstan lowered the ratio of the Russian population from 65% to 49%.⁵ The other half of Kokshetau, absorbed by the Akmolin Oblast, brought about an even balance between the Kazakhs and the Russians; a similar situation occurred in the Karaganda Oblast, which had been merged with the Jazkazgan Oblast.⁶ The mass emigration of Ruthenians to their homeland, combined with the high birth rate among the representatives of the titular nation, accelerated the pace of change in the ethnic structure. By 2021, the share of Russians in the total population of the northern regions had dropped to around 35%, with the exception of North Kazakhstan, where they accounted for 49.22% of the population.⁷

The second step was aimed at strengthening the ties of the Kazakh people with the northern territories. The implementation of this goal began in the 1990s with the decision to move the capital from Almaty to Akmola and the so-called "Kazakhisation" of street and town names. The translocation of the capital became an

³ M. Gołąbek, "Kazachstan i Rosja po upadku ZSRS", *Pisma Humanistyczne*, no. 7, 2010, p. 129.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ Е. Садовская, "Перенос столицы из Алма-Аты в Астану и его влияние на миграционные процессы в Казахстане" *Демоскоп Weekly*, № 71/72, 2002, <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/071/analit03.php> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

⁶ С. Панарин, "Русскоязычные у внешних границ России: вызовы и ответы (на примере Казахстана)", *Диаспоры. Независимый научный журнал*. № 2–3, 1999, с. 147–148.

⁷ А. Zhanmukanova, "Is Northern Kazakhstan at Risk to Russia?", *The Diplomat*, 23.04.2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/is-northern-kazakhstan-at-risk-to-russia> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

opportunity to raise the importance of these lands in Kazakhstan's state-building process, not only internally, but also internationally. International opinion could recognise the cession of the peripheral area of the state, but not of the capital city. Although 28 years have passed since the decision to relocate the most important urban centre, the authorities keep prolonging the implementation of the financial support program for people interested in settling in the northern areas. This project suffers from an uneven amount of subsidies: the highest grants can be obtained when Russians take actions to support separatism in the post-Soviet area, which is why the most favourable conditions were offered after the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In addition to the above scheme, the state administration bodies have been trying to encourage people to change their permanent place of residence by locating large investment projects in this part of the country, providing new jobs, which acts as an incentive for the inhabitants of the south, where there is still a high level of unemployment.

It should be mentioned that the transfer of the capital has posed a certain threat to the internal stability of the state. It has disrupted the current order in the power structures, where representatives of the South (Elder Zhuz) played a dominant role. Moving the capital to the area of the Middle Zhuz caused the need to admit their representatives to the circle of power as hosts of these lands.⁸ Increasing the chances of making a career by Kazakhs from the north has stimulated their interest in raising their qualifications. This allowed for the commencement of the process of restricting representatives of Russian origin in the structures of state administration. Additionally, the expansion of the human resources range limited the influence of family and tribal ties on the positions held.

The "Kazakhisation" of street and place names began right after the collapse of the USSR. It was then that the Russian-sounding names of the cities were removed: for example, Shevchenko was renamed Aktau, Panfilov was renamed Zarkent, and Ust-Kamienogorsk was replaced with Öskemen.⁹ This process slowed down after the signing of an agreement on border delimitation in 2005.¹⁰ The fight against Russian nomenclature began again after Putin's statement in 2014, in which the Russian leader questioned the existence of the Kazakh nation before 1991.¹¹ 2017 can be considered a breakthrough, when the issue of ineffective decommunization

⁸ A. Wierzbicki, P. Załęski, *Trybalizm a władza w Azji Centralnej*, Pułtusk: Akademia Humanistyczna imienia Aleksandra Gieysztor, 2008, pp. 245–248.

⁹ M. Gołębek, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹⁰ W. Baluk, "Polityka bezpieczeństwa Republiki Kazachstanu", *Wschodnioznawstwo. Badania Wschodnie. Polityka Wewnętrzna i Międzynarodowa*, no. 8, 2008, p. 252.

¹¹ Д. Каликулов, "В Казахстане озадачены словами Путина о русском мире", BBC Russian, 2.09.2014, https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/09/140901_kazakhstan_putin [accessed: 22.02.2022].

of the nomenclature in the northern areas was raised.¹² This has become a catalyst for the replacement of old plates with new ones, on which only the entries in Kazakh and English are placed.¹³ The opposition of the Russians led to the suspension of public consultations on the new street names. Currently, they are designated top-down. The greatest difficulties occur with changing the names of Petropavl and Pavlodar.¹⁴ For Russians, the preservation of these names has a symbolic dimension and fuels their views on the connection of these lands with Russia. For the Kazakhs, on the other hand, it is a symbol of the lack of shedding the Russian yoke. There are also visible actions in the sphere of historical policy. Kazakhstan, conducting archaeological excavations as part of the state program called “Medeni mura”, tried to find evidence that the Kazakh ethnos was present in these lands long before the Russian settlement.¹⁵

The third bone of contention concerned the status of the Russian language. A balanced fight against Russian has continued since Putin became president, a key figure in the world of politics who uses the Russian minority and the Russian language as a soft power to put pressure on the leaders of the former Soviet republics. This is confirmed by the Concepts of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of July 15, 2008 and January 12, 2013, which referred to the consolidation of the diaspora and the protection of their interests in the country of residence.¹⁶ The concept of November 30, 2016 was expanded to include efforts to strengthen the position of the Russian language and the Russian mass media in the world.¹⁷

The Russian-Kazakh clashes are also discernible in confessional matters. The consolidation of the diaspora was achieved mainly by uniting the Russian minority around the Orthodox religion. Until 2004, the existence of the structures of the Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan did not raise any concerns. The threat arose when

¹² “В Казахстане 352 улицы все еще носят имя Ленина”, Закон, 9.01.2017, <https://www.zakon.kz/4838277-v-kazakhstan-352-ulicy-vse-eshhe.html> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

¹³ Т. Назарук, “Только на казахском и английском – управление по развитию языков не видит нарушения закона в табличках с QR кодом в Костане”, Наша Газета, 24.09.2018, <https://www.ng.kz/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3238> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

¹⁴ “Переименование Павлодара и Петропавловска – попытка дерусификации или возвращение к истокам?”, 29.12.2020, <https://rus.azattyq-ruhy.kz/analytics/19205-pereimenovanie-pavlodara-i-petro-pavlovsk-a-popytka-derusifikatsii-ili-vozvrashchenie-k-istokam> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

¹⁵ N. Nazarbayev, *Era niepodległości*, transl. by G. Palacz, A. Palacz, Warszawa: Andrzej Palacz, 2018, p. 194.

¹⁶ “Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 15 июля 2008 года”, 15.07.2008, <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/785> [accessed: 22.02.2022]; “Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 12 февраля 2013 г.”, Генеральное консульство Российской Федерации в Кракове, 12.02.2013, <https://krakow.mid.ru/konceptcia-vnesnej-politiki-rossijskoj-federacii> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

¹⁷ Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 30.11.2016 г. № 640 Об утверждении Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации.

President Putin took part in the sessions of the Holy Synod and announced the need for the church to cooperate with the authorities, which meant that it would actually be subordinate to the Kremlin's policy.¹⁸ The new patriarch Kirill does not conceal his close relationship with President Putin. Kazakhstan, seeing this as a serious threat, took steps to weaken the influence of the Russian authorities on the clergy working in dioceses located in Kazakhstan, and thus on the Russian minority. Due to the limited number of Russian political organisations, the church has become a politicised place, with a significant power not only over practicing Russians, but over the minority as a whole. The first attempt was to make it difficult to register Orthodoxy as one of the confessions after the changes to the legislation in 2007. This idea failed due to strong pressure from Russia. The second attempt was made in 2012, when the interest in autocephaly grew among the political elite of Kazakhstan.¹⁹ It rose after realising the role played by the church in the actions against Ukraine in 2014. The consideration of such a scenario may be confirmed by the statement of the Kazakh foreign minister in 2018, who supported the resolution of the crisis related to the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church in favour of preserving peace as soon as possible.²⁰ It was also in Nur-Sultan's interest to try to get the Russian Orthodox Church to recognise these changes. Acceptance of such a state of affairs would constitute a consent to take such measures in Kazakhstan that would make it possible to subordinate the church to state policy and end the perception of this confession as an uncertain element, controlled by a superior centre located in Moscow. However, it is extremely difficult, because the Russian Orthodox Church takes the position that the territory of the former USSR constitutes one undivided canonical territory.²¹ Dependence on Moscow is confirmed by the expectation of instructions from the Orthodox community ordinary at the outbreak of the January protests in Kazakhstan. The Church backed Tokayev's actions only four days after the introduction of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation troops (January 10), while the Grand Mufti, dependent on the power of Nur-Sultan, did so on January 5.²² This raises concerns that if Kazakhstan adopts a col-

¹⁸ J. Sobczak, Wpływ Rosyjskiej Cerkwi Prawosławnej na politykę międzynarodową Federacji Rosyjskiej, [in:] *Z badań nad historią i współczesnością Rosji, Azji Centralnej i Kaukazu*, eds. T. Bodio, J. Marszałek-Kawa, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2017, p. 36.

¹⁹ "Православные Казахстана не думают об отделении от МП РПЦ", Total Media Qazaqstan, 15.05.2012, https://total.kz/ru/news/politika/pravoslavnye_kazakhstan_ne_dumay [accessed: 22.02.2022].

²⁰ "МИД: Казахстан заинтересован в урегулировании церковной ситуации на Украине", РИА Новости, 18.10.2018, <https://ria.ru/20181018/1531006054.html> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

²¹ J. Sobczak, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²² "Глава православной церкви в Казахстане выступил с обращением к гражданам", РИА Новости, 10.01.2022, <https://ria.ru/20220110/mitropolit-1767196127.html> [accessed: 22.02.2022]; "Верховный муфтий Казахстана обратился к гражданам на фоне протестов"

lision course with regard to the Russian Federation, the Orthodox clergy operating among the Russian minority will denounce their obedience to the local authorities. Therefore, the creation of an autocephalous church, like in Ukraine, would be the safest solution.

Another threat is the strengthening of the importance of the Russian media, which are extremely popular in Kazakhstan due to the free use of the Russian language by the majority of the citizens. For many years, the leading message of the Kazakh state media was similar to that of the Russian one. Serious contradictions emerged during the Maidan period in Kiev. Both televisions described these events as an attempted coup and the overthrow of the legal government. However, they became convinced of their strong influence on social opinion in Kazakhstan when, thanks to the media, the Russians built parties supporting membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, despite their initial aversion to such an idea. Problems arose when Russian television began to portray separatism as the will of local Russians to secede.²³ Kazakhstan could also be affected by this scenario. It was then that the reflection on the degree of resemblance to Ukraine and the level of dependence on Moscow began.²⁴ It was noted that Moscow began to be interested not only in the Russian population, but also in Russian-speaking citizens.²⁵ In order to strengthen its security, Kazakhstan had to take steps to oust the Russian language from the public domain.²⁶

One of the solutions was to intensify work on the education system in three languages: Kazakh, English, and Russian.²⁷ In fact, the main focus of the authorities is to promote the idea of conducting education in two languages: Kazakh, and English. This is confirmed by the training of teachers to teach subjects such as physics, chemistry, biology and computer science in English, whereas until now they were conducted mainly in Russian.²⁸ These changes are explained by the desire to include Kazakh specialists in the world of vocabulary used at the global level, as well

стов в стране”, 5.01.2022, Sputnik, <https://ru.sputnik.kz/20220105/Verkhovnyy-muftiy-Kazakhstana-obratilsya-k-grazhdanam-na-fone-protestov-v-strane-19053667.html> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

²³ E. Kołodziej, “Peryferie w Centrum? Miejsce Azji Centralnej w globalnej architekturze bezpieczeństwa”, *Rocznik Strategiczny*, t. 20, 2014/2015, p. 382.

²⁴ E. Kołodziej, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

²⁵ M. Karolak-Michalska, “O polityce Rosji wobec swoich rodaków żyjących na obszarze postradzieckim”, *Studia Gdańskie. Wizja i rzeczywistość*, vol. 13, 2016, p. 236.

²⁶ С. Мисецкий, “Казахстанская модель национальной политики”, *Всходнознавство*, no. 7, 2013, p. 150.

²⁷ L. Masalska, Społeczne i kulturowe aspekty statusu języka rosyjskiego w państwach Azji Centralnej, [in:] *Z badań nad historią i współczesnością Rosji, Azji Centralnej i Kaukazu*, eds. T. Boddio, J. Marszałek-Kawa, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2017, p. 195.

²⁸ Управление образования Акмолинской области, Трехязычие как один из приоритетов современного образования, 8.01.2021, <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/aqmolaedu/press/news/details/144657?lang=ru> [accessed: 22 February 2022].

as the 2017 declaration of transition to the Latin alphabet, effective in 2025.²⁹ Despite being bi-lingual, Russian was given a key role: it was to be an incentive for ethnic Russians to send their children to institutions offering teaching in three languages. The authorities hope that by teaching the young generation of Russians the language of the titular nation, they will be able to systematically limit the use of Russian and thus eliminate the need for Putin to protect this language. This is supported by the fact that every third inhabitant is under 14 years of age and is obliged to learn the Kazakh language.³⁰ Additionally, the number of people learning in Russian decreased from 2.22 million in 2000 to 690 thousand in 2016. According to government statements, by 2025 there will be a complete transition to teaching in the Kazakh language. Such aspirations are confirmed by the words of President Tokayev, who speaks about the need to learn the Kazakh language by everyone who links their future with Kazakhstan and the aspiration to make Kazakh the language of inter-ethnic communication.³¹ Proposing radical solutions shows how great a threat the Kazakh authorities perceive in the continued popularity of the Russian language in the socio-political life of the republic. The harsh rhetoric is related to the criticism of the Kremlin, which is effectively counteracted by the theory that the Russians are part of the Kazakh nation, and not a separate national group.³²

The fear of Russians being disloyal has forced them to take steps to limit the freedom to establish political and social organisations, the participation of their members in the process of exercising power, and the broadest possible control over their activities. This affected not only representatives of the ethnic minority, but also ethnic Kazakhs.

Blocking the creation of political parties representing the interests of the Russian minority generates the problem of their lack of representation in power structures. Especially that this grouping would have no problems with winning the seats of deputies at the 5% threshold, taking into account the size of the minority – 18.42% of the republic's population.³³ The authorities justify this by trying to block the formation of nationalist groups. This is not the best line of argument, as it is used by the Kremlin as a weapon to influence the shape of Kazakhstan's political scene.

²⁹ Указ Президента Республики Казахстан от 26 октября 2017 года № 569. О переводе алфавита казахского языка с кириллицы на латинскую графику.

³⁰ Э. Сулейменова, “Очерк языковой политики и языковой ситуации в Казахстане”, *Russian Language Journal*, vol. 59, issue 1, 2009, p. 24.

³¹ “Нужно превратить казахский язык в язык межнационального общения – власти РК”, *EurAsia Daily*, 7.09.2020, <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/09/07/nuzhno-prevratit-kazahskiy-yazyk-v-yazyk-mezhnacionalnogo-obshcheniya-vlasti-rk> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

³² Г. Ергалиев, “Русские – это часть нашего народа”, *Zona KZ*, 22.06.2020, <https://zonakz.net/2020/06/22/russkie-eto-chast-nashego-naroda> [accessed: 22.02.2022]; N. Nazarbayev, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

³³ *Численность населения Республики Казахстан по отдельным этносам на начало 2021 года*, Комитет по статистике Министерства национальной экономики Республики Казахстан.

Under the pretext of fighting nationalism, the Russians are blocking the registration of political groups demanding the “Kazakhisation” of the republic’s social and political life and legislative changes in the language. An example of this is the Halyk-Ruha party, which has been awaiting registration since 2008, despite fulfilling all formal obligations.³⁴

The real reason for blocking the uprising of the Russian party in Kazakhstan is the fear that, after entering parliament, this formation could become a tool in the hands of the Kremlin to put pressure on Kazakhstan. This thinking is correct, but blocking the participation of Russians in the political life of the state generates a feeling that the state treats them as strangers, which does not create in them the need to identify with it.³⁵ Similar feelings about alienation are experienced by Kazakhs who are unable to elect the heads of local executive authorities. This mechanism was blocked in the 1990s for fear that in larger urban centres in the northern districts, the seat of the *akim* would go to the representatives of the Russian minority. They could conduct activities aimed at strengthening the ties of the oblasts they manage with the Russian Federation, thus increasing the threat of secession. Over the years, the exclusion of not only Russians, but also Kazakhs from the decision-making process, generated an increase in antagonism between the society and the authorities. This phenomenon was used by Russia to strengthen its role as a guarantor of the stability of the existing regime. In order to alleviate this state of affairs, President Tokayev decided in 2021 to hold general elections of *akims* only in smaller county towns and in rural areas.³⁶ Taking over only these units was due to the inability to take over the positions by the Russians, because they live mainly in large cities. The January events forced the announcement of a declaration on holding *akim* elections in 2023 in county towns and large cities, excluding the capital and Almaty. This gives the Russians a chance to take over the office of the *akim* in the cities of Pavlodar and Petropavl, i.e. two major urban areas located near the Russian border.

On the other hand, social organisations were subjected major centralisation. Cossack groups posed a particular threat to internal security due to their military service in the Russian army. It is during this period that the authorities in Nur-Sultan lose control over them. The neutralizing action was to limit the possibility of establishing new organisations, apart from those associated in the Association of Russian, Slavic and Cossack organisations or in the Union of Cossack Societies

³⁴ “Объединение русских в Казахстане считает, что создание партии ‘Халык Рухы’ противоречит политике межнационального согласия”, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30103623 [22.02.2022].

³⁵ A. Wierzbicki, “Stratyfikacja etnospołeczna w Azji Centralnej i jej wyzwania dla etnopolityki (na przykładzie Kazachstanu)”, *Politeja*, no. 5, 2014, p. 318.

³⁶ “Около 800 сельских акимов выберут в Казахстане”, *Forbes KZ*, 11.02.2021, https://forbes.kz/news/2021/02/11/newsid_243725 [accessed: 22.02.2022].

of Kazakhstan.³⁷ In order not to be accused by the Kremlin of nationalism, this decision had to be made also against Kazakh associations. While in the case of Kazakh organisations, which did not have foreign support, such solutions proved successful, in the case of Russian organisations there were obstacles to surveillance of their activities as a whole, as they maintained contacts with their counterparts in Russia. In order to minimize the creation of new channels of communication with Russia, difficulties were introduced in the registration of new social organisations. In this case, the Kazakhs who were once again deprived of their right to freedom of association as part of the fight against Russian influence were again affected.

Conclusions

The existence of such a large Russian minority in Kazakhstan poses a threat to the security of the state. According to the research findings based on the questions posed at the outset of this paper, the Russian minority itself expresses little interest in joining the northern *oblasts* with the Russian Federation. This does not change the fact that it is the Kremlin's tool for putting pressure on the authorities in Nur-Sultan. Despite not showing any attempts to separate, it is disturbing that Russia supports such actions. This is confirmed by the fact that members of the Russian minority place the letters Z or V on their cars as a symbol of support for the "special operation". Not only the authorities, but also the Kazakh public see a certain danger in this, which is why they are forcing them to download these symbols from their vehicles.

Using them as a pressure force is associated with inhibiting the process of evolution of Kazakhstan's political and social system. Fearing the strengthening of this group, the authorities limited the possibility of establishing social organisations, including those of a political nature. As a result of these actions, ethnic Kazakhs who did not have the opportunity to associate became a group of victims. In addition, the need to constantly see whether the Russians recognize that the Russian minority is under pressure from nationalists makes it impossible to build the idea of national unity based on the leadership of Kazakh culture. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen internal security, which makes the security system still fragile. The decision to create three oblasts (Žetysu, Abay, Ulytaic) proves that as the share of Russians in the population structure of the northern *oblasts* declines, the authorities are ready to unblock decentralisation. The best example of this is the

³⁷ "ОЮЛ 'Ассоциация русских, славянских и казачьих организаций Казахстана'", Ассамблея народа Казахстана, <https://assembly.kz/ru/struktury-ank/etnokulturnye-obedineniya/respublikanskiye-eko/assotsiatsiya-russkikh-slavyanskikh-i-kazachikh-organizatsiy-kazakhstan> [accessed: 22.02.2022]; "Казачество в современной истории Казахстана", <https://articlekz.com/article/5944> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

creation of the Abaya Oblast, which overlaps with the former Semipalatinsk Oblast, which was dominated by inhabitants of Russian origin at the time of the collapse of the USSR.

Despite numerous difficulties, the authorities keep taking measures to limit Russian influence by removing the Russian language from common use, reforming the education system, fighting for changes in the names of cities and streets, and limiting the role of the Russian media. This is supported by demographic changes: in fact, about 30,000 Russians leave Kazakhstan every year, and another as many die. Thirty years ago, they accounted for almost 37.4% of the population, and in 2021 – merely 8.42%. This ratio is still high, but according to demographic forecasts, in 2030 they will constitute about 5% of the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan.³⁸ This means that within a decade the Kremlin's main argument about the large number of ethnic Russians and the need to protect their interests will disappear. There remains an excuse to intervene to protect the Russian-speakers. It will remain valid for several decades to come, as the process of ousting the Russian language will take much longer than the natural disappearance of the representatives of the Russian minority. This mechanism may be used at a time when the political courses of Moscow and Nur-Sultan significantly diverged, but its effects would be catastrophic – the Russian Federation would lose its second most important ally, right after Belarus.

The alliance with Russia gives Kazakhstan a chance to carry out effective de-Russification without the perturbations and consequences that have hit Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine. The fact that most of the changes do not have to be implemented at the state level is in favour of Kazakhstan, as they occur spontaneously in society, which Moscow decision-makers are also fully aware of. Hence, in the coming years, there should be an automatic discharge of the threat resulting from the presence of Russians in the republic and the widespread use of Russian. This poses a challenge for the state administration, which will have to develop a line of argument that will convince the Kremlin of the actions aimed at maintaining the current *status quo* in this area, while carrying out actions that will put an end to the old order.

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³⁸ Д. Науханов, "К 2030 году русских в стране практически не останется – политолог", 365 Info, 27.10.2020, <https://365info.kz/2020/10/k-2030-godu-russkih-v-strane-prakticheski-ne-ostanetsya-politolog> [accessed: 22.02.2022].

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Численность населения Республики Казахстан по отдельным этносам на начало 2021 года, Комитет по статистике Министерства национальной экономики Республики Казахстан.

Russian minority and the security of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Abstract

This article examines the dangers posed by the presence of a large Russian minority in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The detailed analysis of the situation in the period from 1991 to 2021 has made it possible to identify not only the dangers, but also the ways in which the Kremlin takes advantage of this issue to exert major pressure on Kazakhstan's political decision makers to promote Russia's vital interests. The paper looks at the measures taken by the authorities in Nur-Sultan, the main purpose of which is to limit Russian influence in the republic, as well as the negative impact of the adopted mechanisms on the growth of participation of ethnic Kazakhs in the socio-political life of the state.

Key words: Russian minority, danger, counteraction, Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian Federation



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Polish government policy towards the hard coal mining sector after 2015

Introduction

In the years 1990–2021, the hard coal mining sector in Poland underwent a restructuring process, which resulted in a decrease in coal output, reduction of employment in mines and changes in the organisational structure of the mining industry. The biggest restructuring of hard coal mining industry was carried out by the government of Jerzy Buzek at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It resulted in liquidation of 23 unprofitable mines, reduction of over 100,000 jobs, and the restoration of profitability of mines.¹ In the following years, the provisions of the government's programs for restructuring mining enterprises were not implemented, as a result of which the hard coal mining sector did not achieve lasting profitability. The reason for the failure of the restructuring of the hard coal mining sector was the inconsistency of the government's actions with regard to the elimination of jobs in mining and the reduction of mining privileges. In 2014, Prime Minister Donald Tusk did not take any decision to liquidate unprofitable mines. The reason for the Prime Minister's lack of decision was to seek public support for Platforma Obywatelska (PO, the Civic Platform) in the upcoming European

¹ *Ty górnicza zmija! Rozmowy z profesorem Andrzejem Karbownikiem o restrukturyzacji polskiego górnictwa węgla kamiennego*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Górnicze, 2014, pp. 165–179.

Parliament and local government elections. Also, Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, under the influence of strikes of mining trade unions, abandoned the recovery plan for Kompania Węglowa SA, which assumed the liquidation of four loss-making mines (KWK Pokój, KWK Sośnica-Makoszowy, KWK Brzeszcze and KWK Bobrek-Centrum).²

Although hard coal, alongside lignite, is the most important energy carrier in Poland, its extraction has been decreasing since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2008, 84 million tons of hard coal was mined in Poland, and in 2015, 73 million tons. Hard coal consumption in Poland decreased from 81 million tons in 2008 to 73 million tons in 2015. Also, hard coal consumption in the European Union (EU) decreased from 467 million tons in 2008 to 346 million tons in 2015.

In December 2019, the European Commission unveiled a multi-year strategy called the European Green Deal, which involved transforming the energy sector. The strategy set EU member states two ambitious climate targets for 2030 and 2050. The first target was to achieve zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The second target was to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to the levels in 1990.³ Initially, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary blocked the EU's adoption of the 2050 climate neutrality target. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has stated that Poland cannot afford to meet the 2050 climate neutrality target due to historical and structural circumstances. According to Energy Forum experts, the implementation of the European Green Deal will cost Poland around 500 billion euros.

At the end of 2020, at the European Council (EC) summit, the presidents and prime ministers of the EU Member States unanimously decided to implement the interim target of the European Green Deal, i.e. to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.⁴ In May 2021, before the EC summit, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed that all EU member states do not question the EU goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050.⁵ The provisions adopted at the May 2021 EC summit

² M. Kamola-Cieślak, "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski a sytuacja ekonomiczna Kompanii Węglowej SA PO 2014 roku", *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka*, no. 1, 2016, pp. 138–141.

³ J. Sobolak, "Krótka historia Europejskiego Zielonego Ładu i problemów z KPO, czyli co w Polsce poszło nie tak?", *Business Insider*, 11 December 2021, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/gospodarka/krotka-historia-europejskiego-zielonego-ladu-i-problemow-z-kpo-czyli-co-w-polsce/mlvwmps> [accessed: 3 April 2022].

⁴ *Posiedzenie Rady Europejskiej (10 i 11 grudnia 2020 r.) – konkluzje*, Rada Europejska, Bruksela 2020, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47337/1011-12-20-euco-conclusions-pl.pdf> [accessed: 3 April 2022].

⁵ "Polska popiera neutralność klimatyczną UE, ale...", *Teraz Środowisko*, 26 May 2021, <https://www.teraz-srodowisko.pl/aktualnosci/Polska-poparcie-neutralnosc-klimatyczna-UE-10367.html> [accessed: 3 April 2022].

confirmed the implementation of the European Green Deal objectives, which will be a serious challenge for Poland due to the fact that the Polish energy sector is dependent on coal.

Poland's transition away from hard coal requires difficult decisions, including closing mines, halting the construction of the new ones and shutting down existing coal units in power plants. In November 2021, during the UN COP26 climate summit held in Glasgow, Poland announced a gradual transition away from coal in the energy sector by 2049. As stated by Prime Minister Morawiecki, the energy transition meant abandoning new investments in coal mining and developing clean technologies. The Glasgow Declaration was a confirmation of the social agreement on the transformation of the coal mining sector and selected processes of transformation of the Silesian Province (commonly referred to as the social agreement on the transformation of the coal mining sector).⁶

In 2021, among EU countries, Poland was the most dependent on coal. More than 70% of electricity production was dependent on this fuel. Departure from hard coal in the Polish energy sector will be connected, among others, with closing mines, providing jobs for people working in the hard coal mining sector and increasing the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the Polish energy mix.

The aim of the article is to analyze the government's policy towards the hard coal mining sector in Poland in the years 2015–2021. This issue is presented in the context of hard coal deposit in Poland, the cost of purchasing CO₂ emission authorizations, the position of mining trade unions in relation to restructuring programs and mine liquidation and the decision to be taken by the EC on granting public aid for mine liquidation until 2049. The paper poses the following research hypothesis: The European Commission will not approve state aid for the implementation of the social agreement on closing the coal sector until 2049, which was signed by Morawiecki's government with the mining trade unions in 2021.

Analyzing the above issue, it is reasonable to pose the following research questions:

1. What were the assumptions and implementation of the government's policy towards coal mining in Poland in 2015–2021?
2. Is the liquidation of hard coal mines according to government policy realistically possible by 2049?

The interdisciplinary approach to the studied phenomenon imposed the use of research methods appropriate to political science (systemic, decision-making, comparative methods), legal science (dogmatic method), sociology (statistical method). Due to the topicality of the subject of this article, the research material was documents. Important sources of data were documents produced by the European

⁶ The social agreement was approved by the government of Morawiecki and the trade unions on May 28, 2021.

Association for Coal and Lignite and Eurostat, as well as the Polish government, and interviews with mine management and trade unions.

Institutional determinants of hard coal mining restructuring

The restructuring of hard coal mining is primarily the responsibility of the government administration. Within the framework of the energy security policy, the Council of Ministers defines the directions of the hard coal mining sector and, through specialised institutions, conducts restructuring and liquidation of mining companies. From 2015 to 2019 in the governments of Beata Szydło (2015–2017) and Mateusz Morawiecki (2017–2019), the Ministry of Energy (ME) was the ministry responsible for coal mine operations and mineral deposit management. From 2015 to 2019, the ME was headed by Krzysztof Tchórzewski. The position of Deputy Minister was held by Grzegorz Tobiszowski, who at the same time held the position of Government Plenipotentiary for Hard Coal Mining Restructuring. The tasks of the Minister of Energy included, among others, issues related to the national energy policy, security of energy supply and management of mineral deposits. Minister of Energy Tchórzewski supervised the mine operations and managed the mining property.⁷ He was the patron of the Ostrołęka C coal block construction project. In the energy policy of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice), this was a strategic investment. The plans related to the construction of the Ostrołęka C coal block were one of the program demands of PiS in the 2015 parliamentary elections. It is worth noting that Ostrołęka was a part of the constituency from which Tchórzewski was elected to the Polish Parliament in 2015. Three years later, the construction of the Ostrołęka C coal-fired unit began. During construction, Morawiecki's government decided to dismantle it at a cost of 1.5 billion PLN. The government argued its decision with the EU climate policy aiming to reduce greenhouse gases and move away from coal to clean energy sources. It was announced that a gas-steam unit would be built in Ostrołęka in place of the coal unit.

In 2019, following the parliamentary elections, Morawiecki was once again elected Prime Minister. Yet the organisational structure of Morawiecki's second government was reorganized compared to the first composition of his cabinet. In order to efficiently carry out corporate governance of state-owned companies, including energy companies, the ME was transformed into the Ministry of State Assets (MSA).⁸ In November 2019, the position of Minister of State Assets was held

⁷ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 7 grudnia 2015 r. w sprawie utworzenia Ministerstwa Energii, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2015, item 2075; Zarządzenie Ministra Energii z 18 października 2016 r. w sprawie podziału pracy w Kierownictwie Ministerstwie Energii, Dz.Urz. ME, 2016, item 11.

⁸ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 19 listopada 2019 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie utworzenia Ministerstwa Energii, Dz.U., 2019, item 2290.

by Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin. The task of the Minister of State Assets, likewise the Minister of Energy, was to direct the management of mineral deposits. The Minister of State Assets was responsible for the state's policy on the management of, among others, coal mines. Tasks related to state energy policy were taken over by the Ministry of Climate after the abolished ME.

In October 2020, the Climate Ministry was merged with the Ministry of Environment. In MSA's organizational structure, mineral deposit management was subordinated to the Mining Department. In 2019–2020, Deputy Minister of State Assets and Government Plenipotentiary for Coal Mining Restructuring Adam Gawęda was responsible for coal sector affairs at MSA. The plan for hard coal mining during the COVID-19 pandemic, prepared by the Deputy Minister of State Assets Gawęda, provided for limiting hard coal imports through an active sales policy and improving the efficiency of coal mining, accelerating the liquidation of some non-productive mines being in the structures of Spółka Restrukturyzacji Kopalń SA (SRK) and carrying out the consolidation process of the Polish mining industry.⁹ The plan for hard coal mining during the COVID-19 pandemic was not accepted by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets Sasin. The reason for non-acceptance was the proposal to accelerate the liquidation of mines that were not operating and were subject to SRK. In March 2020, Gawęda was dismissed from his functions in the government of Morawiecki. In this situation, the supervision of mining was taken over by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets Sasin. Two months later, the Plenipotentiary of the Minister of State Assets for Coal Mining, Jonasz Drabek, formerly Director of the Mining Department at MSA, took over the sector and mining companies.¹⁰ The Minister's plenipotentiary, who did not hold the position of Minister, only supervised the implementation of tasks related to the restructuring of the hard coal mining sector. Therefore, the function of the Minister's plenipotentiary held by Drabek was not equivalent to the function held by the government's plenipotentiaries for the restructuring of the hard coal mining sector and, at the same time, the Deputy Ministers Tobiszowski and Gawęda.

One of the urgent tasks of the Minister's plenipotentiary for Mining Affairs Drabek, was to clarify the financial problems of state-owned coal mining companies caused, among other things, by a surplus of coal (7.6 million tons) accumulated on stockpiles at mines. Since 2020, the situation of the mines worsened, which was related to a decrease in demand for hard coal of energy companies. In September

⁹ "Odwołany minister opisuje w rządzenie spór o górnictwo", *BiznesAlert.pl*, 30 March 2020, <https://biznesalert.pl/adam-gaweda-dymisja-wiceminister-aktywow-panstwowych-pelnomocnik-gornictwo-energetyka-wegiel> [accessed: 3 April 2022].

¹⁰ Zarządzenie M, A i P z dnia 11 maja 2020 r. w sprawie ustanowienia pełnomocnika do spraw górnictwa węgla kamiennego, *Dz.Urz. MAP*, 2020, item 10.

2020, Prime Minister Morawiecki signed a regulation establishing the Government Plenipotentiary for the transformation of energy companies and hard coal mining.¹¹ At the same time, the position of the Government Plenipotentiary for coal restructuring,¹² which was vacant after the resignation of the Deputy Minister of State Assets Gawęda, was abolished.

The reason for abolishing this position, given by Prime Minister Morawiecki, was the appointment of the Government's Plenipotentiary for the transformation of energy companies, which took over the tasks of the plenipotentiary for mining restructuring.¹³ The appointment of the Government's Plenipotentiary for the transformation of energy companies and coal mining was also related to the ongoing work in MSA to prepare a strategy for the transformation of the energy and mining sector. In September 2020, the Prime Minister appointed Deputy Minister at MSA Artur Soboń the Government Plenipotentiary for Transformation of Energy and Coal Mining Companies. The Government Plenipotentiary was entrusted with tasks related to the preparation and implementation of the concept of transformation of the energy and mining industry, as well as providing opinions on Government's draft documents in the field of energy and mining. At the turn of 2020/2021 Soboń, representing the Government, participated in talks with mining trade unions on the social contract along with the determination of the date of mine closures and social packages for miners and the mechanism for subsidizing unprofitable mining plants. In December 2021, the position of Deputy Minister of State Assets and Government Plenipotentiary for the Transformation of Energy Companies and Coal Mining was taken by Piotr Pyzik. Soboń was appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry of Development and Technology.

Resources, consumption, export and import of hard coal to Poland

From 1990 to 2020, there was a visible (threefold) decline in hard coal mining in the EU. In 1990, the production of this raw material was 277.4 million tons and 56.5 million tons in 2020. The decrease in hard coal mining in the EU was related to high prices of CO₂ emission rights and increasing the share of RES and natural gas in electricity production. In 1990, Poland mined 147 million tons of hard coal, or 53% of the EU total. At the same time, 70 mines were operating, employing

¹¹ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 3 września 2020 r. w sprawie ustanowienia Pełnomocnika Rządu do spraw transformacji spółek energetycznych i górnictwa węglowego, Dz.U., 2020, item 1525.

¹² Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 3 września 2020 r. w sprawie zniesienia Pełnomocnika Rządu do spraw restrukturyzacji górnictwa węgla kamiennego, Dz.U., 2020, item 1523.


¹³ B. Sawicki, "Premier powołał pełnomocnika rządu do spraw transformacji energetyki i górnictwa", *BiznesAlert.pl*, 5 September 2020, <https://biznesalert.pl/premier-powolal-pelnomocnika-rzadu-do-spraw-transformacji-energetyki-i-gornictwa> [accessed: 9 April 2022];

416 thousand people.¹⁴ Between 1990 and 2000, hard coal was produced in Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain and France, among other countries. At the end of 2018, all EU countries except Poland and the Czech Republic closed their hard coal mines.

Although there was a reduction in hard coal production in Poland between 1990 and 2020, Polish mines still produced the most hard coal compared to other EU countries. In 2020, due to lower demand for electricity during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a visible decrease in demand for hard coal on the global market. Mining this raw material in the EU amounted to 67 million tons in 2019 and 56.5 million tons in 2020. According to research conducted by the International Energy Agency, hard coal extraction in the EU in 2021 amounted to 68.4 million tons and increased by 21% (11.9 million tons) compared to 2020.

Hard coal extraction in the EU in the years 1990–2021, is shown in Figure 1. Polish mines also extracted more hard coal in 2021 than the year before. According to data from the Industrial Development Agency, Polish mines extracted more than 55 million tons of hard coal in 2021. Figure 2 presents hard coal mining in Poland from 2015 to 2021.

Figure 1. Hard coal mining in the European Union between 1990–2021




Own elaboration based on: Eurostat, *Coal production and consumption statistics*, 22 February 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Coal_production_and_consumption_statistics [accessed: 9 April 2022]; *European Association for Coal and Lignite AISBL, Euracoal Annual Report 2019–2020*, <https://euracoal2.org/download/Public-Archive/Library/Annual-Reports> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

¹⁴ *Węgiel kamienny. Hard coal*, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny, Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, <https://www.pgi.gov.pl/dokumenty-pig-pib-all/foldery-instytutowe/foldery-surowcowe-2018/6214-folder-wegiel-kamienny-1/file.html> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

The increase in demand and production of hard coal in 2021 was driven by the global economic recovery, increased use of hard coal for power generation, adverse weather conditions and a surge in natural gas prices.¹⁵ CO₂ emissions increased by more than 2 billion tons globally in 2021 compared to the previous year. Hard coal accounted for over 40% of the total increase in global CO₂ emissions.¹⁶ It is worth noting that despite the increase in hard coal in 2021, the EU's renewable energy production was “the highest ever, exceeding 8,000 TWh in 2021, a record 500 TWh above 2020 levels.”¹⁷ In addition, in line with climate policy, a decarbonization process has begun in the EU. The first EU country to phase out coal-fired power generation was Belgium (2016), followed by Sweden (2020), Austria (2020) and Portugal (2021).

Figure 2. Hard coal mining in Poland between 2015–2021



Own elaboration based on: *Obraz polskiego górnictwa na rynku węgla w latach 2011–2020 i po 7 miesiącach 2021 r.*, Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu SA, https://szkolaeksploatacji.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/xxx_sep_ar_p_raport.pdf [accessed: 9 April 2022]; W ubiegłym roku wzrosło wydobycie i sprzedaż węgla. Tak wynika z danych ARP, Polskie Radio 24, 21 February 2022, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/42/273/Artykul/2905985,W-ubieglym-roku-wzroslo-wydobycie-i-sprzedaz-wegla-Tak-wynika-z-danych-> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

¹⁵ *Coal Analysis and forecast*, International Energy Agency, December 2021, <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/f1d724d4-a753-4336-9f6e-64679fa23bbf/Coal2021.pdf> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

¹⁶ “W 2021 roku światowa emisja CO₂ była najwyższa w historii”, *Energetyka 24*, 11 March 2022, <https://energetyka24.com/klimat/wiadomosci/w-2021-roku-swiatowa-emisja-co2-byla-najwyzsza-w-historii> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

¹⁷ “Global CO₂ Emissions Rebounded to Their Highest Level in History in 2021”, United Nations Climate Change, 9 March 2022, <https://unfccc.int/news/global-co2-emissions-rebounded-to-their-highest-level-in-history-in-2021> [accessed: 9 April 2022].

Between 1990–2021, despite the reduction of hard coal mining in the EU, this raw material continued to be used, among others, for the production of electricity. In 1990, hard coal consumption in the EU amounted to almost 500 million tons and in 2020 – 146 million tons (of which 89.5 million tons were imported, 53% of which from the Russian Federation).

According to the Central Statistical Office, hard coal consumption in Poland was 72.3 million tons in 2015, 74.2 million tons in 2016, 74.6 million tons in 2017, 74.2 million tons in 2018, 68.3 million tons in 2019, 62.4 million tons in 2020.¹⁸ From 1990 to 2021, domestic hard coal was used in Poland by power plants, combined heat and power plants and heating plants.

Considering 2015–2016, Poland exported slightly more hard coal than it imported (net exporter). Since 2017, there has been a sharp increase in the import of this raw material to Poland (net importer). Between 2015 and 2021, hard coal entered the Polish market primarily from the Russian Federation. The raw material was also imported from the United States, Australia, Colombia, Kazakhstan and Mozambique. Hard coal imports and exports to Poland in the years 2015–2021 are presented in Figure 3. The directions of hard coal imports to Poland in the years 2015–2021 are presented in Figure 4.


In the years 2015–2021, the increase in the import of Russian hard coal to the Polish market resulted from its lower price (which was related to cheaper mining) compared to the price of domestic coal and high quality of the raw material. For example, a ton of hard coal produced by Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka in 2020 cost 460 PLN, and a ton of coal imported from the Russian Federation cost 302.90 PLN.¹⁹ It is worth noting that coal-fired power plants were more willing to buy imported coal in the situation of high CO₂ emission fees imposed on them.

In 2017–2021, mining trade unions repeatedly protested against coal imports to Poland. According to miners, the import of Russian coal to Poland had an impact on the deepening difficult situation in the Polish mining industry additionally related to the growing coal reserves.

¹⁸ *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2015*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2016, p. 8; *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2016*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2017, p. 8; *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2017*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2018, p. 11; *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2018*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2019, p. 11; *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2019*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2020, p. 11; *Zużycie paliw i nośników energii w 2020*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa 2021, p. 11.


¹⁹ J. Frączyk, “Węgiel z Rosji tańszy nawet od mialu z polskich kopalń. Górnictwo ma problem”, *Business Insider*, 7 February 2020, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/ceny-wegla-w-polsce-kontra-swiat-wegiel-z-rosji-tanszy-od-mialu-z-polskich-kopaln/nz7jrbs> [accessed: 14 April 2022].

Figure 3. Hard coal exports and imports in Poland in 2015–2021



Own elaboration based on: S. Medoń, Dlaczego import węgla kamiennego do Polski jest tak wysoki?, O węglu.pl, 29 September 2020, <https://oweglu.pl/dlaczego-import-węgla-kamiennego-do-polski-jest-tak-wysoki> [accessed: 14 April 2022]; *Udzielenie odpowiedzi przez sekretarza stanu w Ministerstwie Aktywów Państwowych przez Adama Gawędę na interpelację posła Aleksandra Misztalskiego z dnia 27 stycznia 2020 r. w sprawie polityki węglowej*, Minister Aktywów Państwowych, 21 February 2020, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/INT9.nsf/klucz/ATTBMFJX6/%24FILE/i01571-01.pdf> [accessed: 14 April 2022].

Figure 4. Hard coal imports in Poland in 2015–2021



Own elaboration based on: S. Medoń, *op. cit.*; *Udzielenie odpowiedzi...*, *op. cit.*

In the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the Polish parliament passed a law introducing an embargo on coal from the Russian Federation.

Imported coal was and is used in the district heating sector and by private companies. The decision to ban the import of Russian coal to Poland will result in increased supplies of this raw material from other directions. Russian coal may be replaced by Colombian coal which has similar parameters but is much more expensive. In turn, according to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of State Assets, Sasin, “in the reality of war and the embargo on Russian coal, Polish mines have to work longer than it was assumed.”²⁰

Government policy towards transformation of the Polish mining industry

For over a decade, Poland's energy security has been an important element of PiS program. In 2009, the document *Nowoczesna, solidarna, bezpieczna Polska* (Modern, Reliable, Safe Poland) focused on ensuring energy security of Poland by diversifying supplies of energy sources and using domestic hard coal and lignite. Analysis of the provisions of *Nowoczesna, solidarna, bezpieczna Polska* program allows concluding that Polish economy was to be dependent on hard coal and lignite due to working power plants in Poland. Hard coal and lignite “covered over 90% of the economy's needs for electricity. It is not in Poland's interest to significantly change this state, which would firstly be associated with additional costs associated with switching energy production from coal to other fuels, and secondly, would make the economy dependent on external supplies of energy resources [...]. Actions aimed at increasing the marketization of coal mining, particularly hard coal, should be continued, e.g. through the expansion of the framework of cooperation between the raw material base and energy producers, restructuring activities in the hard coal mining industry and securing new deposits and mining fronts.”²¹

It should be noted that the provisions of the *Nowoczesna, solidarna, bezpieczna Polska* program regarding the share of coal in electricity generation were different from the policy of the EU, which, caring for clean air, started to move away from this raw material in the power industry. In 2015, the electoral postulates presented by the candidate for Prime Minister of Poland in the parliamentary elections – Szydło, coincided with the program provisions of PiS. Szydło announced the restructuring of the coal mining sector and the establishment of the ME. The hard coal mining sector was to fall under the ME. The restructuring of the hard coal mines was necessary because the operations of most state-owned hard coal mines were generating

²⁰ “Sasin o konieczności zmiany strategii: Kopalnie będą wygaszane zdecydowanie wolniej”, *Wprost*, 12 April 2022, <https://biznes.wprost.pl/gospodarka/energetyka/10684987/sasin-o-koniecznosc-zmiany-strategii-kopalnie-beda-wyga> [accessed: 14 April 2022].

²¹ *Nowoczesna, solidarna i bezpieczna Polska. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Warszawa 2009, p. 234.

losses, which were affected by low labor productivity, limited investment in mining equipment and the declining price of coal on the global market. In 2015, 23 mines operated under three coal companies – Kompania Węglowa SA (KW), Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa SA (JSW), and Katowicki Holding Węglowy SA (KHW). The debt of the coal companies within KW and KHW amounted to PLN 13 billion.²² Due to the losses generated by the hard coal mines the Ministry of Economy decided to restructure them. As a result of negotiations between the trade unions of coal companies and the government, it was agreed to suspend the fourteenth payment to miners for 2017–2018 and to reduce the monthly salaries of mine directors by 7.3%.

In April 2016, Polska Grupa Górnicza Sp. z o.o. (PGG) was set up,²³ which took over the indebted KW. The newly established company was recapitalized by energy companies (including PGE Górnictwo i Energetyka Konwencjonalna SA, Energa Kogeneracja Sp. z o.o., PGNiG Termika SA, Węglokoks SA) for the amount of PLN 2.4 billion and by banks and funds (BNP Paribas Bank Polska SA, Santander Bank Polska SA) in the form of bonds for over PLN 1 billion. In 2017, the mines of KHW were added to PGG. In order to carry out the holding, PGG was recapitalized for the amount of PLN 1 billion. It is worth noting that energy companies were not interested in recapitalizing mines which generated losses and the high price of Polish coal. The energy companies found it more profitable to purchase cheaper and better quality imported coal. Changes in the positions of presidents and supervisory board members of the energy companies have resulted in the newly appointed management of the energy companies deciding to invest funds in PGG.

Thanks to the financial support from energy companies, Polish mines have been able to continue operating. It should be noted that under EU law, member states are not allowed to subsidize the hard coal sector except for closing down mines. The integration of the energy companies and the mines was supposed to solve the financial problems of the mines and guarantee a constant supply of coal for Polish power plants.

In PGG, organizational and employment restructuring was carried out with the aim of reducing the number of jobs, changing the organizational structure of enterprises, starting investments and disposing of redundant assets. The hard coal companies employed 80 thousand employees in 2017, 79.8 thousand in 2018, 80.3 thousand in 2019, 77.2 thousand in 2020 and 75 thousand in 2021. In the same years, the Polish government granted state aid to the hard coal mining sector. State

²² W. Gałązka, “Górnictwo: zamykamy trzyletni etap restrukturyzacji sektora”, *Górnictwa Izba Przemysłowo-Handlowa*, <http://www.giph.com.pl/aktualnosci/art/gornictwo-zamykamy-trzyletni-etap-restrukturyzacji-sektora> [accessed: 23 April 2022].

²³ In December 2017 Polska Grupa Górnicza Sp. z o.o. was transformed into a joint stock company.

aid provided to mines amounted to: in 2017 – PLN 1,365 billion, in 2018 – PLN 140 million, in 2019 – PLN 729 million, in 2020 – PLN 1,084 billion. In 2015–2021, the operation of hard coal mines in Poland proved to be unprofitable due to the decline in demand for coal, which was mainly caused by the high price of coal.²⁴ In 2020, lower use of domestic coal resulted from a decline in electricity consumption due to pandemic lockdown with gradually increasing use of renewable energy sources in households. At the end of 2020, there were nearly 7 million tons of excess hard coal in Polish mines. It is worth noting that the amount of raw material stored at mines has steadily increased since 2018. The net financial result of hard coal mining amounted to: in 2015 – PLN 4.5 billion; in 2016 – PLN 0.4 billion; in 2017 – PLN 2.9 billion; in 2018 – PLN 0.9 billion; in 2019 – PLN –1.1 billion; in 2020 – PLN 4.3 billion; in 2021 (first three quarters) – PLN 2.3 billion.²⁵ Despite election promises, PiS has taken steps to close mines.

Between 2019 and 2021, the government and representatives of mining trade unions agreed on a list of mines to be liquidated. The list included KWK Brzeszcze Wschód (2019), KWK Mysłowice (2019), KWK Wieczorek I (2019), KWK Boże Dary (2020), KWK Wieczorek II (2020), KWK Centrum (2021), KWK Krupiński (2021), KWK Mysłowice-Wesoła I (2021), KWK Rydułtowy I (2021), KWK Śląsk (2021).²⁶ It should be noted that these mines did not produce coal for several years due to the exhaustion of their deposits. The companies chosen for liquidation were transferred to SRK, which was responsible for their closure.

Coal imported by private companies, which was competitive in terms of price and quality in relation to that extracted from domestic mines, turned out to be a major problem for the Polish mining industry. In 2020, miners' protests against imported coal from Russia influenced the decision of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets Sasin, who banned state power plants from buying coal from abroad.²⁷ The decision of the Deputy Prime Minister was a heavy burden for the power plants, which paid high fees for CO₂ emissions. The consequence of these actions was an increase in energy bills. Despite the unprofitability of hard coal mining in Poland, the government document *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r.* (Energy Policy of Poland by 2040) states that domestic hard coal will remain an important element of Poland's energy security.

²⁴ Except 2017–2018.

²⁵ B. Derski, "Górnictwo przynosiło 4,3 mld zł strat w 2020 roku", Wysokienapiecie.pl, 31 March 2021, <https://wysokienapiecie.pl/36605-gornictwo-przynioslo-43-mld-zl-strat-w-2020-roku> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

²⁶ T. Raudner, "SRK przedstawiło listę 14 kopalń do likwidacji do 2023 roku", ŚląskiBiznes.pl, 8 January 2020, <https://www.slaskibiznes.pl/wiadomosci,srk-przedstawilo-liste-14-kopalni-do-likwidacji-do-2023-roku,wia5-1-2401.html> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

²⁷ J. Frączyk, *op. cit.* [accessed: 25 April 2022].

Demand for hard coal “will be covered by domestic resources, and the import-export relationship will be supplementary. The role of this raw material will be reduced. The share of coal in the energy consumption structure will reach no more than 56% in 2030.”²⁸ The Entrepreneurship Council criticized the government’s *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r.* because it provides for, among other things, “production of energy from coal in 2030 at the level of 75 TWh, by 35 TWh less than in 2020, which will significantly increase the risk that the goals of reducing CO₂ emissions by at least 55% by 2030 at the EU level and climate neutrality as of 2050, as set by the EU will not be achieved.”²⁹

According to Ember, a British think-tank, in light of the *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040*, the transition away from hard coal will not happen quickly, and the feasibility of the EU’s goal of reducing GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2030 is unlikely.³⁰ With the growing debt of hard coal mines, at the end of 2020, representatives of the government of Morawiecki (including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets Sasin, and Plenipotentiary for the transformation of energy companies and coal mining Soboń) and mining trade unions (including Chairman of the Board of the Silesia-Dąbrowa Region NSZZ “Solidarność” Dominik Kolorz, Chairman of the Company Coordination Organization of the Trade Union of Miners in Poland PGG Sebastian Czogała) undertook negotiations on plans to close mines. As a result of the negotiations, the parties signed a social agreement on the transformation of the hard coal mining sector. The document concerns closing hard coal mines by 2049 according to a schedule agreed upon between the parties. It has been agreed that unprofitable mines will receive public aid for their operation and their closure will take place in the late 2040s of the twenty-first century. It is worth noting that unprofitable mines would continue to be maintained and subsidized, which is against the law in the EU. A package of social protection for workers from the liquidated companies, such as mining vacations or one-off severance payments, was a part of the social agreement.³¹

In December 2021, the Polish Parliament received a draft (from PiS parliamentary group) of an act amending the Act on the functioning of the hard coal mining

²⁸ *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r. zał. do uchwały nr 22/2021 Rady Ministrów z 2 lutego 2021 r.*, Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, <https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/polityka-energetyczna-polski> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

²⁹ *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r. zał. do uchwały nr 22/2021 Rady Ministrów z 2 lutego 2021 r.*, Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, <https://kig.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/uwagi-do-polityki-energetycznej-polski-2040.pdf> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

³⁰ “Ember: podejście polskiego rządu ws. PV trudne do zrozumienia”, Gramzielone.pl, 16 March 2021, <https://www.gramzielone.pl/energia-sloneczna/104996/ember-podejscie-polskiego-rzadu-ws-pv-trudne-do-zrozumienia> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

³¹ “Poland agrees coal mining phase out with unions by 2049”, Climate Home News, 25 September 2020, <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/09/25/poland-agrees-coal-mining-phase-unions-2049> [accessed: 25 April 2022].

sector, which provided for a system of support for the transformation of the hard coal mining sector. It should be noted that the parliamentary draft does not require the extensive debate or consultation required for government draft. In the first quarter of 2022, the Act was passed by the parliament and signed by Polish President Andrzej Duda. According to Article 2 of the Act on amending the Act on the functioning of the hard coal mining industry in the years 2022–2031, funds coming from the state budget in the amount of PLN 28.821 billion are provided for mine closures. Thanks to the Act, it will be possible to suspend and ultimately redeem over PLN 818 million of PGG's liabilities towards the Social Insurance Institution and PLN 1 billion of the loan from the Polish Development Fund.

Implementation of the solutions set out in the amended law regarding the transformation of the hard coal mining sector requires notification of the EC. A decision on this matter has not been made yet.

Conclusions

As far as the first question posed at the beginning of the article is concerned, it should be noted that Poland's energy security and the restructuring of the hard coal mining industry were an important part of the PiS scheme. In the years 2015–2021, PiS government aimed to make Poland's energy security dependent on domestic hard coal. According to the assumptions of the government program, the Polish economy was to be based on hard coal as the primary energy resource. The governments of Szydło and Morawiecki supported the operations of the mines by taking decisions to keep them in a situation where they were generating losses from their operations and while EU countries were abandoning using coal. Between 2015 and 2021, PiS government failed to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy towards hard coal mining sector taking into account the EU climate policy and the increased demand for energy resources of the Polish economy. Due to the high costs of mining and low quality of coal obtained, as well as maintaining high safety standards of work in difficult geological conditions, most Polish mines should be liquidated. The government's reluctance to run difficult negotiations with miners was due to fear of their protests and the loss of support of mining trade unions, which are the political base of PiS party. Frequent personnel changes in ministries of energy and state assets resulted from the government's lack of a professional approach to issues important for Polish energy security.

As for the second question, it must be stated that the implementation of the EU objective to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 55% by 2030 and a noticeable increase in the price of emission allowances forced the PiS government to make decisions related to abandoning fossil fuels, including hard coal. The government realised that the transition from hard coal in the energy sector is inevitable. Hence,

the government's decision to stop the construction and subsequent dismantling of the Ostrołęka C coal block.

Liquidation of the mine is possible on the condition that the EC accepts the government's restructuring plan for the hard coal mining sector. There is a high probability that the EC may not consent to public aid for mining on the terms proposed by the Polish party. The EC may object to subsidising unprofitable enterprises for almost three decades, i.e. until 2049. The EU law provides for financial aid in connection with closing down mines, not with their continuation. In addition to public aid, mine closures are conditioned by replacement of hard coal with other energy sources. In this situation, Poland needs to increase the share of renewable energy sources in its energy mix as soon as possible. Shifting away from coal in the energy sector may prove to be a big challenge for the Polish government in the situation of the war in Ukraine. Replacing Russian gas and coal by buying them from other countries will increase the price of these raw materials. It is unlikely that coal-fired power plants will be decommissioned by 2049. Such a solution could result in an energy shortage.

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Polish government policy towards the hard coal mining sector after 2015

Abstract

The article looks at the government's policy towards the hard coal mining sector in Poland in the years 2015–2021 in the context of the climate policy of the European Union, and the increase in demand for energy resources of the Polish economy. Despite the fact that for several years hard coal mines in Poland have been generating losses, they continue to operate. For political reasons, they could count on government support. Poland's obligations towards the EU have made the transition from hard coal in the power industry inevitable. The article discusses the assumptions of the government's mine restructuring plan until 2049. Its implementation depends on the decision of the European Commission on granting public aid to the liquidated mines.

Key words: energy policy, government decisions, coal mining, energy resources, Poland



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Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of energy security in the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO)¹

Introduction

For many years, ensuring Poland's energy security has been a key component of the political thought of Polish factions of different political identification. Politicians from all parties have formulated proposals for specific solutions in the field of energy security and energy policy, which, in their opinion, were to have a positive impact on state security and the position of Poland in Central Europe.

The idea of diversifying the sources and directions of natural gas supplies to Poland has brought about the need to cooperate with countries exporting energy resources. The key consequence of such an assumption was the concept of strategic energy cooperation with Norway and Denmark, formulated by politicians of many political affiliations. The major elements of this cooperation scheme include the construction of a pipeline system that enables the connection of natural gas

¹ The opinions expressed in the publication represent the views of the author only and cannot be equated with the standpoint(s) of the Institute of Central Europe.

deposits in Norway with customers in Poland, i.e. the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.² Such activities were extremely important given the importance of this commodity in Poland's energy balance – which constitutes approx. 17% of total primary energy consumption – and the country's high dependence on the Russian Federation (approx. 56.6%),³ a country with significant world gas resources. Nevertheless, it is not only the share, but most of all the use of natural gas that was important from the point of view of energy security, as in Poland's case, a large part of natural gas is used for heating purposes and in industry, including refineries, chemical plants, and other sectors of the domestic industry.

The goal of this article is to look at the political thought⁴ of the two key political parties in Poland, i.e. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO, the Civic Platform), in the construction of the Baltic Pipe. Thus, the subject scope covers political thought, while in the factual sense, the study concerns the views of representatives of individual political parties on the issue of natural gas imports to Poland. The study rests on the basic method applied by researchers of political thought, i.e. source analysis, and it applies research techniques in the form of content analysis and comparative analysis, which allows for the configuration of similarities and differences in relation to the research issue at hand. The considerations contained in the article reveal the main arguments formulated by PiS and PO politicians towards the construction of the gas pipeline. The starting point for the analyses conducted was the thesis that, in the opinion of these two political parties, the concept of Polish-Norwegian cooperation was to be a proposal to solve Poland's key energy challenge, i.e. diversification of sources and directions of natural gas supplies from Russia. Taking up this particular topic is important due to the scarcity of studies that feature original findings on the actual standpoint of representatives of political parties on the construction of the Baltic Pipe.

The foundation of energy security in the opinion of PiS

Due to the dependence on the import of energy resources from the Russian Federation, the diversification of sources and directions of natural gas supplies to Poland

² M. Ruszel, A. Kucharska, *Dywersyfikacja źródeł dostaw gazu ziemnego do państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej – wyzwania i perspektywy rozwoju*, Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowej, 2020, p. 53; P. Kwiatkiewicz, Polityczny i ekonomiczny aspekt doboru nośników energii a kwestie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Rynki surowców i energii – teraźniejszość i przyszłość*, vol. 1, *Polityka – gospodarka – zasoby naturalne i logistyka*, ed. P. Kwiatkiewicz, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Esus, 2014, pp.163–192.

³ *Poland 2022. Energy Policy Review*, International Energy Agency, Paris 2022, pp. 131–132.

⁴ Political thought should be understood as “any form of reflection on political reality, regardless of the degree of development, internal coherence and systematisation, as well as theorising and concretisation.” J. Jachymek, W. Paruch, Wstęp, [in:] *Więcej niż niepodległość. Polska myśl polityczna 1918–1939*, eds. J. Jachymek, W. Paruch, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2001, p. 11.

has been a priority issue for PiS. Among the energy concepts, energy cooperation with Norway has played an important role. The idea of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline has recurred in both political manifestos and political activity of the party, especially during its rule in Poland, and the investment was a flagship project promoted at all forums. Treating the gas pipeline in strategic terms resulted from its fundamental benefit, which was the real diversification of the source of natural gas.

In the opinion of PiS, the diversified structure of supplies was a condition for the energy security of the state.⁵ In this context, Jarosław Kaczyński, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in 2006–2007, recognised the diversification process as “one of the government’s top priorities.”⁶ PiS planned to implement this postulate through cooperation with Norway and Denmark for the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline connecting Poland with Norwegian deposits of energy resources.⁷ What is of key importance is the fact that for PiS, Norway was a key partner in the planned supplies of natural gas, which was confirmed by including this country in the plans related to the creation of the European Energy Security Treaty.⁸ As a result, PiS politicians voted in favour of reactivating the concept of building a gas pipeline connecting the Norwegian shelf with the Polish coast of the Baltic Sea,⁹ and the direct pipeline connection was to fulfil three important tasks.

First, it was to create a balanced natural gas supply structure. As a result of the investment, it was possible, on the one hand, to maintain the import of natural gas

⁵ *Program 2005. IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla Wszystkich* [s.l.].

⁶ “Premier: Najważniejsze zadanie MG to dywersyfikacja dostaw paliw”, *Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł*, 4 August 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/premier-najwazniejsze-zadanie-mg-to-dywersyfikacja-dostaw-paliw,12860.html> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

⁷ “Wypowiedź Anny Fotygi podczas debaty nad informacją ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007 roku”, *Sejm RP*, 11 May 2007, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/4502edaa6c2fbb77c125745f0037938f/301fdb47f14d1be6c1257466003fd88?OpenDocument> [accessed: 20 January 2022]; K. Wichowska, J. Sobala, “To esbecka opinia, że jestem ponurakiem”, *Gazeta Polska*, 24 September 2005, no. 38, p. 9; K. Hejke, “Nie możemy zostać w III RP”, *Gazeta Polska*, 1 November 2006, no. 44, p. 5.

⁸ M. Paszkowski, “Polskie projekty na rzecz wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w Europie w myśli politycznej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości oraz Platformy Obywatelskiej”, *Polityka i Społeczeństwo*, no. 2, 2017, p. 71, <https://doi.org/10.15584/polispol.2017.2.5>.

⁹ The Baltic Pipe gas pipeline was to connect the gas system of Poland and Denmark. This project was related to the construction of the Skanled gas pipeline, which was to connect natural gas deposits in Norway with customers in Sweden and Denmark. The Baltic Pipe project was therefore an extension of the Skanled gas pipeline. In June 2006, PGNiG S.A. acquired 15% of the shares in the consortium that was to build the Skanled gas pipeline. Ultimately, the implementation of the Skanled project was suspended in 2009. “Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo przystąpiło do konsorcjum budującego gazociąg SKANLED”, PGNiG, 20 June 2007, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/polskie-gornictwo-naftowe-i-gazownictwo-przystapilo-do-konsorcjum-budujacego-gazociag-skanled/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2007¤tPage=3> [accessed: 17 January 2022].

from the Russian Federation, and on the other hand, to create additional sources and routes for the import of energy resources to Poland.¹⁰ However, this postulate was changed, as it was recognised that as a result of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in Central Europe, natural gas supplies from that country should be completely suspended. Therefore, Poland decided not to extend the bilateral agreement under the Yamal contract after 2022.¹¹

Second, it was to limit the Russian Federation's ability to use "price blackmail" and "political pressure", as in the absence of diversification, the price pressure on the supply of natural gas from the dominant supplier was growing.¹² In this context, it was also possible to make independent decisions regarding the source of natural gas, as natural gas purchased from the Russian Federation was, in the opinion of Maciej Małecki, a PiS MP, "politically burdened."¹³ At the same time, it was emphasised that the opening of the new gas import route made it possible to ensure access to commodity exchanges in Europe, and thus, in the event of the suspension of natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation, to supplement the shortages with raw material from the West.¹⁴

Third, the overriding driving force was the need to increase the availability of this commodity other than those from the Russian Federation in this region, and at the same time to ensure the energy security of Central European countries.¹⁵

¹⁰ "Wypowiedź Piotra Naimskiego w trakcie przedstawienia przez prezesa Rady Ministrów programu działania Rady Ministrów z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania", Sejm RP, 18 November 2015, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=1&dzien=4&cwyp=14&view=S> [accessed: 12 January 2022]; "Naimski: Dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu przed liberalizacją rynku", *Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł*, 8 June 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/naimski-dywersyfikacja-dostaw-gazu-przed-liberalizacja-rynku,10872.html> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

¹¹ "Naimski: Polska nie przedłuży kontraktu jamalskiego", *BiznesAlert.pl*, 14 August 2019, <https://biznesalert.pl/naimski-polska-kontrakt-jamalski-gaz-pgnig-energetyka> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

¹² "Sygnały dnia: Rozmowa z Jackiem Sasinem", *Polskie Radio 24*, 30 November 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/13/53/Artykul/2858935> [accessed: 19 January 2022]; "Naimski: Redukujemy możliwość szantazu gazowego", *Energetyka24*, 28 December 2021, <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/wiadomosci/naimski-redukujemy-mozliwosc-szantazu-gazowego> [accessed: 19 January 2022].

¹³ "Gaz-System podpisał w poniedziałek w Brukseli umowę na dofinansowanie budowy gazociągu Baltic Pipe", *Radio Maryja*, 15 April 2019, <https://www.radiomaryja.pl/multimedia/gaz-system-podpisał-w-poniedziałek-w-brukseli-umowe-na-dofinansowanie-budowy-gazociagu-baltic-pipe> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

¹⁴ "Piotr Naimski: Nie będziemy przedłużali kontraktu na gaz z rosyjskim Gazpromem", *Polskie Radio 24*, 13 September 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7976/Artykul/2806230> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

¹⁵ "Piotr Naimski: Uruchomienie gazociągu Baltic Pipe uniezależni nas od Rosji", *Polskie Radio 24*, 20 November 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7976/Artykul/2852684> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

It was stressed that natural gas would also be supplied via the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline to other countries that have undertaken measures to diversify the sources and directions of gas supplies.¹⁶ In this respect, it was necessary to expand the infrastructure in Central Europe.

PiS politicians negatively assessed the agreement on the import of natural gas from Norway, broken by the former Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD, Democratic Left Alliance) and Unia Pracy (UP, Labour Union) government.¹⁷ The consequence of the failure to implement the joint investment were the major difficulties experienced by PiS in their negotiating with partners from Scandinavia. Kaczyński pointed to the complications in the implementation of the gas pipeline construction project, because “the Norwegians had already burned their fingers once, which was caused by the extreme irresponsibility of the SLD government.”¹⁸ It was argued that the Norwegian party remembered the contract for the purchase of natural gas negotiated and signed in 2001 by the then government of Jerzy Buzek. In the opinion of Piotr Naimski, Secretary of State and Government Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure, the resignation by the government of Leszek Miller from continuing this project made Poland an unreliable partner.¹⁹

The change in the attitude of the Norwegian party to cooperation with Poland took place at the time of purchase by PGNiG SA shares in natural gas fields in Norway.²⁰ As a result, it was emphasised that the contract for the purchase of shares in

¹⁶ “Kolejna wielka umowa na dostawy gazu LNG do Polski. Sasin: To krok na drodze do pełnego bezpieczeństwa energetycznego”, Polskie Radio 24, 2 September 2021, <https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/2799493> [accessed: 18 January 2022]; “Przydacz: Dokończenie Baltic Pipe leży w interesie całej Europy Środkowej”, Energetyka24, 4 June 2021, <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/przydacz-dokonczenie-baltic-pipe-lezy-w-interesie-calej-europy-srodkowej> [accessed: 9 January 2022].

¹⁷ “Wypowiedź Artura Zawiszy w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 26 January 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/b17f07185c2f6608c12574650036ef97?OpenDocument> [accessed: 10 January 2022]; “Wypowiedź Anny Fotygi w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 14 December 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/4502edaa6c2fbb77c125745f0037938f/e6a8ebbb52c24ac6c12574650045eb8?OpenDocument> [accessed: 12 January 2022].

¹⁸ “Premier Kaczyński: Chcemy kupić gaz z Norwegii”, Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł, 29 October 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/premier-kaczynski-chcemy-kupic-gaz-z-norwegii,16201.html> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

¹⁹ “Naimski: Trybunał Stanu dla Millera i Pawlaka za działanie wbrew polskim interesom”, TVP Info, 23 September 2019, <https://www.tvp.info/44515464/naimski-trybunal-stanu-dla-leszka-millera-i-waldemara-pawlaka-za-dzialanie-wbrew-polskim-interesom> [accessed: 15 January 2022]; *Premier Kaczyński...*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ In 2007, PGNiG S.A. made an agreement for the purchase of a 15% interest in three exploration and production licenses for the production of natural gas and crude oil from the Skarv and Snadd fields on the Norwegian continental shelf. “PGNiG uzyskuje dostęp do złóż gazu ziemnego i ropy naftowej na Morzu Norweskim”, PGNiG, 1 March 2007, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/pgnig-uzyskuje-dostep-do-zloz-gazu-ziemnego-i-ropy-naftowej>

the fields, concluded by the company in 2007, had a positive impact on the negotiations regarding the construction of the gas pipeline. It was assessed that as a result of the concluded agreement, it was possible to deliver to Poland natural gas which was produced by PGNiG SA from fields in Norway. Nevertheless, the analysis of political thought shows that PiS politicians realised at the time that the purchased shares in the fields would not fully guarantee the diversification of natural gas supplies to Poland. In the opinion of Naimski, it was originally supposed to be the “first step” in the involvement of the Polish company in Norway.²¹ The situation had changed since 2015, when the increased activity of PGNiG SA was to be a strategic element of the chosen actions in Norway and purchase of as many assets as possible. This type of approach resulted from PiS’s return to the concept of building a gas pipeline.²² The actions taken led, *inter alia*, to increasing shares in the fields and to their being taken over by PGNiG SA INEOS E&P Norge AS in Norway.²³ It was emphasised that the natural gas produced by the company was to be sent directly to Poland via the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.

In sum, it should be noted that the issue of a long-term contract for gas supplies from Norway to Poland, as part of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, was a pivotal solution promoted by PiS. Politicians of this political party emphasised that the construction of a direct connection between the natural gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf and the Polish coast would have a significant impact on the country’s energy security by ensuring the diversification of the sources and routes of natural gas supplies to Poland. An important activity in this respect was the activity of PGNiG SA on the Norwegian market, including the acquisition of mining assets.

Continuation of key energy projects in the opinion of the PO

PO politicians have repeatedly referred to the need to diversify the sources and routes of natural gas supplies to Poland. Representatives of this political faction have assigned an important role to international projects, in particular Polish-Norwegian energy cooperation. The views that were being formulated had direct

na-morzu-norweskim/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2007%C2%A4tPage=6 [accessed: 21 January 2022].

²¹ “Sygnały dnia: Rozmowa z Piotrem Naimskim”, Polskie Radio 24, 5 March 2007, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/237753,Partia-rosyjska-w-Polsce> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

²² A. Piziak-Rapacz, “Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w polityce rządu koalicji PiS, LPR i Samoobrony (2005–2007) oraz rządu Beaty Szydło – analiza porównawcza”, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka*, no. 1 (22), 2016, p. 156.

²³ “Strategiczna transakcja PGNiG w Norwegii”, PGNiG, 25 March 2021, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/strategiczna-transakcja-pgnig-w-norwegii/newsGroupId/10184> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

consequences on political practice, and thus on the measures taken to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.

Politicians became aware of the international situation of Poland, including the degree of dependence of the domestic economy on the supply of energy resources originating from the Russian Federation. They negatively assessed this type of dependency, which had a direct impact on the energy security of the state. As Wojciech Wilk, an MP affiliated with PO, once pointed out, this situation meant that “a problem with gas supplies from the East may arise overnight.”²⁴ PO politicians saw possible threats resulting from basing imports on only one supplier, because such a situation could be used “as an instrument of economic pressure, often blackmail from producer countries that treat commodity policy in political terms.”²⁵ The general opinion of PO was that energy issues played a key role in the state’s foreign policy, thus becoming its integral part. Krzysztof Zaremba, a PO MP, even believed that “energy resources [had] replaced tanks, and military action.”²⁶ One of the consequences of such views was the need to maintain state supervision over key energy companies, which included, *inter alia*, PGNiG SA and Gaz-System SA.²⁷

PO politicians have repeatedly pointed out that “the main problem with gas supplies to Poland is [...] the lack of diversification of supply sources [...], not intermediaries.”²⁸ They critically assessed the energy policy pursued by the SLD government in 2001-2005. The key allegation was the “failure to diversify gas supplies to Poland, including [...] abandonment of the Norwegian project, [...] abandonment of the Yamal II project, [...] failure to increase domestic gas production, [...] failure to increase the storage space to the EU requirements, as well as [...] not implementing new concepts, such as the Amber project or the project of importing

²⁴ „Wypowiedź Wojciecha Wilka w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 11 January 2007, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/9a905bcb5531f478c125745f0037938e/7dde8e6e886f028ac125746500472df1?OpenDocument> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

²⁵ “Wypowiedź Norberta Olbryckiego w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, Sejm RP, 21 February 2019, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=77&dzien=4&wyp=251&view=S> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

²⁶ “Wypowiedź Krzysztofa Zaremby w trakcie debaty nad informacją ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2006 roku”, Sejm RP, 15 February 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/4eccb99a20d6020ec125746500373904?OpenDocument> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

²⁷ “Wypowiedź Jana Wyrowińskiego w trakcie debaty nad informacją rządu na temat kierunków prywatyzacji w roku 2006, sprawowania nadzoru właścicielskiego nad spółkami z udziałem Skarbu Państwa jak i innymi państwowymi osobami prawnymi”, Sejm RP, 11 May 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/394762c3294bc0a9c1257465003a7b2f?OpenDocument> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

²⁸ “Wypowiedź Zbigniewa Chlebowskiego w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 5 May 2005, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/7af1a583a131a9c9c12574790041f5ba?OpenDocument> [accessed: 11 January 2022].

gas from other regions of the world to Poland, for example from the Transcaucasia and Arab countries.”²⁹

Among the concepts for the diversification of natural gas supplies to Poland, the politicians of PO pointed to the project of building a direct Polish-Norwegian gas connection. In the opinion of PO representatives, three elements determined the advantages of the contract signed by the government of Buzek. First, the possibility of re-exporting natural gas purchased by Poland. This type of provision in the contract made it possible to resell the purchased this commodity when it was impossible to fully use it for domestic needs. Second, limited investment costs, as the pipeline was to be built by the Norwegian side, so there was no need for Polish enterprises and the state budget to allocate funds for this purpose. Third, physical diversification of supply sources. As a result of the investment, in line with the position of PO politicians, there would be “a possibility to overcome this situation [...] in which 90% of gas supplies come from a single source.”³⁰ In the opinion of Janusz Lewandowski, a PO politician, “only gas supplies from Norway mean [...] the desired level of energy security.”³¹

PO politicians believed that the resignation by Leszek Miller’s government from the concluded agreement was a “strange negotiating tactic”³² used in talks with the Russian Federation to purchase natural gas. In their opinion, the criticism of the Norwegian contract presented in public by the SLD government was an inappropriate negotiation procedure.³³ Despite the positive attitude towards the concept of building the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline in 2007–2015, the government coalition of the PO-PSL did not conduct Polish-Norwegian energy cooperation in this area. This type of accusation was made by Janusz Kowalski, an MP from Solidarna Polska, who claimed that work on the construction of the gas pipeline was suspended due to the government of Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in

²⁹ “Wypowiedź Adama Szejnfelda w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 7 July 2005, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/6f1bf9590b2955f7c125747b0035cb02?OpenDocument> [accessed: 9 January 2022].

³⁰ “Wypowiedź Jana Rokity w trakcie debaty nad rozpatrzeniem wniosku o wyrażenie wotum nieufności ministrowi Skarbu Państwa Wiesławowi Kaczmarkowi”, Sejm RP, 9 January 2002, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/1bc999c5155faadac12574720025c0dd?OpenDocument> [accessed: 5 January 2022].

³¹ J. Dudala, “Nie politykujmy tylko działajmy”, *Nowy Przemysł. Miesięcznik Gospodarczy*, no. 3, 2004, p. 16.

³² “Wypowiedź Jana Rokity w trakcie debaty nad rozpatrzeniem wniosku o wyrażenie wotum nieufności ministrowi Skarbu Państwa Wiesławowi Kaczmarkowi”, Sejm RP, 9 January 2002, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/1bc999c5155faadac12574720025c0dd?OpenDocument> [accessed: 5 January 2022].

³³ “Posiedzenie Komisji Gospodarki, Komisji do Spraw Kontroli Państwowej oraz Komisji Skarbu Państwa”, Sejm RP, 14 July 2004, <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/wgsknrn/GOS-229> [accessed: 4 February 2022].

2007–2014.³⁴ Nevertheless, Michał Szubski, president of the management board of PGNiG SA in 2008–2011, claimed that “Norwegian companies withdrew from the project,”³⁵ which resulted in the company’s inactivity in the context of further work on the construction of the gas pipeline.

PO politicians have supported the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline and the actions taken by the PiS government since 2015, but they have also seen the threats resulting from the timely commissioning of the pipeline.³⁶ In this context, they have raised the need to continue talks with the Russian Federation to extend the contract for the import of natural gas, so that Poland would not run out of gas. Włodzimierz Karpiński, Minister of the Treasury in 2013–2015, emphasised the fact that “in order to have any chance of a possible extension of gas supplies from Russia, in the event of delays in the case of Baltic Pipe, this year [2019 – M.P.] should open a negotiation window with Russia.”³⁷ Basically, the party’s approach to the construction of the gas pipeline was based on market principles, so when importing natural gas, the key aspect in the opinion of politicians from this party was the price, not the source of this commodity. Radosław Sikorski, an MP affiliated with PO, highlighted the fact that “this gas [had to] be purchased on the most favourable terms.”³⁸ For this reason, in the opinion of PO, it was possible to continue importing natural gas from Russia, provided that appropriate contractual conditions were ensured.³⁹

To sum up, it should be noted that the analysis of the political thought of PO indicates a different approach to PiS towards Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of natural gas supplies to Poland. A characteristic feature of the PO politicians’ thinking towards building a diversified structure of natural gas imports was the fact that the state’s energy security was based on political and economic cooperation with exporters of energy resources, including Norway. Nevertheless, the positive verbal position towards Polish-Norwegian cooperation, in fact, due to the negative

³⁴ “Polityka energetyczna Donalda Tuska. Janusz Kowalski: Był uległy wobec Rosjan, blokował Baltic Pipe”, *Polskie Radio 24*, 14 December 2021, <https://polskieradio24.pl/130/8358/Artykul/2868446> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

³⁵ “Posiedzenie Komisji Skarbu Państwa”, *Sejm RP*, 12 May 2011, <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/wgskrn6/SUP-190> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

³⁶ “Wypowiedź Sławomira Nitrasa w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, *Sejm RP*, 6 June 2018, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=63&dzien=2&wyp=62&view=S> [accessed: 21 January 2022]; “Wypowiedź Michała Urbaniaka w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, *Sejm RP*, 12 January 2022, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=46&dzien=1&wyp=287&view=S> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

³⁷ “Karpiński: Jesteśmy za Baltic Pipe, ale krytykujemy układ z Danią”, *BiznesAlert.pl*, 5 March 2019, <https://biznesalert.pl/karpinski-po-baltic-pipe-opozycja> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

³⁸ “Sikorski: Gazprom nas ograł”, *BiznesAlert.pl*, 24 January 2022, <https://biznesalert.pl/sikorski-gazprom-nas-ogral-rozmowa> [accessed: 26 January 2022].

³⁹ J. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, *Racja stanu we współczesnej polskiej myśli politycznej 2001–2015*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2018, pp. 441–442.

position of the Norwegian side, meant that Poland did not take active steps to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline in 2007–2015. After the PO took power in Poland in 2007, it was not until 2013 that the investment was entered on the list of “Projects of Common Interest” and only in 2016, i.e. after PiS took power in Poland, did Gaz-System SA, together with Energinet from Denmark, develop a feasibility study for the Baltic Pipe project.

Conclusions

Poland’s great dependence on natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation forced the need to undertake actions aimed at creating a more diversified structure of gas imports. In this context, various political parties have advocated cooperation with key natural gas exporters, including Norway, and the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The implementation of the investment, which was extremely costly and complicated, also required a certain amount of activity in the political field and convincing partners from Norway and Denmark to implement this investment. Political support was necessary given the suspension of the project by the government of Leszek Miller. In addition, the activity of PGNiG SA was an element that contributed to increasing Poland’s credibility with regard to the willingness to import natural gas from Norway, and the portfolio of mining assets under construction.

Undoubtedly, for PiS, the issue of the scale of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation and the politicisation of this problem was an extremely important challenge. Consequently, politicians from this group were in favour of building several energy projects aimed at building a more diversified structure of gas supplies. The development of infrastructure was important in order to connect the Polish energy system with the European system and to enable the purchase of natural gas on commodity trading exchanges on the continent. An indispensable element of this strategy was the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline and a regasification terminal on the Baltic Sea. As a result, steps were taken to build a diversified portfolio of contracts for the supply of natural gas, which was to ultimately lead to the required diversified structure of gas imports. An important postulate and goal was also to resign from the need to conclude agreements at the intergovernmental level, as such a situation caused the politicisation of natural gas supplies.

For PO, economic considerations were a key aspect of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. In this regard, many politicians of this party stressed that a steady supply of this commodity at an attractive price was necessary for economic development. While PO politicians pointed to the legitimacy of infrastructure development, they were aware that any delays in the construction of the gas pipeline may adversely affect the level of Poland’s energy security. In this context, they

denied the legitimacy of completely resigning from cooperation with OAO Gazprom. As a result, it can be assumed that PO was in favour of building a diversified supply structure of natural gas, and the Russian Federation would play an important, but not the only role in energy cooperation.

To recapitulate, both PiS and PO were in favour of energy cooperation with Norway. However, the two groups differently emphasised the need to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. For PiS, this project played a strategic role in ensuring Poland's energy security, while for PO it was to play an important role in the diversified structure of natural gas imports.

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Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of energy security in the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO)

Abstract

The large share of natural gas supplies that are sent to Poland from the Russian Federation has been heavily criticised by many Polish political parties. Politicians from several political groups have emphasised the need to diversify the sources and directions of this commodity. In this respect, cooperation with Norway was to play a key role in ensuring the implementation of this scheme. The goal of this article is to analyse the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, the Law and Justice) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO, the Civic Platform) parties in the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The main research paradigm applied in the text is the analysis of testimonies and traces of political thought. Taking up the topic is important due to an overall lack of studies that show original findings of the standpoint of various political parties in Poland on the idea of building this specific type of energy infrastructure.

Key words: political thought, Baltic Pipe, energy security, political parties



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Defence policy of the Republic of Poland in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine

Introduction

Contemporary Europe, after years of peace, is again on the fire of war. The authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin and the lack of respect for international law have led to bloodshed in the territory of the independent Ukrainian state. The immediate threat that has appeared at the gates of the European Union and NATO is the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a situation that has caused not only shock among Western countries, but has also prompted them to revise their security and defence policies, including, in particular, the overall capacity and equipment of their armies. Given its geostrategic location, Poland has also been faced with this challenge.

The first days of the war in Ukraine resulted in the need, expressed by all political parties, to significantly increase Poland's defence potential, although several activities in this area began already in 2014, as a consequence of Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the outbreak of the conflict in the eastern parts of Ukraine. In light of the above circumstances, the goal of this article is to look at Poland's defence policy and assess its defensive potential, taking into account the assumptions of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, as well as selected investment plans and modernisation schemes for the defence sector in Poland.

Arguably, Poland's defence potential is highly inadequate to face up to the challenges posed by an open armed conflict, in particular a so-called hybrid conflict, a thesis that the author firmly believes in. The reasons for this are multiple and chiefly go down to the many years of neglect of Polish governments in the defence sector, and the lack of a long-term and consistent reform package of the Polish Armed Forces. The ambitious plans for the purchase of military equipment announced by the current government, although necessary, are not a remedy for all the defence problems that Poland is facing.

The research issue has been presented applying a variety of methods: content analysis to look at a variety of source documents and studies, factor analysis to identify variables affecting the state's defence potential, the descriptive method to outline and evaluate investment and modernisation plans in the Polish Armed Forces, and a few elements of the decision-making method, which has been applied to describe the various political phenomena related to the decision-making process. The research problem, given its topicality, has not received enough academic attention yet. For this reason, the article has been based on source documents and, to a large extent, on internet reports in the form of comments by the Ministry of National Defence and short analytical links of different institutions, such as e.g. The Kazimierz Pulaski Foundation, and the Center for Strategic Analyzes or Strategy & Future, which relate to the presented issues. In addition, the importance of the topic for the public means that the issue has become the subject of analyses published by specialist online portals, such as Defence24.pl or Polska Zbrojna, as well as press articles published on Internet portals.

Key tenets of Poland's security and defence policy¹

The currently binding National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted on 12 May 2020, indicates the progressive decomposition of the international order, which results in uncertainty and unpredictability in the security environment. The Strategy states explicitly that "the most serious threat is the neo-imperial policy of the authorities of the Russian Federation"² – not only in relation

¹ The key documents that concern Poland's security are the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 1997, no. 78, item 483), the acts that set out the tasks and principles of the functioning of security institutions in Poland, The Homeland Defence Act of March 11, 2022, and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Classified documents include the Development Program of the Polish Armed Forces, the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland, the Plans for the Use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, or those relating to the Military Command System.

² *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020* [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2020], Warszawa 2020, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP_2020.pdf [accessed: 16 March 2022]

to Poland, but generally for the entire international order, which was already highlighted in the previous strategy of 2014. The goals set out in the 2020 Strategy have evolved as a result of a series of changes that have occurred in the security environment. They confirm and, at the same time, continue the shift that took place in thinking about security and defence policy after 2014. Thus, the need to strengthen the security of NATO and make the EU's eastern flank even stronger has come to the fore. In addition, the 2020 document refers to such security challenges as hybrid threats, including the risk of subliminal aggression, activities in cyberspace, new unmanned technologies, computerised combat and support systems, artificial intelligence, or the risk of using tactical nuclear weapons for the so-called de-escalation of conventional conflict.³

The Strategy can be divided into a diagnostic part, which takes into account the assessment of the international environment and identifies the interests and strategic goals of the state; and a task part, which is based on four pillars that correspond to national interests: 1) security of the state and its citizens; 2) Poland in the system of international security; 3) national identity and heritage; and 4) social and economic development and environmental protection.⁴ Based on the provisions of the Strategy, in the first pillar,

Safeguarding independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and ensuring the security of the state and citizens will be implemented through a variety of actions, such as: integrating national security management, including state defence management and building adaptation abilities; increasing the state's resistance to threats by creating a universal defence system based on the efforts of the entire nation and building understanding for the development of the resistance and defence capabilities of the Republic of Poland; strengthening the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to deter and defend against security threats, with particular emphasis on increasing the level of mobility and technical modernization; increasing the level of resilience to cyber threats and increasing the level of information protection in the public, military and private sectors, and promoting knowledge and good practices enabling citizens to better protect their information, and ensuring the safe functioning of the state and citizens in the information space.⁵

Each of the strategic goals listed above has been assigned with a series of specific tasks and preparatory actions that are deemed necessary for their implementation. The same approach has been taken with regard to the remaining pillars of the Strategy.

³ S. Koziej, "Braki Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2020: bez koncepcji operacyjnej i priorytetów preparacyjnych", *Pułaski Policy Paper*, no. 4, 26 May 2020, <https://pulaski.pl/pulaski-policy-paper-s-koziej-braki-strategii-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-2020-bez-koncepcji-operacyjnej-i-priorytetow-preparacyjnych/> [accessed: 16 March 2022].

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP 2020, op. cit.*

With regard to the priorities of Poland's external guarantors of security – NATO and the EU in the first place – the Strategy points to the need to effectively influence the policy of the Alliance and the EU so that decisions made in these structures are in line with Poland's security interests. Secondly, the strategic partnership with the US is mentioned, especially in the areas of security and defence, and then regional cooperation, mainly within the Bucharest Nine, the Visegrad Group and the Weimar Triangle. The strengthening of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, as well as supporting them through the implementation of European and transatlantic aspirations, are invariably a major part of regional cooperation. The next pillars relate to strengthening the identity and national heritage as carriers of patriotic attitudes, and to creating a positive socio-economic image of Poland.⁶

Technical modernisation scheme of the Polish Army for 2021–2035

The Technical Modernisation Plan of the Polish Armed Forces is a classified document that takes into account the detailed scope of modernisation of the army and is updated every few years. The main subject to update is the timing of task implementation and its scope, by adding new projects and/or removing those that have been abandoned or already completed. As a rule, Technical Modernisation Plans are financed from the state budget under the annual budget acts and are implemented as part of the system of acquiring military equipment.⁷ Due to the extensiveness of the issue, only the current 15-year Technical Modernisation Plan for 2021–2035, announced by the Minister of National Defence on 10 October 2019, has been referred to below.

According to the public announcements of the Ministry of National Defence, the document mentions an increase in the investment budget to the level of PLN 524 billion and repeats several provisions from the previous plan (Modernization expenditure plan for 2017–2026) as a continuation of the undertaken and planned activities; a few new schemes have also been introduced. The updated plan includes, among others:

- purchase of additional F-16 aircraft for the Polish Army,
- continuation of the Harpia program, i.e. replacement of the Mig-29 and Su-22 aircraft with new multi-role 5th generation F-35 aircraft, in the number of 32,
- the new program Harpi Szpon, which is closely related to military drones and means unmanned aerial vehicles that are to cooperate with the F-35,

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ J. Ciślak, "Nowe plany, struktury i niewiele dostaw. Modernizacja Sił Zbrojnych RP w 2021 roku", *Defence24.pl*, 29 December 2021, <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/podsumowanie-realizacji-plan-modernizacji-technicznej-w-2021-roku> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

- continuation of the Kruk program, i.e. the purchase of attack helicopters,
- a new Observer program on the basis of which the army is to acquire satellites, microsatellites, reconnaissance planes and drones,
- development of the Wisła program, i.e. delivery of medium-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems (based on Patriot systems),
- development of the Narew short-range air defence system,
- development of the Miecznik and Orka programs, under which it is planned to acquire respectively three universal missile frigates for coastal defence and two submarines. In addition, as part of the Murena program, it is planned to purchase six light missile ships from Polish shipyards,
- continuation of the purchase of the Krab cannon-howitzers, Rak self-propelled mortars, Homar rocket launchers capable of hitting targets 70–300 km away, and wheeled APC Rosomak,
- continuation of the purchase of light anti-tank guided missiles codenamed Pustelnik and Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles,
- new Balsa program, thanks to which the Polish Army will acquire new, modern engineering robots supporting the work of sappers,
- the Ottokar Brzoza program, which involves the procurement of several dozen tank destroyers for the anti-tank regiment.⁸

As a consequence of the announced schemes, on 31 January 2020 in Dęblin, the head of the Ministry of National Defence signed a contract for the purchase of 32 multi-role 5th generation aircraft (F-35A), along with a training and logistics package. The value of the contract is USD 4.6 billion, and the first deliveries are to be made to Poland in 2024. In May 2020, Poland purchased from the US Javelin anti-tank launchers worth USD 54.5 million. In July 2021, the Ministry of National Defence announced a plan to purchase 250 American Abrams tanks in the latest version (M1A2 SEPv3), purchase of 24 Turkish Bayraktar combat drones and purchase of 100 FlyEye reconnaissance drones from WB Electronics. On April 5, 2022, these announcements were finalized and Minister of National Defence Mariusz Błaszczak signed a contract for the purchase of 250 Abrams tanks from the USA for over PLN 20 billion along with accompanying vehicles – technical support vehicles, armoured vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs), and ammunition.⁹ The

⁸ “524 miliardy złotych na modernizację Wojska Polskiego do 2035 roku”, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 10 October 2019, <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/524-miliardy-zlotych-na-modernizacje-wojska-polskiego-do-2035-roku> [accessed: 19.03.2022]

⁹ The contract also covers the purchase of 250 sets for neutralising radio-fired explosives, 26 Hercules technical support vehicles, 17 AVLBs, turbine engines for tanks, rifles and ammunition, communication systems and GPS receivers, as well as spare parts and equipment for repair facilities. See: “Umowa na Abramsy podpisana. Pierwsze czołgi jeszcze w tym roku”, Business Insider, 5 April 2022, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/wiadomosci/umowa-na-abrams-y-podpisana-pierwsze-czolgi-jeszcze-w-tym-roku/c603f0n> [accessed: 7 April 2022].

first 28 units for training purposes are to be delivered to Poland in 2022, and the rest of the order will be carried out successively until 2026. The situation remains unresolved regarding the purchase of Polish drones. As it results from the e-mails of the head of the Prime Minister's Chancellery that go back to 2019, intercepted and published on the web, these drones were to be only in the testing phase, which unfortunately turned out to be a failure.¹⁰ In turn, the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones are to be delivered to the Polish army in autumn 2022, according to the promises of the Ministry of National Defence.¹¹ In December 2021, Poland signed a contract with the US for the supply of 300 used MRAP Cougar vehicles for a total of USD 27.5 million.¹²

In 2021, plans were also continued to strengthen the national defence and industrial base, a significant part of which is now consolidated in Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (Polish Armaments Group), a major state-owned holding company. For this reason, on 15 December 2021, a contract was signed with PZL Mielec for the supply of another four Black Hawk commando helicopters (the first four were delivered in 2019). On 7 September 2021, the head of the Ministry of National Defence also signed an agreement with the PGZ-Narew Consortium for the purchase of 23 sets of the Narew short-range air defence system. In turn, in October 2021, Huta Stalowa Wola S.A., a part of the PGZ-Wisła consortium, delivered the first two complete M903 launchers, which are part of the Wisła air defence systems. According to the agreement concluded in 2018 between Poland and the US, a total of sixteen sets will be based on the Patriot system.¹³

During the session of the Sejm's National Defence Committee, which took place on 15 December 2021, Deputy Minister Wojciech Skurkiewicz reported on the status of implementation of modernisation contracts conducted by the Polish

¹⁰ M. Madejski, "Mają być czolgi i nowa ustawa. Rok 2022 zweryfikuje obietnice dla armii", *Business Insider*, 3 January 2022, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/wiadomosci/rok-2022-w-wojsku-maja-byc-czolgi-i-nowa-ustawa-co-czeka-armie/9bjzjmy> [accessed: 7 January 2022].

¹¹ J. Sabak, "Skurkiewicz: Tureckie drony Bayraktar TB2 na wyposażeniu polskiego wojska już jesienią", *Bankier.pl*, 25 March 2022, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Skurkiewicz-Tureckie-drony-Bayraktar-TB2-na-wyposazeniu-polskiego-wojska-jesienia-tego-roku-8305735.html> [accessed: 28 March 2022].

¹² P. Bednarz, "Polska na zakupach wojskowych w USA. Abramsy to nie wszystko. Oto co już kupiliśmy za oceanem", *Business Insider*, 5 April 2022, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/technologie/abramsy-to-nie-wszystko-co-polska-armia-kupuje-od-usa/10n4qfn> [accessed: 7 April 2022].

¹³ "MON przeznaczy na modernizację wojska 524 mld zł. Zyskają na tym polskie zakłady zbrojeniowe", *Polskie Radio24*, 31 December 2021, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/42/259/Artykul/2867360,MON-przeznaczy-na-modernizacje-wojska-524-mld-zl-Zyskaja-na-tym-polskie-zaklady-zbrojeniowe> [accessed: 19 March 2022]; "System bezpieczeństwa wschodniej flanki NATO. Debata na konferencji Defence24Day", *Polskie Radio24*, 29 September 2021, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/42/273/Artykul/2816283,System-bezpieczenstwa-wschodniej-flanki-NATO-Debata-na-konferencji-Defence24Day> [accessed: 19 March 2022].

Armed Forces at the end of 2021 with the participation of Polish defence industry plants.¹⁴ According to the data provided, the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate carried out 46 tasks with a total value of PLN 1.201 billion in the field of repairs, while in the field of purchases and modifications of equipment, it carried out 135 tasks worth PLN 601 million. The total value is PLN 1.802 billion, of which PLN 1.370 billion were allocated to entities of the Polish Defence Industry. As for the Armament Inspectorate of the Polish Armed Forces,¹⁵ at the end of 2021 it was implementing 357 long-term contracts with a total value of PLN 94.12 billion, of which 174 contracts worth PLN 38 billion were conducted by the Polish Defence Industry.¹⁶

Poland's defence potential

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a debate on the defence capabilities of the Polish army and has prompted a need to review the country's current defence potential. It is worth noting that the process of acquiring military equipment from the moment of contracting to delivery is usually long, hence the assessment of the effects of technical modernization will only be possible in the long term. Nevertheless, in the face of a threat, what really matters is the current potential of the army and its combat capabilities.¹⁷

According to the data of the Ministry of National Defence announced at the beginning of 2022, the Polish Army employs about 111.5 thousand professional soldiers and can rely on the backup of 32 thousand soldiers of the Territorial Defence Forces.¹⁸ Comparing it to a few other countries, especially European ones, it is

¹⁴ Rozpatrzenie informacji Ministra Obrony Narodowej na temat stanu realizacji kontraktów modernizacyjnych realizowanych przez Siły Zbrojne RP z udziałem polskich zakładów przemysłu zbrojeniowego, Posiedzenie sejmowej Komisji Obrony Narodowej nr 49 dnia 2021.12.15, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/PosKomZrealizowane.xsp?komisja=OBN#49> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

¹⁵ On 1 January 2022, under Decision 310/DPZ of the Minister of National Defence of 1 September 2021, the Armaments Agency was established to replace the Armaments Inspectorate of the Polish Armed Forces. The new institution also took over the tasks of the dissolved Inspectorate of Innovative Defence Technologies and the Offset Agreements Office. At the beginning of 2022, new rules for the procurement of military equipment, development and implementation of central material plans also began to apply. See: J. Ciślak, "Nowe plany, struktury i niewiele dostaw...", *op. cit.*

¹⁶ See more: J. Sabak, "Skurkiewicz: W 2021 roku z PPO zwarto umowy warte 9,9 mld zł. 95% z nich trafi do spółek PGZ", *Defence24.pl*, 16 December 2021, <https://defence24.pl/przemysl/skurkiewicz-w-2021-roku-z-ppo-zwarto-umowy-o-wartosci-99-mld-zl-z-czego-95-trafi-do-pgz> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

¹⁷ J. Ciślak, "Nowe plany, struktury i niewiele dostaw...", *op. cit.*

¹⁸ "Liczniejsze wojsko i więcej pieniędzy na obronność – Rada Ministrów przyjęła projekt ustawy o obronie Ojczyzny", 22 February 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/liczniesze>

not a comfortable situation for the front country. Marek Budzisz, an expert of the Strategy & Future think tank, notes in one of his articles that “in the current situation, Poland is able to deploy 10 to 12 tactical battalion groups in the emergency hour, which is far too little for the policy of deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank to be effective.”¹⁹

However, it should be added that, although at a low pace, the number of soldiers is gradually increasing every year. This is primarily the result of the “Become a soldier of the Republic of Poland” social campaign held by the Ministry of National Defence, and the simplification of the rules of recruitment to the army. Moreover, the conditions for the service of professional soldiers in terms of received salaries have improved.²⁰ The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has increased the interest in serving in the army even further. As Minister Błaszczak once said, “in just one week (from February 24), over 2,200 volunteers submitted declarations of joining the Polish Armed Forces. Previously, it was about 400 people a week.”²¹ However, a major area of concern is the gradual termination of the National Reserve Forces scheme, which has been observed for several years. Its core purpose is to provide staff to supplement jobs in each of the five types of the Polish Armed Forces. Unfortunately, this is an effect of the decision made in 2010 to suspend conscription. Thus, the most numerous group of reservists are currently people aged 51–60 and 41–50.²²

The problem of the Polish army, however, is not so much the quantity of the army as its quality, and, therefore, the completeness of the equipment and the combat readiness of soldiers. Experts Maciej Kucharczyk and Witold Jurasz from the Center for Strategic Analyzes (OAS) scrutinised the condition of the Polish army in 2019 labelling them as “catastrophically bad.” Generally speaking, the modernisation of the army is façade, in their opinion, and the average age of the equipment used has not changed compared to the state of 20 years ago. In their opinion, “the Polish army is the islands of modernity in the sea of backwardness.” The experts have pointed out a number of deficiencies, including the lack of a long-term

wojsko-i-wiecej-pieniedzy-na-obronnosc--rada-ministrow-przyjela-projekt-ustawy-o-obronie-ojczyzny2 [accessed: 21 March 2022].

¹⁹ As cited in: M. Budzisz, “Armia 250 tysięcy – marzenie, które nie zostanie zrealizowane”, Strategy & Future, 3 November 2021, <https://strategyandfuture.org/armia-250-tysiecy-marzenie-ktore-nie-zostanie-zrealizowane> [accessed: 25 March 2022].

²⁰ The indicator on which the remuneration was calculated increased from 2.95 in 2015 to 3.81 in 2019, *Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2015–2020*, <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/BBN2015-2020.pdf> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

²¹ As cited in: “Więcej chętnych do armii”, *Polska Zbrojna*, 7 March 2022, <http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/36676?t=Wiecej-chetnych-do-armii#> [accessed: 20 March 2022].

²² M. Kozubal, “Rezerwistów jest coraz mniej i są coraz starsi”, *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 February 2021, <https://www.rp.pl/wojsko/art253691-rezerwistow-jest-coraz-mniej-i-sa-coraz-starsi> [accessed: 21 March 2022].

and consistently implemented reform, and blaming individual governing teams for it. “This means that we are buying too little and too slowly to realistically modernize the army as a whole. The novelties are barely sufficient to replenish the losses resulting from the necessity to withdraw completely obsolete or used equipment,” claim the analysts.²³ Professor Brigadier General Stanisław Koziej, who talks about *ad hoc* “injection purchases”, which, in his opinion, do not contribute to the expected increase in the state’s defence, but serve more for propaganda purposes.²⁴ An example is the purchase of the Abrams tanks. While their choice is not questioned, because they are highly advanced on the battlefield, looking at the mosaic of what Poland currently has at its disposal – i.e. Leopard 2 tanks (Leopard 2PL and Leopard 2A5 variants), PT-91 and the most numerous and heavily worn tanks T-72 in the T-72M/M1/M1R versions – considerable efforts should be made to integrate and combine all these tanks into one system, and taking into account completely different technologies and components, it also requires a significant additional investment to purchase the entire accompanying logistic kits.²⁵

Looking at the equipment of the Polish army, it turns out that many military units do not have the appropriate equipment they need. The navy is the most underinvested, the capabilities of which were assessed by Deputy Minister Wojciech Skurkiewicz himself, who said that “the operational capabilities of the Navy in the area of counteracting surface and underwater targets, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence are significantly limited.”²⁶ The minister’s words should come as no surprise, given the technical condition of the fleet. These are mainly outdated and worn-out ships that are often subject to prolonged repairs. Due to many years of neglect, the Polish Navy has only one submarine, ORP (Okręt Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, lit. Polish Navy Ship) Orzeł, built in the 1980s. It is necessary to replace all the vessels, but this is a very costly undertaking and, above all, a long-lasting task. New ships rarely enter service. In recent years, only the ORP Ślężak patrol corvette, ORP Kormoran minehunter and a series of six tugs have been incorporated. Two more mine destroyers ORP Albatros and Mewa are currently under construction, and they will probably enter service in 2022. According to the announcements of the head of the Ministry of National Defence, the technological leap will be the

²³ As cited in: M. Kucharczyk, W. Jurasz, “Siły Zbrojne RP czyli ani silni, ani zwarci, ani gotowi”, Ośrodek Analiz Strategicznych, 14 June 2019, <https://oaspl.org/2019/06/14/sily-zbrojne-rp-czyli-ani-silni-ani-zwarcia-ani-gotowi> [accessed: 21 March 2022].

²⁴ M. Madejski, *op. cit.*

²⁵ B. Kucharski, “Czołgi Abrams dla Wojska Polskiego – komentarz”, Zespół Badań i Analiz Militarnych, 15 July 2021, <https://zbiarn.pl/czolgi-abrams-dla-wojska-polskiego-%E2%80%92-komentarz> [accessed: 7 April 2022].

²⁶ M. Dura, “MON: Marynarka Wojenna RP ze znacząco ograniczonymi zdolnościami [Komentarz]”, Defence24.pl, 18 March 2021, <https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/mon-marynarka-wojenna-rp-ze-znacząco-ograniczonymi-zdolnościami-komentarz> [accessed: 7 April 2022].

Miecznik program, i.e. the construction of frigates with high combat capabilities, the Orka program (submarines) and the Murena program (missile ships). There is still a long and bumpy road to the implementation of these investments. More than once, ambitious announcements have turned out to be a hostage of time, funds or the decision-making process. In addition, the delays we observe in the navy will not be compensated by the purchase of a few ships, but must be offset by in-depth structural and technological reforms.²⁷

Another underinvested area is anti-aircraft defence, the systems of which, during massive air attacks, have no chance to effectively fight the enemy. The military is very modestly equipped with anti-missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles, so important on the battlefield, as demonstrated by military operations in Ukraine. The lack of an effective air defence could even undermine all other modernisation efforts. Although air defence was identified as a priority area for modernization a few years ago, it was clearly underinvested during that time.²⁸

The pace of delivery of the remaining deliveries of new and modified military equipment also leaves much to be desired. Only last year, we managed to obtain only a few pieces of equipment from contracted deliveries.²⁹ One of the major problems, apart from cost-intensiveness, is the complicated system of acquiring military equipment in which a large group of entities is involved, which also translates into the pace of the work that is carried out.³⁰

According to OAS and Strategy & Future experts, “Poland does not need a large army, but an appropriately structured, complete and combat-ready army [...]; the key in the modern battlefield is not the amount of equipment, but the manoeuvrability of units, firepower and the so-called C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence). Even relatively old hardware can be effective if it is supported by an efficient C4I.”³¹ Jacek Bartosiak adds that “modern war is lightning fast, it is based on systems, decision loop, dronisation, technology saturation”, therefore it is necessary to expand special forces, radar system, intelligence

²⁷ “Gen. Skrzypczak: Kilka słów o polskiej Marynarce Wojennej”, Defence24.pl, 13 March 2022, <https://defence24.pl/kilka-slow-o-polskiej-marynarce-wojennej-opinia> [accessed: 2 April 2022]; J. Ciślak, “Miecznik i niewiele więcej? Modernizacja Marynarki Wojennej w 2022 roku”, Defence24.pl, 24 January 2022, <https://defence24.pl/miecznik-i-niewiele-wiecej-modernizacja-marynarki-wojennej-w-2022-roku> [accessed: 4 April 2022].

²⁸ P. Bednarz, *op. cit.*

²⁹ See more: J. Ciślak, “Nowe plany, struktury i niewiele dostaw..”, *op. cit.*

³⁰ See more: “Wybrane aspekty modernizacji technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP”, Polska Zbrojna, 17.08.2021, <http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/35063?t=Wybrane-aspekty-modernizacji-technicznej-Sil-Zbrojnych-RP#> [accessed: 28 March 2022].

³¹ As cited in: A. Patrzyła, “Polskie wojsko jest w alarmująco złym stanie. Co musimy zrobić, by wygrać potencjalną wojnę z Rosją?”, Forsal.pl, 13 December 2021, <https://forsal.pl/swiat/bezpieczenstwo/artykuly/8307842,polskie-i-rosyjskie-wojsko-stan-porownanie-potencjalna-wojna.html> [accessed: 2 March 2022].

and counterintelligence at the tactical, operational or strategic level³². An inseparable element is also readiness for active cyber defence, as stated in the cybersecurity doctrine issued in January 2015 by the National Security Bureau. In 2018, the Act on the National Cybersecurity System was adopted,³³ and it was the first such legal act in Poland. It shows where we are. It is also necessary to create a cyber defence force, which was noticed by Polish decision-makers and included in the Development Plan of the Polish Armed Forces for 2017–2026.³⁴ However, it was not until February 2019 that the Concept for the Organization and Functioning of the Cyberspace Defence Forces was approved, and on 8 February 2022, the Cyberspace Defence Forces Component Command was formally established, cooperating closely with the National Cyberspace Security Center³⁵. The Cyberspace Defence Forces were formally formed on 1 January 2022, but, according to reports, they may not be fully operational until the turn of 2024/2025.³⁶

The Homeland Defence Act

As a consequence of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine, the Polish government accelerated work on a new law on state defence. Its initial assumptions were made public in October 2021, and on 28 February 2022, the government urgently sent its bill to the parliament, advocating, *inter alia*, the need to increase the size of the army, restore the reserve system, increase the defence budget, as well as the general technical modernisation of the army. The Homeland Defence Act,³⁷ which is the official name of the document adopted in March 2022, is intended to modernise

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2018 r. o krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa, Dz.U., 2018, item 1560, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20180001560> [accessed: 2 March 2022].

³⁴ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2019, p. 137.

³⁵ See: *Wojska Obrony Cyberprzestrzeni rozpoczynają działalność*, MON, 8 February 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/wojska-obrony-cyberprzestrzeni-rozpoczynaja-dzialalnosc> [accessed: 5 April 2022].

³⁶ The Cyberspace Defence Forces currently do not constitute a separate type of armed forces. Ultimately, they are to constitute a specialised component of the Armed Forces. See more: P. Jaszczuk, *Wojska Obrony Cyberprzestrzeni – rodzaj sił zbrojnych, rodzaj wojsk czy specjalistyczny komponent?*, CyberDefence24, 9 February 2022, <https://cyberdefence24.pl/armia-i-sluzby/wojska-obrony-cyberprzestrzeni-rodzaj-sil-zbrojnych-rodzaj-wojsk-czy-specjalistyczny-komponent> [accessed: 5 April 2022]; *idem*, *Wojska Obrony Cyberprzestrzeni. Kto może trafić do polskiego cyberwojska?*, CyberDefence24, 11 February 2022, <https://cyberdefence24.pl/armia-i-sluzby/wojska-obrony-cyberprzestrzeni-kto-moze-trafic-do-polskiego-cyberwojska> [accessed: 5 April 2022].

³⁷ Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny, Dz.U., 2022, poz. 655, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20220000655> [accessed: 2 April 2022].

the Polish Armed Forces, but also to organise the provisions on defence and the army itself, so far contained in several different acts.

Although the act itself does not specify the target number of the armed forces, the Minister of National Defence, Mariusz Błaszczak, made it clear that it was about 300,000 soldiers, including 250,000 professional soldiers and 50,000 soldiers of the Territorial Defence Forces. The reserve staff will also be increased, which will now be divided into active and passive staff. In addition, an incentive and profit system, as well as clear and simplified rules for promotion, will be introduced for candidates for military service. On the other hand, experienced professional soldiers who decide to continue their service will receive incentive benefits, the amount of which will depend on the achieved service period. The act also introduces voluntary basic military service performed for a period of 12 months.³⁸

Based on the new regulations, from next year, it is also assumed that the expenditure on the Polish Army will increase to a level of at least 3% of the country's GDP.³⁹ It is worth mentioning that after 2014 Poland increased the percentage of GDP allocated to defence, with most of these funds being spent on repairing the equipment in use and personnel costs, not the purchase of new equipment.⁴⁰ In the case of personnel costs, it is also important to mention that a level higher than 2% of GDP, also includes military pensions, which in 2021 accounted for almost 1/5 of the entire budget of the Ministry of National Defence.⁴¹ Eurostat data, which does not treat this expenditure as expenditure on defence, indicate that Poland spends 1.6% of its GDP on the armed forces in 2019, and 1.7% in 2020.⁴²

Whilst working on the final version of the Homeland Defence Act, a decision was taken to introduce a new, additional financing mechanism, which will be the Armed Forces Support Fund, guaranteed by the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego [lit. National Economy Bank], a financial institution operating outside the central

³⁸ "Liczniejsze wojsko i więcej pieniędzy na obronność – Rada Ministrów przyjęła projekt ustawy o obronie Ojczyzny", MON, 22 August 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/liczniesze-wojsko-i-wiecej-pieniedzy-na-obronnosc--rada-ministrow-przyjela-projekt-ustawy-o-obronie-ojczyzny2> [accessed: 29 March 2022].

³⁹ It states that annual expenditure from the state budget of at least 2.2% of the GDP in 2022 and at least 3% of the GDP in 2023 and subsequent years shall be allocated to financing defence needs. *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ M. Kucharczyk, W. Jurasz, "Siły Zbrojne RP czyli ani silni, ani zwarczi, ani gotowi", *op. cit.*

⁴¹ *Omówienie sprawozdania z wykonania budżetu państwa za okres od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2021 r.*, Ministerstwo Finansów, <https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/sprawozdanie-roczne-za-2021> [accessed: 23 March 2022] oraz "Wydatki na obronność. Polska na tle UE", Money.pl, 27 August 2021, <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wydatki-na-obronnosc-polska-na-tle-ue-6676784102124384a.html> [accessed: 23 March 2022].

⁴² *Government expenditure on defence*, Eurostat, data extracted in February 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_on_defence#Expenditure_on_.27defence.27 [accessed: 5 April 2022].

budget, supported by contributions from the government, contributions from state defence companies, proceeds from bonds or securities, and from profits from sale of military equipment or the proceeds from the rental of military infrastructure. The military will also be able to purchase equipment through leasing.⁴³

Most of these postulates had been pursued by military and expert circles for a long time; therefore, the assumptions of the act should be considered necessary if one wants to talk about a real strengthening of the Polish army, although it will only take place in the long run. However, doubts may arise from the assumed disproportionate increase in the number of soldiers in relation to the increase in military spending. It turns out that if we are to increase the budget from 2.0% of GDP to 3%, and at the same time we assume that the army will increase twice, i.e. to 300,000 soldiers. This means that a larger army will still not be sufficiently invested. If we assume 3% of GDP, we should proportionally increase the army to 200,000 soldiers. If it is important to build an army of 300,000 soldiers, the expenditure ought to be raised to the level of 4.5% of GDP in order to maintain the pace of modernization without lowering the quality.⁴⁴

Another controversial issue is the fact that the newly established Armed Forces Support Fund goes beyond the state budget, which has been the main source of financing for the army so far, so the debt of the fund will not be included in the state public debt, and thus will not be subjected to the control exercised by the Polish parliament. This is a procedure that has already been applied in the case of another special-purpose fund, i.e. the COVID-19 Counteracting Fund. This poses a major risk of abuse and a temptation to conceal the actual state of public finances, which in the longer term may lead to a critical level of state debt. Yet this is not a randomly taken action, as maintaining financing only within the state budget would inevitably lead to the government's need to increase budget revenues, e.g. by new or higher taxes, or to cuts in other expenses, or to an increase in the state deficit, which, in turn, gives rise to the threat of a number of serious consequences for its financial credibility. Therefore, in order to avoid this, the government decided to establish a new special purpose fund.⁴⁵

⁴³ "Liczniejsze wojsko i więcej pieniędzy na obronność...", *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ M. Oleksiejuk, "Najważniejsze założenia Ustawy o obronie Ojczyzny", Casimir Pulaski Foundation, <https://pulaski.pl/komentarz-pulaskiego-najwazniejsze-zalozenia-ustawy-o-obronie-ojczyzny-michal-oleksiejuk/> [accessed: 10 April 2022].

⁴⁵ M. Chądzyński, "Wzrost wydatków na wojsko. Wszystko co trzeba wiedzieć o finansowaniu armii", 300Gospodarka, 3 March 2022, <https://300gospodarka.pl/explainer/wzrost-wydatkow-na-wojsko-wszystko-co-trzeba-wiedziec-o-finansowaniu-armii> [accessed: 10 April 2022]; J. Cęglarz, "Rząd wyprowadza finansowanie armii poza budżet. 'Ekonomiczny analfabetyzm'", Business Insider, 22 February 2022, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/gospodarka/rzad-wyprowadza-finansowanie-armii-pozza-budzet-ekonomiczny-analfabetyzm/k4m031x> [accessed: 10 April 2022].

Conclusions

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has prompted Polish political decision-makers to undertake another, hopefully this time, effective revision of Poland's defence potential. The currently emerging image of the combat readiness of the Polish Armed Forces is not optimistic, especially in the area of air defence and the navy, and this may be of key importance, for example, due to the vicinity of the Kaliningrad Oblast. In addition, being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and also a front-line state, Poland has a duty to build an army capable of cooperating within NATO and to create appropriate infrastructure for the allied forces. At the same time, strengthening Poland's defence potential is necessary from the point of view of the state to build an effective policy of deterrence, but also to sustain a possible first enemy attack.

All this requires rational and thoughtful decisions and their consistent implementation. In summary, the analysis presented above has led to the following conclusions.

First, Poland needs a long-term defence strategy, consistently implemented by successive Polish ruling teams.

Second, the combat capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces should be fully completed and increased as soon as possible. The technical modernisation program for 2021–2035 defines the overall demand; however, the key here will be financing and the consistency of implementing individual programs, the effects of which will de facto only be visible in a few years. Combat capabilities, in turn, must be developed on the basis of efficient reconnaissance, command, communication and modern technologies adapted to the so-called lightning wars, but above all, they must fit into the long-term defence strategy of the Republic of Poland. Purchasing military equipment alone is certainly not enough. Cyber defence also remains a key challenge. The establishment of cyber defence troops should be noted positively, however, until they are operational, the state must implement ad hoc measures if we want to avoid, for example, the cyberattack scenario that Estonia struggled with in 2007.

Third, the increase in defence spending should be noted positively, however, in order for it to bring the desired results, most of these funds should be dedicated to the purchase of new equipment, and not the cost of maintaining a military manpower. Hence the level of 300,000 soldiers announced by Minister Mariusz Błaszczak seem too high a target.

Fourth, any decision made on the purchase of new equipment for the army, compatible with the entire defence system, should be consulted with military experts and practitioners and not only be a political decision.

All the assumptions of the Homeland Defence Act should be considered necessary for the real strengthening of the Polish army, however, we will have to wait

several years for the effects, if we manage to flexibly implement all its provisions and guarantee adequate financing. Finally, the construction and implementation of an integrated security management system, including the management of state defence mechanisms to be operative during a war at both the central – i.e. governmental – and local/regional level, is yet another challenge that lies ahead.

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*Defence policy of the Republic of Poland
in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine
Abstract*

As a consequence of Russia’s aggressive actions – initially with regard to the annexation of Crimea, and the beginning of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 – many European Union countries have revised their current security and defence policies. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated on 24 February 2022, only strengthened this tendency. For Poland, one of NATO’s major eastern flank states, the need to improve the management of national security that corresponds to the challenges and threats that lie ahead has become self-evident. The goal of this article is to look at the assumptions of the defence policy of the Republic of Poland, and to evaluate the country’s defence potential based on the implemented modernisation schemes.

Key words: defence policy, Poland, Russian aggression, Polish Armed Forces



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Operation “Sluice”. The so-called migration crisis at the Polish-Belarussian border: an example of hybrid actions taken in the second half of 2021 as documented in the reports of the Polish border guard

Introduction

A year after the rigged presidential elections in Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka decided to use the migration crisis in Europe in 2015–2017 to destabilise the eastern flank of NATO and the European Union (EU) by taking advantage of the so-called demographic weapon, also known as Weapon D.¹ With the tacit support of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka, still hesitant to retain power, launched a hybrid operation against Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, member states of NATO and the EU. For this purpose, he used thousands of economic migrants who had been transported by air to Belarus since spring 2021. The Belarusian authorities had abolished visas for citizens of many post-Soviet countries and from other

¹ See: W. Repetowicz, “Broń »D« jako zagrożenie asymetryczne”, *Wiedza Obronna*, no. 21, 2018, pp. 107–125, <http://wiedzaobronna.edu.pl/index.php/wo/article/view/21/18> [accessed: 8 May 2022]; D. Niedzielski, “Kryzys na granicy Polski z Białorusią – nowy format działań hybrydowych?”, *Biuletyn Akademickiego Centrum Komunikacji Strategicznej*, no. 1, 2022, p. 2.

more distant countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The underlying objectives of these actions vary, but one of them is the return of the Central and Eastern European region – including Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states – to the reconstruction scheme of the Russian sphere of influence, thoughtfully devised in Moscow.

This paper looks at the events that took place on the Belarusian-Polish border, as well as in the regions of Belarus bordering Lithuania and Latvia. The events and activities are developmental in their nature; hence the circumstances and timing of their completion cannot be predicted, and because the situation is dynamic, no broader studies have been conducted on the subject of the crisis so far. Reference has been made to the modest literature on the subject available, as well as to the information found on the websites of the Polish Border Guard, which has been provided in the footnotes and bibliography. In terms of research methodology, the author has applied the evolutionary method, the method that aims to describe developmental processes and migration, and the sociological method for the study of social structures.

To act against Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, the Belarusian regime used migrants brought to Belarus from the countries of the Near and Middle East, and from Russia. As Witold Repetowicz noted, “Belarus has not been known so far as a country that ‘receives refugees.’”² The regime’s reluctance to accept migrants is also confirmed by Amnesty International: for example, in 2020, the Belarusian authorities granted international protection to only five people, and the regime cooperates with many authoritarian governments, sending people who fled from it to their country of origin for various reasons.³ Based on the observations of events and information that we already have since August 2021, the following theses can be made on this subject: First if all, the so-called the migration crisis was created by the regime of Lukashenka as a hybrid attack first on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU in order to weaken them. Second, the Belarusian authorities are supported by the Russian Federation, whose authorities are interested in the economic and resource-related “kneeling down” of the EU countries. Third, the overriding goal of the Russian Federation is to enhance a closer integration of Belarus and strengthening the country’s vassal-like bondage with Russia, as can be seen from the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Arguably, Belarusian actions are compatible with the war in Ukraine, although this issue requires a separate analysis. Fourth, the crisis may end with the return of migrants to their countries of residence, while the construction of a border fence and its surveillance schemes serve to detain migrants. These are the key goals of the actions taken by the Belarusian secret service, code-named “Sluice”.

² W. Repetowicz, *op. cit.*

³ “Sytuacja na granicy. Pytania i odpowiedzi”, Amnesty International Polska, 4 February 2022, <https://amnesty.org.pl/sytuacja-na-granicy-pytania-i-odpowiedzi> [accessed: 25 June 2022].

The nature of the so-called migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border

The turn of July and August 2021 witnessed the outbreak of the so-called "migration crisis." The aim of the Belarusian secret services was to literally "push" tens of thousands of people from the countries of the Middle East and the Middle East out from Belarus and into Poland. A large part of them were economic migrants, often with their families, who came to Belarus after the Belarusian authorities had lifted visas in September 2021 for many countries from this part of the world. Thus, they extended the list to 80 countries for which visas were abolished in 2017.⁴ The Belarusian regime used the experience of the 2015–2017 migration crisis in Europe as a result of the Arab Spring revolution against the undemocratic authorities that led to the revolution and the ongoing war in Syria.⁵

Illegal migration to Lithuania and Latvia, and subsequently to Poland, began at the turn of July and August 2021. It was supported by the Belarusian services, financed by state-owned enterprises, and consistently encouraged by Lukashenka himself. According to Tadeusz Giczán, an independent Belarusian journalist and CEPA think tank expert, the Belarusian services conducted activities under the code name "Sluice", developed in 2010–2011 by the heads of the KGB and OSAM, a special unit of the Belarusian Border Service. The then transfer of migrants across the border forced the EU to transfer tens of millions of euros to Belarus to seal the border. The members of the BYPOL organization of former officers of the Belarusian services operating in Warsaw informed about the operation "Sluice". According to them, the transfer of people to the EU borders was supported by the Belarusian services and the Armed Forces, and the entire operation was probably led by the head of the KGB of Belarus, General Iwan Tertel. Initially, the Belarusian authorities attacked the borders with Latvia and Lithuania; in this case, an additional factor was the fact that the leader of the Belarusian opposition, Sviatlana Cichanouska, who took refuge there in fear of being arrested by the Belarusian KGB, resided in Vilnius.⁶

⁴ "Białoruś rozszerza tryb bezwizowy. Obejmuje m.in. obywateli Egiptu, Jordanii, Pakistanu i Iranu", Forsal.pl, 16 September 2021, <https://forsal.pl/swiat/bezpieczenstwo/artykuly/8247501,bialorus-rozszerza-tryb-bezwizowy-obejmuje-min-obywateli-egiptu-jordanii-pakistanu-i-iranu.html> [accessed: 18 October 2021]; see: D. Niedzielski, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵ A. Dzisiów-Szuszczukiewicz, "»Arabska wiosna« – przyczyny, przebieg i prognozy", *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 2, 2011, p. 42; see: W. Wilk, *Wojna w Syrii i kryzys humanitarny. Informator dla dziennikarzy*, Warszawa: Polskie Centrum Pomocy Międzynarodowej, 2016, p. 17, https://pcpm.org.pl/pliki2015/2016/04/SYRIA_Informator_full.pdf [accessed: 12 December 2021].

⁶ "Operacja »Śluza«. Tadeusz Giczán: Łukaszenka toczy wojnę hybrydową, zaplanował ją od A do Z, to było jasne od początku", Polskie Radio 24, 29 August 2021, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/2796861,Operacja-Sluza-Tadeusz-Giczán-Lukaszenka>

The actions taken by the Belarusian regime are an example of a hybrid aggression by means of demographic weapons in the form of tens of thousands of people, where young men predominate, although there are also women (including pregnant women) and children. Pushing these people across the border to Lithuania, Latvia and Poland by the Belarusian services is a threat to the security of the border zone of these countries and its inhabitants. It is enough to mention the erroneous approach to the issue of migrants in Germany in 2015, when the then chancellor Angela Merkel, back in September 2015, “invited” hundreds of thousands of people from African and Middle East countries to Germany, whose arrival had a negative impact on the sense of security, because among the refugees were several former activists of the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations who were hiding from the justice system. For the above reasons, Poland and Hungary did not agree to the compulsion to relocate refugees on their territory, choosing security over the human rights, which are of major significance for the neo-Marxist circles, which treat patriotism and the obligation to defend the borders of the state and its citizens as “nationalism.” Hence, after the crisis of 2015–2017, the government of the Republic of Poland has consistently taken the position of defending the state’s borders and its security.⁷ The consequences of the uncontrolled influx of Islamic migrants were also terrorist attacks in Germany, France and Belgium, rapes and sexual harassment of women, such as in Cologne.⁸ Currently, the situation with refugees may repeat itself in Gibraltar.

Operation “Sluice” and its course in 2021: Latvia and Lithuania

From spring 2020, the Belarusian regime prepared to transfer migrants to the territory of the EU. To do this, commandos of OSAM, a special unit of the Belarusian Border Service, conducted illegal reconnaissance in the border forests in Poland. The aim of these activities was to determine the routes used by smugglers so that they could be reused for the smuggling of migrants, but the Polish Border Guard failed to locate them. From the spring of 2021, the Border Guard officers of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia recorded more and more attempts of illegal border crossing by migrants from the Middle East and Africa. Apparently, the Belarussian regime uses them to destabilise EU countries, as revenge for the imposition of sanctions

toczy-wojne-hybrydowa-zaplanowal-ja-od-A-do-Z-to-bylo-jasne-od-poczatku [accessed: 9 November 2021].

⁷ A. Głowacki, *Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców. Komunikat z badań nr 3*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, 2017, pp. 4–10; see: G. Baziur, Zagrożenia podstawowych praw człowieka w Europie w kontekście kryzysu migracyjnego i zagrożenia terrorystycznego w latach 2015-2017, [in:] *Prawa człowieka i ich ochrona*, eds. M. Malczyńska-Biały, K. Żarna, Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo UR, 2018, pp. 20–26.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 28–30.

following yet another rigged presidential election, and for notorious violations of human rights.⁹

The implementation of operation "Sluice" began on 26 May 2021, three days after the Ryanair plane, on board of which was opposition blogger Raman Pratasiewicz, and his arrest by KGB officers, was forced to land at the airport in Minsk. In response, the EU imposed additional sanctions on Belarus, and Lukashenka announced that he would not obstruct people trying to enter the EU, his speech being repeatedly broadcast on Iraqi television.

After increasing the number of flights between Iraqi cities and Minsk, Iraqis began arriving in Belarus, and they were serviced by the Centrkurort company. After landing in Minsk, they received tourist visas, after which a large part of them went to the vicinity of the border with Lithuania, trying to cross it illegally. Some people used the help of smugglers, paying them 1,000–1,500 USD to be transported to Vilnius. Following the EU intervention, the Iraqi authorities suspended flights from Iraq to Belarus. Still, many Iraqis kept flying to Minsk via the Istanbul airport, or via Syria. Eventually the Turkish and Syrian airlines also banned flights to Belarus.¹⁰

After the Lithuanian government's decision to turn back the people who were trying to cross the border illegally, Belarusians redirected migrants to the borders with Poland and Latvia, and Lithuanians refused to let more than 1,500 people. After the border was closed by the Lithuanian authorities, they asked the Iraqi side to send airplanes to Minsk to take these people, including those who threw their passports away, to return them to the country, which the Iraqi authorities did, and the Belarusian regime decided to launch a hybrid attack on Poland.

Operation "Sluice": a demographic attack on Poland

The first cases of illegal migrants crossing the Polish-Belarusian border were registered on 5 July 2021, when a Border Guard patrol from the Narewka unit detained 40 Afghans near Babia Góra, who crossed the so-called "green border" without any documents. After the court's decision, they were placed in centres for foreigners.¹¹

⁹ W. Wasylów, "Białoruscy komandosi w Polsce. Reżim Łukaszenki przygotowywał się do przerzutu migrantów od roku", *Natemat.pl*, 12 November 2021, <https://natemat.pl/383727,bialoruskie-sily-specjalne-robily-rozoznanie-po-polskiej-stronie-granicy> [accessed: 12 December 2021].

¹⁰ "Kolejne linie lotnicze zawieszają loty do Mińska. To nimi przylatują migranci", *Radio Zet*, 13 November 2021, <https://wiadomosci.radiozet.pl/Swiat/Kryzys-na-granicy-z-Bialorusia.-Syrjskie-linie-Cham-Wings-zawieszaja-loty-do-Minska> [accessed: 14 November 2021].

¹¹ E. Szczepańska, "Zatrzymano nielegalnych migrantów", *Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej*, 6 July 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9270,Zatrzymano-nielegalnych-migrantow.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

Large groups of migrants began to cross the Polish-Belarusian border in August 2017. Between 6–9 August, officers of the Podlasie Border Guard Unit detained 349 people from Iraq and Afghanistan for illegal border crossing, who were subsequently ordered by the court to be placed in guarded centres for foreigners.¹²

During the illegal crossing of the border by migrants, the life and health of some was put at risk: for example, on the night of 19–20 August, Border Guard officers from Narewka rescued 12 people who were stuck in the Narew backwaters.¹³ Among the people who crossed the Polish-Belarusian border illegally, some made an attempt to legalise their stay in Poland, e.g. on 21 October, when officers from the Border Guard Post in Białowieża took over a group of 29 people from Iraq who declared their willingness to apply for protection in Poland; after the decision of the court, they were placed in centres for foreigners.¹⁴

Since the beginning of the “migration crisis”, the Belarusian services have used migrants to attack the Polish border, often pushing them towards it or hitting and kicking them. On 23 October, a group of about 70 aggressive people tried to break through to Poland near Usnarz Górny, throwing stones at the Border Guard officers. A day later, the migrants made another attempt, injuring two soldiers, who were transported to a hospital in Białystok, where their wounds were treated, and they were eventually discharged. Among the people breaking the border, Border Guard officers saw Belarusian soldiers in civilian clothes cutting the barbed-wire fence with scissors.¹⁵

In order to hinder the smuggling of migrants, officers of the Border Guard and the Police were locating and catching couriers who transported people from Belarus to Poland and to the border with Germany. An example of this was seen on 26 October, when 37 migrants from Iraq, during a bus control by Border Guard officers, demolished the vehicle, preventing their escape to Germany with the support of the Police. Also, on 8 December in the Jacowlan area, an Border Guard patrol tried to stop a vehicle for inspection, the driver of which did not respond to the signal

¹² “Duże grupy cudzoziemców zatrzymane na polsko-białoruskim odcinku granicy”, Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 9 August 2021, <https://strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9350,Duze-grupy-cudzoziemcow-zatrzymane-na-polsko-bialoruskim-odcinku-granicy.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

¹³ E. Szczepańska, “Na pomoc migrantom”, Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 20 August 2021, <https://strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9374,Na-pomoc-migrantom.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

¹⁴ “Grupa 29 imigrantów ubiega się o ochronę w Polsce”, Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 22 October 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9498,Grupa-29-imigrantow-ubiega-sie-o-ochrone-w-Polsce.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

¹⁵ “Migranci podjęli próbę siłowego przedarcia się do Polski”, Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 25 October 2021, <https://ww.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9500,Migranci-podjeli-probe-silowego-przedarcia-sie-do-Polski.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

and was later captured. The Border Guard handed it over to the Police, and the migrants were handed over to the Border Guard Station in Kuźnica Białostocka.¹⁶

The largest attack by migrants to the border took place on 16 November in Bruzgi, under the supervision of the deputy commander of the Border Service of the Republic of Belarus, General Roman Podlinev. They were repulsed by the Polish Border Guard, Police and Army officers. Seven policemen, a Border Guard officer and a soldier were wounded in the riots. After the attacks, the migrants were withdrawn from camps on the border, but returned a day later under Belarusian escort.¹⁷ The Belarusian side once again accused the Polish services of being heartless towards people and young children, who – according to their narrative – were supposed to freeze, hence they tried to escape to Poland, for which the Polish services were supposed to use stun grenades, but it was the last action on such a large scale.¹⁸

On the order of Mariusz Kamiński, Poland's Minister and Coordinator of Special Services, on 18 November, the commander-in-chief of the Border Guard, General Tomasz Praga, temporarily closed the traffic at the border crossing Kuźnica Białostocka-Bruzgi.¹⁹ Poland notified the chairman of the State Border Committee of Belarus, Lieutenant General Anatoly Lappo, about this decision, demanding that it be unblocked by 21 November 2021.²⁰ On 19 November, the Belarusian side informed that there were no foreigners in the vicinity of this crossing, and that most of the foreigners had been evacuated to the "Bruzgi" transport and logistics centre, and on November 18, a part flew from Minsk to Iraq. General Lappo announced that the Border Service officers would sort out the logistic situation in the area of the Bruzgi-Kuźnica border crossing point and stressed that Belarus was ready to resume traffic in this crossing.²¹

¹⁶ "Zatrzymano 37 nielegalnych migrantów", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 27 October 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9506,Zatrzymano-37-nielegalnych-migrantow.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

¹⁷ "Policja: Odparliśmy atak na granicę", Portalsamorządowy.pl, 16 November 2021, <https://www.portalsamorządowy.pl/wydarzenia-lokalne/policja-odparlismy-atak-na-granice,328921.html> [accessed: 16 November 2021].

¹⁸ "Обострение ситуации на белорусско-польской границе", Государственный пограничный комитет Беларуси – информационный портал, 16.11.2021, <https://gpk.gov.by/news/gpk/130020> [accessed: 2.12.2021].

¹⁹ "Zawieszenie ruchu granicznego w Kuźnicy", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 8 November 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9536,Zawieszenie-ruchu-granicznego-w-Kuznicy.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

²⁰ "List komendanta głównego Straży Granicznej RP, gen. T. Pragi do przewodniczącego Państwowego Komitetu Granicznego Republiki Białoruś, gen. lejtn. A. Lappo z 18 XI 2021 r.", Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, 18 November 2021, <https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/przejscie-kolejowe-w-kuznicy-moze-zostac-zamkniete> [accessed: 12 December 2021].

²¹ "Strona białoruska reaguje na zapowiedź zamknięcia towarowego przejścia kolejowego w Kuźnicy", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 19 November 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl>

However, the illegal border crossing continued, mainly near Czeremcha and Dubicze Cerkiewne, where it continues until now, mainly at night. Belarusian border services would send migrants text messages with instructions in Arabic, informing them of how to break through to the Polish side. Due to the impatience of migrants, there were messages about the arrival of buses, which, with the alleged consent of the Polish authorities, were to take them to Germany, but this was clearly fake news.²²

The provocations continued, and on 1 December, Belarusian officers fired on Polish lighting masts near Terespol, destroying the border protection infrastructure.²³ In response, the Minister of National Defence, Mariusz Błaszczak, summoned the defence attaché of Belarus, expressing his protest against such practices.²⁴ From the second half of November, the frequency of border violations decreased. The construction of the dam from December 2021 to June 2022 should also stop the influx of illegal migrants to Poland.

The role of Belarusian-Russian disinformation in the crisis: between security and the protection of human rights

A major component of the Belarusian hybrid activities was the disinformation campaign, in which the Belarusian authorities presented migrants as refugees from Iraq from poverty, and from Afghanistan as victims or people threatened by the Taliban regime.²⁵ Thanks to information from independent media, mainly social media, the truth about the actions of the Belarusian regime against Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, as NATO and EU member states, began to reach people's awareness. A similar situation occurred during the hybrid aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2014, but the parties to the conflict are pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas. As there were no such groups in Belarus, the regime brought in migrants who, after being trained by the services, fulfil a similar role.

pl/pl/aktualnosci/9562,Strona-bialoruska-reaguje-na-zapowiedz-zamknienia-towarowego-przejscia-kolejowego.html [accessed: 12 December 2021].

²² K. Dejas, "Migranci otrzymują instrukcje od reżimu. »Okazcie cierpliwość, wytrzymajcie«", Interia.pl, 12 November 2021, <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/kraj/news-migranci-otrzymuja-instrukcje-od-rezimu-okazcie-cierpliwosc-,nId,5641207> [accessed: 12 November 2021].

²³ K. Grzech, "Zniszczono maszty oświetleniowe na granicy polsko-białoruskiej", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 1 December 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9601,Zniszczone-maszty-oswietleniowe-na-granicy-polsko-bialoruskiej.html> [accessed: 13 December 2021].

²⁴ "Kryzys na granicy. Padły strzały z terenu Białorusi", Wprost, 1 December 2021, <https://www.wprost.pl/polityka/10557631/granica-polsko-bialoruska-padly-strzaly-z-terenu-bialorusi-mariusz-blaszczak-prowokacje-bialoruskich-sluzb-sa-absolutnie-nieakceptowalne.html> [accessed: 1 December 2021].

²⁵ "Operacja »Śluza«", *op. cit.*

On 23 August 2021, Lukashenka stated that "Poland caused a border conflict with migrants"²⁶ by violating the Belarusian border, accusing the Polish Border Guard of allegedly forcing out to the Belarusian side, a thesis that was being disseminated by the Belarusian media, announcing that migrants from Syria, Iraq and Libya, Afghan citizens would join.²⁷ The Russian-Belarusian disinformation system presented the activities of the Border Guard, the army and the Police as heartless and hostile to migrants. This narrative was also supported by the media in Poland opposing the government, with the support of organisations defending human rights. In this case, there was a dilemma typical of a state threatening a crisis of security or independence: security or human rights?²⁸

Human rights defenders, such as Janina Ochojska from the Polish Humanitarian Action, with the support of some anti-government opposition activists, such as Władysław Frasyniuk from Koalicja Obywatelska (KO, the Civic Coalition), began to accuse the Border Guard, Police and soldiers of brutal treatment of migrants attacking the Polish border under the supervision of Belarusian services.²⁹ The allegations revealed that the situation at the border in this respect is not "black and white", as reported by numerous volunteers, e.g. activists of the "Granica" group, who tried to help people, disregarding the intentions of the Belarusian regime and counteracting the actions Belarusian by the Polish services. They postulated that an educational campaign should be conducted among local residents in order to open them up to help people crossing the border illegally.³⁰ During the humanitarian crisis, one message was missing at the border, which led to a communication crisis. It resulted from the difference of intentions of the Belarusian and Polish services (attack with "D" weapons → protection of the border against it), and the lack of coordination of the activities of Polish services and volunteers, not to mention the rejection of Frontex assistance by the Polish authorities.³¹

²⁶ "Alaksandr Łukaszenka oskarżył Polskę o wywołanie konfliktu granicznego", Forsal.pl, 23 August 2021, <https://forsal.pl/swiat/aktualnosci/artykuly/8230263,lukaszenka-oskarzyl-polske-o-wywołanie-konfliktu-granicznego.html> [accessed: 1 December 2021].

²⁷ "Łukaszenka oskarża Polskę o wywołanie konfliktu granicznego", Gazeta Prawna, 23 August 2021, <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8230253,lukaszenka-oskarza-polske-konflikty-graniczny.html> [accessed: 24 June 2022].

²⁸ K. Chochowski, "Kryzys na granicy polsko-białoruskiej jako przejaw wojny hybrydowej. Aspekty administracyjnoprawne", *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2021, pp. 83–96.

²⁹ "Komisja Praw Człowieka NRA o sytuacji na granicy polsko-białoruskiej", Adwokatura.pl <https://www.adwokatura.pl/z-zycia-nra/komisja-praw-czlowieka-nra-o-sytuacji-na-granicy-polsko-bialoruskiej> [accessed: 24 June 2022].

³⁰ *Kryzys humanitarny na pograniczu polsko-białoruskim. Raport Grupy Granica*, ed. W. Klaus, Grupa Granica, 1 December 2021, <https://www.grupagranica.pl/files/Raport-GG-Kryzys-humanitarny-napograniczu-polsko-bialoruskim.pdf> [accessed: 13 December 2021], pp. 13–23.

³¹ M. Kurzejewski, "Kryzys komunikacyjny na granicy polsko-białoruskiej", *Biuletyn Akademickiego Centrum Komunikacji Strategicznej*, no. 1, 2022, pp. 15–19.

On 24 August, the representatives of 32 foreigners staying on the Polish-Belarusian border sent applications to the European Court of Human Rights requesting international protection and asking for the supply of food and medicine. On 1 October, the president of the Supreme Bar Council, Przemysław Rosati, requested the Ombudsman for Children, Mikołaj Pawlak, to scrutinise the protection and humanitarian aid for children staying in the border area of Poland and Belarus. He appealed for intervention in the case of ending the use of the push back procedure against mothers with children by the Polish services, as the ombudsman protects the rights of children regardless of their origin and nationality.³²

On 23 October 2021, the Supreme Bar Council appealed to the Polish authorities to respect the human dignity, rights and freedoms of every human being, including migrants on the Polish-Belarusian border, and to respect the principle of “non-refoulement,” a major provision of the Geneva Convention. These activities led to the launch of a free Legal Aid Coordination Centre for migrants in Hajnówka by legal advisers who came to the border for this purpose.³³ Such situations took place, but in view of the tension on the border, these actions meant that thousands of people – victims of the Belarusian regime’s policy – were not allowed to enter Poland and the EU, as in 2015–2017.

The case of the alleged lack of help from the Polish authorities was taken advantage of by opposition politicians, mainly from the Left and the KO. Iwona Hartwich, a member of the KO, demanded that the border be opened, forgetting about the consequences of the uncontrolled admission of migrants to Germany by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2015.³⁴ On 31 August 2021, former President Aleksander Kwasniewski spoke about the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border. He supported the protection of the border, but accused the government of heartlessness towards migrants, jamming volunteers, and preventing the supply of products and water.³⁵ This context also included the rebellion that took place on 25 November

³² “Kryzys migracyjny. Prezes Naczelnej Rady Adwokackiej wzywa do działania Rzecznika Praw Dziecka”, *Wprost*, 1 October 2021, <https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10501321/kryzys-migracyjny-prezes-naczelnjej-rady-adwokackiej-wzywa-do-dzialania-rzecznika-praw-dziecka.html> [accessed: 25 June 2022].

³³ Uchwała nr 26/2021 Naczelnej Rady Adwokackiej z dnia 23 października 2021 r., https://www.adwokatura.pl/admin/wgrane_pliki/file-uchwala-nra-nr-26-2021-32203.pdf, por. „Radcowie prawni na granicy polsko-białoruskiej”, *Rzeczpospolita*, 3 December 2021, <https://www.rp.pl/zawody-prawnicze/art19163431-radcowie-prawni-na-granicy-polsko-bialoruskiej> [accessed: 24 June 2022].

³⁴ Twitter, 20 August 2021, <https://twitter.com/iwonahartwich/status/1428722102799159298> [accessed: 12 November 2021].

³⁵ A. Zygiel, “Kwaśniewski o sytuacji na granicy: Politycznie rząd działa słusznie, humanitarnie – bezdusznie”, *RMF24*, 1 September 2021, https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-kwasniewski-o-sytuacji-na-granicy-politycznie-rzad-dziala-sl,nId,5455721#crp_state=1 [accessed: 12 November 2021].

at the Centre for Foreigners, located at the Military Training Centre in Wędrzyn. They refused to go out for lunch, destroying the fence and other equipment, demanding that they be released. However, the situation was brought under control and the services identified the 10 most aggressive people, isolating them from the rest of the migrants from this centre.³⁶

Meanwhile, officers of the Podlasie and Nadbuże Border Guard Departments, along with several non-governmental organisations, volunteers and residents helped migrants who cross the border. The Podlasie Branch of the Border Guard distributed a variety of items, such as: thermal blankets, protein and energy bars, bottled water, thermos flasks with tea, warm clothes, shoes, blankets, and food. A fundraising campaign was also held with the cooperation of the Human Rights Defender, with the participation of the Polish Red Cross, Caritas Polska and the University of Warsaw, and on the initiative of the Border Guard and the Polish Army chaplains. Thanks to the integration of assistance, the Border Guard also ensured full care and necessary medical care to the detained and to those staying in Guarded Centres for Foreigners.³⁷

On the orders of President Andrzej Duda, a humanitarian convoy went to Belarus on 23 August, but despite the appeals of the Polish side it was not admitted there. The same situation occurred with the next ones on 5 and 23 October, as they were also not allowed into the territory of Belarus.³⁸ Belarusian-Russian disinformation used the case of helping refugees in Poland, as well as probably the cases of inappropriate attitudes of Polish officers to create a black and white message from the Polish-Belarusian border, but the situation there was much more complex than the information provided.

Counteracting actions by the Belarusian regime by the Polish authorities

Since the beginning of the crisis, the Polish authorities have adopted a border protection strategy in line with the Polish *raison d'état*. In response to the actions taken by the Belarusian authorities, President Duda introduced a state of emergency in the border areas for 30 days, effective 2 September, which, due to the further escalation

³⁶ E. Szczepańska, "Bunt w ośrodku dla migrantów w Wędrzynie", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 26 November 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9579,Bunt-w-osrodku-dla-migrantow-w-Wedrzyne.html> [accessed: 12 December 2021].

³⁷ E. Szczepańska, "Z pomocą migrantom", Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej, 22 October 2021, <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/aktualnosci/9499,Z-pomoca-imigrantom.html> [accessed: 8 December 2021].

³⁸ "Kryzysowa sytuacja na granicy z Białorusią. Polska wysłała pomoc humanitarną", TVP Info, 23 October 2021, <https://www.tvp.info/56534064/migranci-granica-polska-konwoj-z-pomoca-humanitarna-rusza-na-bialorus> [accessed: 12 November 2021].

of tension and the arrival of new groups of migrants, was extended on 2 October for another 60 days. It covered 183 localities in the border areas of Podlaskie and a part of Lubelskie regions, and the majority of residents understood these activities with understanding.³⁹ The same goal was also achieved by the enactment of the State Border Protection Act by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on 17 November 2021, and the decision to build a border wall with safeguard mechanisms that would hinder illegal crossing.⁴⁰

Pursuant to the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 30 November 2021 on the introduction of a temporary ban on staying in specific areas in the border zone adjacent to the state border with Belarus, on December 1, the state of emergency was replaced by a ban on staying in these areas imposed on anyone, apart from the residents of the areas, from outside the activity zone. The ban was in force from 1 December 2021 to 1 March 2022. Journalists could stay there only with prior accreditation issued by the commander of a given Border Guard post.⁴¹ The key issue was the safety of journalists, as well as of officers of the Border Guard, Police and soldiers. It was resolved that editorial offices interested in participating in an organised form of entry to the area subjected to the prohibition of stay would be able to indicate the area of their visit, and at their disposal, a special press centre would be made available, located between Kuźnica Białostocka and Sokółka.

On 8 December, Poland's President Duda and his wife came to Kuźnica Białostocka, where they met with officers of the Border Guard, Police, Fire Brigade, soldiers of the Polish Army and soldiers of allied forces from the UK and Estonia, who had been there since December 2021. The talks also concerned assistance for migrants, both at the border and during their stay in migration centres in Poland. After the meeting at the border, the president and his wife took part in a charity concert for migrants and sick children of officers and employees of the Podlasie Border Guard Division "Pomagamy Razem III", which took place at the Podlasie Opera and Philharmonic in Białystok.⁴² In the following months, the crisis gradually de-escalated, which resulted from both the return of potential migrants from

³⁹ "Stan wyjątkowy przy granicy – co myślą mieszkańcy? »Zrobią w końcu porządek z tymi, co tu się nazjeżdżali«", *Niezależna.pl*, 31 August 2021, <https://niezalezna.pl/409663-stan-wyjatkowy-przy-granicy-co-mysla-mieszkanicy-zrobia-w-koncu-porzadek-z-tymi-co-tu-sie-nazjezdza> [accessed: 10 November 2021].

⁴⁰ Ustawa z dnia 17 listopada 2021 r. o zmianie ustawy o ochronie granicy państwowej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, *Dz.U.* [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2021, item 2191.

⁴¹ Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji z dnia 30 listopada 2021 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia czasowego zakazu przebywania na określonym obszarze w strefie nadgranicznej przyległej do granicy państwowej z Republiką Białorusi, *Dz.U.*, 2021, item 2193.

⁴² "Spotkanie ze służbami na granicy polsko-białoruskiej", *Prezydent.pl*, 8 December 2021, <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-krajowe/spotkanie-z-przedstawicielami-sluzb-chroniacymi-granice-polsko-bialoruska,46323> [accessed: 15 December 2021].

Belarus to their countries of residence, the construction of a dam on the border, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which overshadowed the smouldering crisis, although some of the migrants were directed by the Belarusian services to Ukraine so that they would go to Poland with the refugees.

Conclusions

Ever since the migration crisis broke out, the question of the date and method of its termination, as well as its short and long-term effects, has been of major importance. On the surface, the answer seems simple: once the Belarusian dictator stops sending migrants over to the borders of Belarus with the countries of the EU. However, this may happen when the demands are met, or when the costs of his actions prove to be higher than the potential benefits, and the sanctions of the EU and the US will actually be conducive to an ultimate collapse of the Belarusian economy, indirectly hitting Russia, for supporting the actions of the Belarusian regime.⁴³

The number of migrants who made attempts to illegally cross the border with Poland in 2021 was around 40,000 people: in August 2021 there were 3,500 attempts, in September there were 7,700, in October – 17,300, in November – 8,900, and in December 2021 the number of migrants amounted to 1,700 until December 29, 2021.⁴⁴ According to the statistical data of the Polish Border Guard, in 2021 its officers refused entry to Poland through the Belarusian border to 1,610 people. At the same time, they detained and revealed 2,877 foreigners who attempted to cross the state border against the law, or attempted to cross the border from Belarus.⁴⁵ In 2021, the Border Guard authorities detained and revealed the illegal stay of 236 people who came from Belarus, including 111 citizens of that country.⁴⁶ During this period, 7,257 people filed 4,298 applications for international protection, of which 2011 submitted 1,283 applications to the Polish Border Guard in Warsaw, and 673 people submitted a total of 375 applications to the Podlaskie Unit. All of them were granted, following a positive assessment.⁴⁷

In view of the artificially induced migration crisis, since December 2011, Poland has been securing the border with Belarus by building a fence separating the Polish

⁴³ M. Menkiszak, "Kiedy zakończy się kryzys na granicy? »Mamy przed sobą dwie ewentualności«", TVN24, 16 November 2021, <https://tvn24.pl/polska/kryzys-na-granicy-polsko-bialoruskiej-kiedy-i-jak-sie-zakoczy-ekspert-o-dwoch-mozliwosciach-5491888> [accessed: 22 November 2021].

⁴⁴ "W sierpniu było 3,5 tys. prób przekroczenia granicy polsko-białoruskiej – informuje Straż Graniczna", Radio Białystok, 1 September 2021, <https://www.radio.bialystok.pl/wiadomosci/index/id/203925> [accessed: 1 September 2021].

⁴⁵ *Informacja statystyczna za 2021 r.*, Straż Graniczna, Warszawa, styczeń 2022, p. 5, 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

border zone in order to prevent illegal border crossing from Belarus. The dam is 5.5 metres high and has been fitted with electronic motion sensors and cameras. 750 new Border Guard officers have been sent to the border. The legal basis for these activities is the State Border Protection Act of 4 November 2021, which defines the rules for the implementation of the construction of the state border protection of the Republic of Poland, which is also the external border of the EU.⁴⁸ In the context of the general defence of Poland, including potentially the border with Belarus, the Homeland Defence Act was passed by the Sejm on 11 March 2022. Belarus is regarded as a major contemporary ally of Russia, which is important, especially after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, against which Belarus took a “waiting” position, making its territory available for aggression against neighbouring Ukraine.⁴⁹

In sum, the conclusions from the above considerations are as follows. First, the aim of the artificially created “migration crisis” has been to weaken and destabilize the states of the eastern flank of NATO and the EU with the support of the Russian Federation, which is interested in the dependence of the EU in terms of raw materials in the context of building Europe “from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” Second, the geostrategic goal of the Russian Federation has been to foster a closer integration of Belarus with it, as the Russian way to the west (Poland), north (Lithuania, Latvia) and south (Ukraine). Third, the end of the crisis may take place after the construction of a dam on the border and the return of migrants to their countries of residence. However, it cannot be ruled out that an invasion by a “D” weapon, for example, from the side of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, cannot be ruled out. Fourth, the actions taken to destabilise the borders of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are in line with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the aim of which is to distract these countries from providing aid to Ukraine, which ended in failure for the Russian Federation. Also, Belarus and Russia do not intend to give up further weakening the border, they can only change the means and forms of actions, e.g. sabotage, or taking advantage of the Russian minority in Transnistria, Latvia and Estonia to act against these countries. Last but not least, Lukashenka’s position depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. In the event of a defeat of Russia – which is real, provided that an international coalition is formed and military aid is increased, and thus the Russian Federation weakens – Lukashenka may lose power, although Russia will seek to control Belarus, regardless of who will be in charge of the state; hence, an important factor is self-identification of Belarusians.

The adoption of further sanctions by the EU against the Belarusian regime and the tough stance of NATO indicate solidarity with the countries attacked by demographic weapons. In the context of Belarusian hybrid activities under the patronage

⁴⁸ Ustawa z dnia 29 października 2021 r. o budowie zabezpieczenia granicy państwowej, Dz.U., 2021, item 1992.

⁴⁹ Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny, Dz.U., 2022, item 655.

of Russia, as well as Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the solidarity of the EU, NATO and the United Nations with potentially endangered states remains a vital factor at stake.

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Operation “Sluice”: The so-called migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border: an example of hybrid actions taken in the second half of 2021 as documented in the reports of the Polish border guard

Abstract

This article is a cognitive-analytical text that looks at the so-called “migration crisis”, which turned out to be an attempt to destabilise the situation on the border between Belarus and Poland, Lithuania and Latvia in 2021. Following the introduction, which outlines the main goals and theses of the article, the author looks at the origins of the operation by the name of “sluice”, and the nature of the “migration crisis” on the Polish-Belarusian border in the period from August to December 2021. On the basis of the information available, retrieved mainly from the official website of the Border Guard, the author has attempted to describe the operation of the Belarusian authorities and border services in the process of bringing migrants to Belarus, and then “transferring” them over to Poland and other countries of the European Union. The text ends with a summary of the issues raised, and an attempt to outline the prospects of bringing the crisis to an end.

Key words: migration crisis, Poland, Belarus, Russia, disinformation



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Zur Sicherheitsstrategie Deutschlands in der „Zeitenwende“¹

Einführung

Zeitenwenden – Wendezeiten prägten die moderne Geschichte Deutschlands seit seiner Entstehung. Strategisch konzipiert, brachten sie erfolgreiche Entwicklungsschübe und katastrophale Niederlagen: Das Kaiserreich endet im Ersten Weltkrieg (1871–1918), die Krise der Weimarer Republik (1919–33) führte in den Faschismus und Zweiten Weltkrieg (1933–45).² In der deutschen Spaltung (1945–90) waren beide Teilstaaten in einem bipolaren Wechselbad von Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung. Wesentlich fremdbestimmt durch die Siegermächte, waren sie strategiegehemmt und integrierten sich in feindliche wirtschaftliche und militärische Bündnisse – EG/NATO vs. RGW/Warschauer Vertrag. Trotz beschränkter Souveränität, nutzten sie Spielräume und realisierten sozioökonomische Fortschritte sowie einen herausragenden Lebensstandard für ihre Bevölkerung innerhalb gegensätzlicher Systeme. Bei der multipolaren Neuformierung der Welt (1990–2020) war Deutschland sowohl Objekt, als auch

¹ Der Artikel ist eine aktualisierte Überarbeitung von „Außenpolitische Strategie Deutschlands“, in: Crome, E., Hrsg. (2022): *Zeitenwende? Der Ukraine-Krieg und die deutsche Außenpolitik*, WeltTrends, Potsdam.

² Vgl. R. Opitz (Hrsg.), *Europastrategien des deutschen Kapitals 1900–1945*, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Köln 1977.

aktives Subjekt. Es gelangen in dieser „Wende“ – wenn auch konfliktträchtig und widersprüchlich – die strategischen Aufgaben der „deutschen Einheit“, einer technologischen Dynamisierung sowie der globalen Wirtschaftsexpansion. Im Vergleich zu den EU-Nachbarregionen haben Deutschland und seine Bevölkerung seit 1990 eine erfolgreiche Entwicklung durchlaufen.³

Diese letzten drei Jahrzehnte waren jedoch international extrem widersprüchlich und instabil. Dynamische Globalisierung, Dialogpolitik, Intensivierung des weltweiten Handels und Wandels, NATO- und EU-Erweiterung kontrastierten mit anhaltender Konfrontation, 9/11-Terrorismus und seinen Folgen, völkerrechtswidrigen Kriegen (Balkan/Kosovo, Afghanistan, Naher- und Mittlerer Osten), Aufkündigung der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontroll-Verträge, destabilisierender Klimawandel, Massenverelendung, Zerfall von Staaten und anschwellenden Flüchtlingsströmen. Seit der Weltwirtschaftskrise 2009/10, dem russisch-ukrainischen Konflikts (2014/15), der Trump-Ära (2016–20) sowie der Corona-Krise (2019–22) und dem Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine spitzt sich die internationale Lage drastisch zu: Die Altkanzlerin Angela Merkel nennt es eine „Zäsur“, ihr Nachfolger Olaf Scholz „Zeitenwende“ – eine weitere konfliktlastige Phase globaler Systemkämpfe „West gegen Ost und Süd“, „Demokratie gegen Autokratie“, USA/NATO/EU vs. Russland/China (2020–2050?) und der widerspruchsvollen Anhängerschaften ist eingeläutet.

Strategie

Die Strategiekulturen EurAsiens haben eine tiefe Geschichte und sind seit Jahrhunderten Handlungsgrundlage von Großmächten und Imperien. Konzepte, das angehäufte strategische Wissen in ein System zu bringen, sind in Europa schon seit der Antike nachweisbar und ursprünglich im klassischen Militärwesen und der christlichen Staatskirche verortet. 1520 verfasste Niccolò Machiavelli sein Werk „Von der Kriegskunst“ über Strategie und Taktik, Politik und Militärwesen. Im 19./20. Jahrhundert, im Zusammenhang mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen, der Industrialisierung, dem modernen Staatsaufbau sowie den Großkriegen um die Vormachtstellung in Europa und zur Neuaufteilung der Welt, fand strategisches Denken eines Carl von Clausewitz, Friedrich Engels und Helmuth von Moltke Eingang in die deutsche Staatspolitik, in das Militärwesen und die Nationalökonomie. „Strategien“ sind in diesem Zusammenhang eine Gesamtheit des konzeptionellen Denkens und der Praxis von Staaten mit dem Ziel der Bestimmung und Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen und Werte. Sie haben einen längerfristigen Charakter von mehreren Jahren (Amtsperioden) bis Jahrzehnten. Angesichts der Instabilität als gesellschaftlichem Normalzustand, zugespitzt in „Zeitenwenden“, fußen sie auf

³ Vgl. L. Kleinwächter, *Neue deutsche Außenpolitik 1990–2021*, in: *WeltTrends* Nr. 177/2021.

Alternativ-Planungen als flexibles Instrument des Krisenmanagements. Entscheidende Faktoren für die Strategiefähigkeit einer Gesellschaft sind: Ihre ökonomisch-technologischen Potenziale und Produktivitätsfaktoren; materielle, finanzielle und personelle Ressourcen; ihre geostrategische Lage; organisierte Akteure – Staaten, Bündnisse, Parteien, Interessengruppen, Persönlichkeiten; sowie die Qualifikation der Führungseliten und der Gesamtbevölkerung.

Ambivalente Ampel-Orientierung

Die Ampel-Regierung unter Führung der SPD steht vor gewaltigen strategischen Herausforderungen. Gestartet als eine Art Übergangsregierung in auslaufender Kontinuität zur Merkel-Ära, ist sie, im Ergebnis der NATO-Niederlage im 20-jährigen Afghanistan-Krieg, mit weitreichenden Folgen des Niedergangs und Zusammenbruchs westlichen Einflusses in Vorder- und Mittelasien konfrontiert sowie akut mit dem osteuropäischen Russland/Ukraine-Krieg und seinen langfristigen weltwirtschaftlichen Folgekrisen.

Im Koalitionsvertrag vom Dezember 2021 wurde nochvollständig formuliert: „Die deutsche Außenpolitik soll aus einem Guss agieren und ressortübergreifend gemeinsame Strategien erarbeiten, um die Kohärenz unseres internationalen Handelns zu erhöhen.“ Das bedarf eines großen Wurfes. Gerade SPD-Regierungen haben in der Vergangenheit mit strategischen Konzepten durchaus die Rolle Deutschlands und Europas gestärkt. Zu verweisen wäre auf die „Neue Ostpolitik“ der Brandt-/Schmidt-Regierungen (1969–82). Auch die Rot/Grüne-Regierung unter Schröder (1998–2005) leitete mit dem Einstieg in die Energiewende (Atomausstieg 2000) und einer Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie (2002) ein neues Zeitalter ein. Neu waren aber auch die konzeptionslosen Kriegsbeteiligungen Deutschlands (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001-21), die durch die Nichtteilnahme an den Irak- und Libyen-Interventionen (2003 bzw. 2011), nicht völkerrechtskonformer wurden.

Kanzler Scholz nahm am 8. Mai 2022, den 77. Jahrestag der Beendigung des Zweiten Weltkrieges zum Anlass, um Grundsätze deutscher Politik zum Russland-Ukraine-Krieg zu formulieren: „Wir haben nie dagewesene Sanktionen gegen die russische Wirtschaft und die russische Führung verhängt, um Putin von seinem Krieg abzubringen. [...] Und zugleich tun wir nicht alles, was der eine oder die andere gerade fordern. Denn: Ich habe in meinem Amtseid geschworen, Schaden vom deutschen Volk abzuwenden. Dazu zählt, unser Land und unsere Verbündeten vor Gefahren zu schützen. Vier klare Grundsätze folgen daraus für die Politik: Erstens: Keine deutschen Alleingänge! [...] Zweitens: Bei allem, was wir tun, achten wir darauf, unsere Verteidigungsfähigkeit zu erhalten! [...] Drittens: Wir unternehmen nichts, was uns und unseren Partnern mehr schadet als Russland. Und viertens: Wir werden keine Entscheidung treffen, die die NATO Kriegspartei werden lässt.“

Tags darauf bekräftigte Scholz gegenüber den Gewerkschaften seine Aussagen zu Punkt 3: „Ich muss hier niemandem sagen, was etwa ein sofortiger Stopp von Gas für die Chemie-, Stahl- oder Metallindustrie bedeuten würde. Niemandem ist damit geholfen, wenn hier die Lichter ausgehen, uns nicht und der Ukraine auch nicht.“ Klare Ansagen – gegenüber den widersprüchlichen grünen und gelben Partnern in der regierenden Ampelkoalition, an die Oppositionsparteien, an die deutsche Bevölkerung, an die westlichen Verbündeten sowie an die Ukraine und Russland. Für Scholz und Co. wird das nur zur Schicksalsfrage als Kanzler bzw. als Regierung; für große Teile der Bevölkerung sind es Existenzprobleme.

Die von der Ampel-Regierung im Zusammenhang mit dem Russland/Ukraine-Krieg erklärte „Zeitenwende“ hat vordergründig drei intensiv diskutierte, umstrittene Schwerpunkte: (1) Die Reorganisation der Energiewirtschaft Deutschlands, durch Diversifikation und Abbau von (gegenseitigen) Abhängigkeiten von der russischen Erdöl-/Erdgas-Versorgung sowie einem beschleunigten Aus-/Aufbau einer alternativen Energiewirtschaft; (2) Absicherung des Lebensstandards und der Lebensqualität der Bevölkerung; sowie (3) Stärkung der nationalen und bündnispolitischen Verteidigungsbereitschaft. Abgesehen von den in Kriegszeiten üblichen emotionalen Vereinfachungen, der Demagogie und den Täuschungen/Lügen, ist für die Strategiebestimmung jedoch rationaler Verstand notwendig. Zwingend für ihren Erfolg sind eine nüchterne Analyse realistischer Bedrohungs-/Problemsituationen und die Erarbeitung zeitgerechter Lösungen, unter konsequenter Orientierung an den Interessen Deutschlands und seiner Bevölkerung.⁴ Eine nicht unwesentliche Anzahl anglophil-neokonservativer Regierungsmitglieder, Bundestagsabgeordneter und EU-Politiker ist davon – zum Schaden des deutschen Volkes – noch weit entfernt.

Charakter und Ursachen des Ukraine-Krieges

Russland führt seit dem 24. Februar 2022 einen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Diese befindet sich in einem Verteidigungskrieg gegen Russland. Schon seit 2014/15 tobt in der Ukraine selbst ein Bürgerkrieg mit separatistischen Kräften. Gleichzeitig wird die Ukraine im Sinne der NATO-Staaten unter Führung der USA, für einen Stellvertreterkrieg gegen Russland instrumentalisiert. Politisch handelt es sich um einen völkerrechtswidrigen imperialen Krieg um Machtdurchsetzung, Wertedominanz und Ausdehnung/Begrenzung von Einflussphären. Territorial-geographisch ist es ein begrenzter Regionalkrieg zwischen Russland und der Ukraine in Osteuropa, aber mit vielschichtigen globalen Wirkungen.

⁴ Vgl. E. Bahr, *Deutsche Interessen. Streitschrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und Außenpolitik*, Siedler-TB, München 2000; K. von Dohnanyi, *Nationale Interessen. Orientierung für deutsche und europäische Politik in Zeiten globaler Umbrüche*, Siedler, München 2022.

Militärisch als konventioneller Krieg geführt, birgt er mannigfaltige territoriale und waffentechnische Eskalationsgefahren. Die oftmals angeführte Gefahr eines globalen Kernwaffenkrieges ist jedoch hochgradig unwahrscheinlich. Noch am 3. Januar 2022 haben die Kernwaffenmächte in einer Gemeinsamen Erklärung bekräftigt, „dass ein Atomkrieg nicht gewonnen werden kann und niemals geführt werden darf“. Das ist im Nachhinein auch als Teil einer russischen und US-amerikanischen rückversichernden Risikobegrenzung im Rahmen der Kriegsvorbereitungen interpretierbar. Demgemäß wurden auch die während des Krieges durchgeführten russischen Tests von Interkontinentalraketen (20.04.2022), von der „ordnungsgemäß informierten“ US-Regierung als „Routine“ und konform mit den New START-Verhandlungen gesehen. Dennoch werden theoretische Szenarien eines punktuellen Einsatzes von „Mini-Nukes“ in begrenzten Kernwaffeneinsätzen erörtert, die im Zeitalter von Cyberkriegsführung und künstlicher Intelligenz schwer kalkulierbare Eskalations- und Schadensrisiken in sich bergen. In diesem Zusammenhang sind auch konventionelle Angriffe auf Kernkraftwerke außerordentlich gefährlich – Beispiel „Saporischschja“.

Geostrategisch wird der Ukraine-Krieg seitens des Westens als Anlass für die Forcierung eines eurasischen/globalen, meist bipolar betrachteten Systemkonflikts USA/NATO vs. Russland/China genutzt. Er ist ein strategischer Hebel zur „Entkopplung“ Russlands und zunehmend auch Chinas von der Weltwirtschaft durch ein umfassendes Sanktionssystem – auch als Weltwirtschaftskrieg charakterisierbar.

Die Ursachen des Ukraine-Krieges lassen sich langfristig und vielfältig zurückverfolgen. Seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre mit der Auflösung der Sowjetunion und der Selbstständigkeit der Ukraine 1991 bauten sich Konflikte mit Russland auf. Eine deutliche Zuspitzung waren die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Russland um eine mögliche EU-Assoziierung der Ukraine sowie eine NATO-Mitgliedschaft nach 2000. Der Wechsel hin zur Konfrontation, sogar von möglichen Großkonflikten und damit einhergehenden Kriegsvorbereitungen, erfolgte in den Jahren 2008 bis 2014; nach der mehrfachen westlichen Kooperationsverweigerung gegenüber Putin (2001 und 2007), mit dem US-Versuch der Einleitung einer NATO-Aufnahme der Ukraine 2008 und gipfelte in der Ukraine-Krise 2014/15 mit der russischen Besetzung der Krim und der Unterstützung separatistischer Kräfte bei der Bildung der Teilstaaten Lugansk und Donezk.

Weltanschauliches Hauptproblem ist die wechselseitige Negation, der durch die Gegenseite empfundenen Sicherheitsinteressen. Ganz klassisch-traditionell – ähnlich wie im Kalten Krieg in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts – existieren beidseitige Bedrohungsphobien. Phobien (!), die zur Grundlage erklärter Feindbilder hochstilisiert werden. Sie haben außen- wie innenpolitische Funktionen sowohl zur

Manipulation der eigenen Bevölkerung als auch einer Stärkung des Zusammenhalts der Bündnisse, gehen aber wesentlich an den Realitäten vorbei.

Aus russischer Sicht wird dabei die NATO-Ost-Erweiterung bis unmittelbar an die Grenzen Russlands heran, in den Mittelpunkt einer „Einkreisungs-Bedrohung“ gestellt. Letztlich als nicht akzeptabel, als „rote Linie“ wurde dabei der Ukraine-Fall bewertet (trotz Ablehnung der NATO-Aufnahme durch Deutschland und Frankreich 2008).

Seitens der USA/NATO ist es die nun schon seit einem Jahrhundert betriebene antikommunistische, russophob gewandelte Argumentation von einer „Dominanz-/Bedrohungspolitik Russlands“. Die dem Regierungswechsel von Jelzin zu Putin 2000 folgende Stabilisierung Russlands und die umfangreichen eurasischen Kooperationsangebote werden als expansive Machtpolitik fehlinterpretiert und bekämpft.

Russlands Umorientierung

Verdrängt und weitgehend von westlichen Führungen – so auch von der unerfahrenen Ampelregierung Deutschlands – in ihren Konsequenzen nicht verstanden wird die grundsätzliche geostrategische Umorientierung Russlands. Mit strategischen Blick auf die Verschiebungen der globalen Kräfteverhältnisse in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten – Machtverluste der USA und des gesamten Westens sowie dem dynamischen Aufstieg Chinas und einer Vielzahl von Schwellenländern – gibt Russland seine klassische „Europa-Orientierung“ der vergangenen Jahrhunderte schrittweise auf. Die Abwendung und Trennung von Westeuropa/EU sowie die Umorientierung auf EurAsien, in enger Kooperation und strategischer Partnerschaften mit China (seit 2001 Freundschaftsvertrag) und Indien sowie durch die Instrumentalisierung neu geschaffener Großorganisationen (1996/2001 Shanghai Organisation, 2009 BRICS) bestimmen zunehmend das konzeptionelle Handeln und die operative Umsetzung der russischen Führungseliten. Dabei stützt sich Russland v.a. auf seine Potentiale als größte Rohstoffmacht der Welt und als Raketenkernwaffenmacht erster Kategorie. Das schließt Vorbereitungen auf politische und wirtschaftliche Globalkonflikte sowie Regionalkriege ein.

Felder und Dokumente deutscher Sicherheitspolitik

Die Strategie-Gestaltung Deutschlands ist seit den 1990er Jahren vom Verständnis eines umfassenden Sicherheitsbegriffs bestimmt. Dabei werden alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche erfasst. In besonderer Weise die Außen- und Außenwirtschafts-Politik, das Militärwesen und zunehmend die Sozioökologie stehen im Mittelpunkt der

Forschung und Beratung von über einhundert Institutionen und Lobbygruppen. Die deutschen Aktivitäten sind vernetzt mit entsprechenden internationalen, insbesondere in den EU- und NATO-Staaten.

Außenpolitik. Von übergeordneter Bedeutung sind die „Weißbücher zur Sicherheitspolitik“ (1994, 2006, 2016). Sie definieren mittelfristig die Grundlagen und Ziele sowie die strategischen Prioritäten und Gestaltungsfelder. Eine 4-Jahres-Konkretisierung erfolgt dann in den Koalitionsverträgen nach den Bundestagswahlen. Entgegen landläufiger Auffassungen sind diese (nicht die Wahlprogramme der Parteien), durchaus eine praxisnahe Handlungsorientierung mit nachweisbarer Erfolgsquote. Die Ampelkoalition will bis Ende 2022 erstmals eine umfassende „nationale Sicherheitsstrategie“ erstellen.

Bei der Erarbeitung von Strategiestudien für Entscheidungsfindungen sind die Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (BAKS), die Stiftung für Wirtschaft und Politik (SWP) und die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP) die wichtigsten Forschungs- und Beratungsinstitutionen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. So erstellte z.B. die SWP zur Umsetzung von Zielen der Lissabon-Strategie der EU (2000/2020), Großstudien zur Souveränität und Selbstbestimmung der EU/Deutschlands: „Neue Macht – Neue Verantwortung“ (2013), „Strategische Autonomie Europas“ (2019), „Deutsche Außenpolitik im Wandel“ (2021). Als äußerst kritisch bzw. gescheitert einzuschätzen sind die Strategie-Ansätze der letzten Jahrzehnte zur Entwicklungs- sowie Flüchtlingspolitik, zu den Regionen Osteuropa, Kaukasus/Mittelasien sowie die Afrika- und die Indo-Pazifik-Leitlinien. Das zeigt sich in den gegenwärtigen multiplen Global- und Regional-Krisen als außerordentlich problematisch und führt zu Einfluss- und Imageverlusten des demokratischen Gesellschaftsmodells der EU/Deutschlands.

Außenwirtschaft. Deutschland als stärkste Wirtschaftsmacht Europas hat sich seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre global aufgestellt und gehört technologisch zu den sieben führenden Großstaaten. Seine geoökonomischen Ex-/Import-Verflechtungen sind ein Erfolgsfaktor. Im Jahr 2000 wurde die „alternative Energiewende“ bis Mitte des 21. Jahrhunderts, begleitet durch eine Rohstoffstrategie (2010 und 2020) eingeleitet. Beispielhaft für das langfristig-strategische Herangehen sind auch die Großstudien „Deutschland 2030. Zukunftsperspektiven der Wertschöpfung“ (2011; unmittelbar nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise) sowie die jüngsten „Globalisierungsszenarien [...] aus Sicht der deutschen Wirtschaft“ (2021). Letztere prognostiziert Langzeitvarianten für ein handlungsfähiges Europa/Deutschland in Korrelation mit den Wirtschaftsmächten USA und China/Russland, auch unter widrigsten Rahmenbedingungen.⁵

⁵ B. Bartsch, A. Laudien, Ch. Sprich, *Globalisierungsszenarien. Herausforderungen und Handlungsoptionen aus Sicht der deutschen Wirtschaft*, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2021, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/Globaliszenario_2021_2final.pdf.

Die im Rahmen des Sanktionsregimes gegen Russland angegangene Diversifikation und alternative Reduzierung/Ablösung der Erdöl-/Erdgas- und Kohle-Importe sind (bei partieller Aufrechterhaltung von SWIFT-Zahlungsmodalitäten) über 5–10 Jahre realisierbar. Letztlich sogar teilkompatibel zur Langzeitplanung der deutschen Energiepolitik einer Dekarbonisierung. Deutliche Energiepreisteigerungen und sozialpolitische Verteilungskonflikte müssen zur Verhinderung einer langfristigen Stagnation/Wirtschaftskrise und höherer Arbeitslosigkeit, durch sozialpolitische Großprogramme ausgeglichen werden. Kurzfristiger Aktionismus (9-€-Ticket, einmaliger Lastenausgleich, u. ä.) oder demagogische Durchhalte- und Sparappelle („Frieren für die Freiheit“) gehen an den existenziellen Problemen wesentlicher Bevölkerungsgruppen vorbei und bergen sozialen Sprengstoff.

Militärwesen. Die „Weißbücher“ und die Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (1992, 2003, 2011) bestimmen die Ziele, Aufgaben, Fähigkeiten und die völlige NATO-Integration der Bundeswehr. Der Hauptmangel ist das Fehlen einer realistischen militärischen (Nicht-)Bedrohungsanalyse Deutschlands. Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahren wurde die Bundeswehr von einer „Verteidigungsarmee“ zu einer „Armee im Einsatz“ umorientiert. Mit der Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht (2011) ist die Bundeswehr eine Berufsarmee. Im EU-Rahmen wird die militärtechnische Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit (PESCO, 2017) intensiviert. Mehrfache Bundeswehrreformen nach 2000 sind im Wesen gescheitert. Strategische Fehleinschätzungen offenbaren die Auslandseinsätze: beispielhaft der Balkan/Kosovo-Einsatz (ab 1999), der desaströse Afghanistankrieg (2001–21), der laufende Mali-Einsatz. Der jüngste Reformansatz zur Umorientierung auf „Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung“ angesichts des Russland-Ukraine-Krieges ist bislang (noch) nicht schlüssig. Überdeutlich ist dafür die seit Jahrzehnten und besonders in den Krisensituationen fehlende Sachkenntnis und das sichtbare Führungsversagen der Außen- und Verteidigungs-MinisterInnen.

Die Bundesregierung beschloss die Schaffung eines über Kreditschulden finanzierten „Sondervermögens“ von 100 Milliarden Euro für Rüstungsvorhaben. Außerdem sollen ab 2025 mehr als zwei Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts für Verteidigung eingesetzt werden. Das ist realisierbar, aber überflüssig (!) – Verschleuderung von Volksvermögen in Ermangelung einer realistischen Bedrohungsanalyse und Strategieplanung. Die NATO-Staaten, inklusive Deutschland sind militärisch nicht ernsthaft bedroht. Das fragile „Abschreckungs-Konzept“ funktioniert wechselseitig seit den 1960er Jahren. Ein Raketenkernwaffenkrieg ist angesichts der „Gegenseitig Gesicherten Zerstörung“ (MAD) nicht führ- und gewinnbar (Russland 6.000; USA 5.500 Kernsprengköpfe). Die deutsche „nukleare Teilhabe“ ist, auch mit der Anschaffung entsprechender F-35-Flugzeuge als Einsatzsysteme, US-fremdbestimmt. In der konventionellen Hochrüstung sind die

europäischen NATO-Staaten, auch ohne (!) die USA, dem potentiellen Gegner Russland in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten deutlich überlegen: Anzahl des Militärpersonals (2021: 1 zu 2,3; 0,85 zu 2 Millionen), bei den waffentechnischen Stückzahlen, insbesondere bei den Luft- und Seestreitkräften und extrem bei den Rüstungsausgaben (1 zu 5; 65 zu 330 Milliarden Dollar). Selbst eine zusätzliche Berücksichtigung der US-Rüstung sowie der weiteren Auf-/Hochrüstungs-Dynamik der NATO-Staaten insgesamt, verändern die militärpolitische Grundsituation nicht. Der militärische Machtfaktor hat auf der Ebene der Groß- und Nuklearmächte seinen Grenznutzen überschritten und ist nicht mehr rationell handhabbar, sondern birgt unkalkulierbare Eskalationsrisiken einer gegenseitigen Vernichtung in sich. Das ist auch einer der Hintergründe für die „Zurückhaltung“ der USA/NATO beim Direkteinsatz von Streitkräften sowie der Einrichtung einer Flugverbotszone und der Lieferung schwerer Offensiv-Waffen, wie Flugzeugen und Panzern, im Ukraine-Krieg.

Sozioökologie. Seit der Konferenz in Rio de Janeiro (1992) und dem „Kyoto-Protokoll“ (1997) praktiziert die EU/Deutschland eine aktive Umweltpolitik. Der konzeptionelle Durchbruch erfolgte unter der Rot/Grünen-Regierung mit dem „Atomausstieg“ (2000) und der „Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie“ (2002). Die Fortschrittsberichte, ihre Neuauflage (2016) sowie die praktische Umsetzung der Beschlüsse der Pariser Klimaziele (2015) bleiben jedoch weit hinter den Erfordernissen einer Klimastabilisierung zurück. Eine strategische Orientierung auf eine entsprechende Wirtschafts- und Lebensweise steht noch aus. Wesentliche Folgen des Ukraine-Krieges und der Sanktionspolitik, wie die Verlängerung der Energieerzeugung durch fossile Rohstoffe – Kohleverstromung, Einkäufe von Fracking-Gas und Erdöl sowie eine Weiternutzung Atomstrom – stellen die Klima- und Umweltziele in Frage. Die Begrenzung auf 1,5 Grad Erwärmung und die Klimaneutralität durch CO₂-Absenkung bis 2035 sind nicht mehr erreichbar. Darüber hinaus ist eine globale Klima-Kooperation zwischen verfeindeten Großmächten ausgeschlossen. Die Ziele von Paris und die deutsche Klimapolitik einer Energiewende sind damit auf absehbare Zeit gescheitert. Auch ein angedachtes „Sondervermögen“ analog der Rüstungspolitik, aber für soziale und ökologische Fortschritte ist in der Ampelregierung strittig.

Kriegsziele scheitern

Im Russland-Ukraine-Krieg gibt es für keine Seite eine lohnende Siegoption. Der gegenwärtige Kriegsverlauf signalisiert einen möglichen „Pyrrhussieg“ – nur große und kleine Verlierer, „Sieger“ und „Besiegte“ werden ähnlich geschwächt. Dabei sind die absehbare militärische, vor allem aber die langfristige wirtschaftspolitische Gesamtsituation in Betracht zu ziehen. Der Konflikt ist militärisch nicht lösbar,

für, für einen Kompromiss-Frieden ist eine nüchterne, z.T. sehr schmerzhaft Realpolitik unabdingbar.

Militärisch hat Russland die strategische Initiative. Erklärte Ziele sind die „Entmilitarisierung“ und „Entnazifizierung“ der Ukraine. Nach dem Scheitern des Überraschungscoups zum Sturz der ukrainischen Regierung, zog Russland seine Truppen aus dem Raum Kiew zurück und konzentrierte sich auf den Donbass. Trotz damals geringerer Stärke (Russland/Ukraine ca. 100:200 Tausend) erlangten die russischen Truppen durch Konzentrationen, Manövrierfähigkeit und überlegene Feuerkraft, vorrangig in Kesselschlachten, die Überlegenheit gegenüber den ukrainischen Hauptkräften. Mit der Vernichtung des Asow-Regiments in Mariupol wurde das Teilziel der „Entnazifizierung“ als erreicht gesehen. Nach fünf Monaten Krieg ist, bis auf das Gebiet um Odessa, die gesamte Südküste inklusive der Krim, durch Russland und die verbündeten Republiken Donezk und Lugansk besetzt. Weitere Territorialbesetzungen sind wahrscheinlich.

Die ukrainischen Streitkräfte sind dagegen – trotz jahrelanger Vorbereitung auf den Krieg – nur zu taktischen, örtlich-begrenzten Kampfhandlungen in der Lage. Ihre Widerstandskraft stützt sich in totaler Abhängigkeit auf dauerhafte materielle Waffenlieferungen, inklusive Ausbildung und logistische Unterstützung, nachrichtendienstliche Aufklärungs-/Zielaten sowie finanzielle Milliardenhilfen der USA/NATO und der EU. Dramatisch sind die Verluste an Militärpersonal (pro Tag 100–500 Tote/Verwundete) und Territorium (bisher ca. 20 Prozent). Der weitere Verlauf des Krieges und seine Dauer sind schwer kalkulierbar. Deutlich ist: „Die Unfähigkeit des Westens, seinen Gegner rational zu beurteilen, scheint die Ukraine in eine Katastrophe zu führen.“⁶

Ökonomisch wird Russland durch die Belastungen des Ukraine-Krieges und westliche Sanktionen deutlich geschwächt. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP 2021: ca. 1.700 Mrd. US-Dollar) brach um 10–15 Prozent ein. Der Außenhandel ist rückläufig, insbesondere der West-Export von Rohstoffen sowie der Zugang zur Hochleistungstechnologie weitgehend unterbunden. Dennoch sind die Wirkungen der Sanktionen zeitlich wie inhaltlich unerwartet begrenzt. Während des Krieges konnte Russland bis zu 30 Prozent Mehreinnahmen aus dem Öl-/Gas-Geschäft erwirtschaften. Der Rubel stabilisierte sich, neue Zahlungssysteme auf nationaler Währungsbasis sind im Entstehen. Das westliche Sanktions-Regime gegen Russland wird von einer globalen Staaten-Mehrheit nicht mitgetragen. Das betrifft die strategischen Partner China und Indien sowie über 100 Staaten Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas. Mit einer Bevölkerung von 4,5 Milliarden Menschen und einem BIP von ca. 20-tausend Milliarden US-Dollar (Westen unter 1 Mrd. Menschen,

⁶ Sachkundige Analyse und Prognose vgl. J. Baud, *Stand der militärischen Lage in der Ukraine Anfang Juni*, 27.06.2022, <https://overton-magazin.de/krass-konkret/stand-der-militaerischen-lage-in-der-ukraine-anfang-juni>.

BIP ca. 40 T-Mrd.) sind das die Hauptpartner/-regionen für russische Absatz- und Beschaffungsmärkte in den nächsten Jahrzehnten. Die USA/NATO-Wunschvorstellungen einer weltwirtschaftlichen „Entkopplung“ und „Isolation“ Russlands sind gescheitert. Im Gegenteil, die instabilen Kräfteverhältnisse verschieben sich weiter zugunsten der nicht-westlichen Welt.

Die Ukraine ist wirtschaftlich zusammengebrochen. Schon in dem Jahrzehnt vor dem Krieg hatte sie eine der schwächsten Volkswirtschaften Europas (BIP 2021: ca. 200 Mrd. US-Dollar).⁷ Langfristige Hauptursache der ökonomischen Unterentwicklung ist das Scheitern der Transformation nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion 1990/91. Vergleichbare Nachbarn realisierten eine vergleichsweise dynamische Entwicklung (Polen 4-fach, Rumänien 3-fach höher). Im ersten Kriegshalbjahr 2022, ist ein drastischer BIP-Rückgang von 40–60 Prozent zu konstatieren. Zwei Drittel der Arbeitskräfte sind z.Zt. nicht mehr wertschöpfend beschäftigt. Über 7 Millionen UkrainerInnen (ca. 20 Prozent) haben das Land als Flüchtlinge verlassen. Die Wirtschaft liegt im Vergleich zur EU bei unter 10 Prozent Gesamtproduktivität und ist ca. 50 Jahre in ihrer Entwicklung zurückgeblieben.

Ukraine ist kein Verbündeter

Beide Kriegsparteien sind keine Verbündeten Deutschlands. Für Russland erübrigt sich an dieser Stelle eine Begründung. Die Ukraine ist weder Mitglied der NATO noch der EU. Entsprechende Aufnahmeprozesse erfordern in beiden Organisationen Kriterien, der die Ukraine nicht annähernd gerecht wird und längerfristig ihre Mitgliedschaft ausschließen.

Hervorzuheben sind dabei die „Kopenhagener Kriterien“ der EU von 1993 und die, deutlich zurückhaltender formulierten, Bedingungen des NATO-Vertrages:

(1) Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Die Ukraine ist hochgradig geprägt von politischer Instabilität. Demokratie-/Rechtsausübungsind fragwürdig und nicht kompatibel mit westlichen Demokratie-Maßstäben. Sie gleichen eher Russland, Belarus und den Ländern Mittelasiens. Die Staatsstrukturen der Ukraine arbeiten ineffektiv und bremsen Fortschritte.

(2) Marktwirtschaft und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. In der Ukraine herrscht ein korrupter Oligarchen-Kapitalismus. Die Wirtschaft ist desaströs unproduktiv und nicht konkurrenzfähig. Eine Aufnahme würde die EU-Integration langfristig behindern und die vorhandenen Konflikte (z.B. bei der Subventionsverteilung) drastisch vertiefen. Es bestünden die Gefahren einer „strategischen Überdehnung“ und des EU-Zerfalls. Ähnlich dem Problemfall Türkei.

⁷ Vgl. K. Kleinwächter, *Die Ukraine – das hochgerüstete Armenhaus Europas*, 22.06.2022, <https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Die-Ukraine-das-hochgeruestete-Armenhaus-Europas-7147424.html?site=all>.

(3) Beitrag zur Sicherheit. Es ist NATO-Grundkonsens, kein Land als Mitglied in die Allianz aufzunehmen, das sich in einer Konfliktsituation befindet. Deshalb erfolgte bereits 2008 eine entsprechende Ablehnung durch Frankreich und Deutschland. Der Krieg mit Russland, seine unabsehbare Entwicklung und die möglichen Konditionen seiner Beendigung blockieren eine NATO-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine.

EU wie NATO implementieren in ihren Aufnahmebedingungen die Einstimmigkeit aller Mitgliedstaaten zum Beitritt neuer Staaten. Der überhastete EU-Ratsbeschluss (23.06.2022) der Ukraine (und der Republik Moldau) den „Status eines Beitrittskandidaten“ zuzuerkennen ist wesentlich der aufgeheizten Situation geschuldet und trägt stark politisch-propagandistische Züge. Aufgrund der Rahmenbedingungen, der unabsehbaren Konflikt-/Kriegs-Lage, des langwierigen Aufnahmeprocédere und den gravierend unterschiedlichen Interessen der 27 EU- und 30 NATO-Staaten, ist jedoch langfristig (10–20 Jahre) nicht mit einem Beitritt der Ukraine zu rechnen.

Die deutsche Ampelregierung erweist im Einklang mit der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung der ukrainischen Bevölkerung umfassende Solidarität - humanitäre und soziale Hilfe direkt vor Ort sowie den ca. eine Millionen Ukraine-Flüchtlingen in Deutschland. Dazu gehört auch eine angemessene materielle und finanzielle Unterstützung beim Wiederaufbau des Landes.

Eine Solidarisierung mit der antidemokratischen Führungselite und dem korrupten Oligarchen-Regime der Ukraine ist abzulehnen. Hier zeigen sich auch bei der Ampelregierung traditionelle Züge eines doppelbödigen, demagogischen Charakters deutscher Außenpolitik. Deutschlands Freiheit wird nicht „am Hindukusch“ oder von der Ukraine, sondern im Rahmen von EU/NATO von uns selbst verteidigt.

Negation deutscher Interessen

Wie eingangs herausgearbeitet ist die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik unter der Ampelregierung durch eine strategische Trinität von (1) Energie-/Umwelt-Politik, (2) soziale Absicherung des Lebensstandards der Bevölkerung und (3) Stärkung der Verteidigungsfähigkeit geprägt.

Schon im bisher (kurzen) Verlauf des Ukraine-Krieges und der absehbaren Folgen für die deutsche Bevölkerung haben sich die Prioritäten verschoben. Im März bis Mai 2022 standen – mit dem „Sondervermögen“ für die Bundeswehr, den westlichen Sanktionspaketen gegen Russland und den Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine – unmittelbare Reaktionen auf den Krieg im Mittelpunkt der Regierungspolitik und der Aufmerksamkeit der Bevölkerung. Deutlich wurden Tendenzen einer Militarisierung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands.

Danach kippt die gesellschaftliche Situation mit Blick auf die unmittelbaren drastisch-negativen sozialen Auswirkungen sowie die langfristigen Wirkungen. Angesichts der Realitäten sind die Versicherungen des Kanzlers, „Schaden vom deutschen Volk abzuwenden“, respektive die Regierungspolitik zunehmend nicht mehr glaubwürdig.

Die bisherigen EU-Sanktions-Pakete betreffen vor allem die Bereiche Außenhandel, insbesondere Energiewirtschaft, Hochleistungstechnologie und den Währungs-/Kapitalmarkt. Russland hat den „Wirtschaftskrieg“ des Westens angenommen und reagiert mit Gegenmaßnahmen auf die Sanktionen. Dabei hat es insbesondere gegenüber Deutschland im Bereich Energie/Gas eine wirksame Eskalationskontrolle. In Folge des Gesamtkonfliktes wurden die Beziehungen in der Außenwirtschaft instabil, wirken die gegenseitigen (!) ökonomischen und sozialen Abhängigkeiten.

Die Interessen Deutschlands stehen zur Disposition. Schnell wurde deutlich, dass nahezu alle Lebensbereiche der breiten Bevölkerungsmasse negativ betroffen sind. Die Inflation in Deutschland – seit fast 30 Jahren unter 2 Prozent – sprang innerhalb der letzten Monate auf 7–9 Prozent! Das betrifft vor allem die Existenzgrundlagen (!) der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung durch massive Preissteigerungen bei Lebensmitteln, Energie und Wohnkosten. Es drohen trotz massiver Stützungsgelder die Verringerung des Lebensstandards, eine Verarmung von 30–40 Prozent der unteren Bevölkerungsschichten sowie deutlich höhere Belastungen der Mittelschicht. Eine neue, drastisch negative Erfahrung für die jüngeren Generationen.

Soziale Verteilungskämpfe und Proteste haben begonnen: massive Lohnforderungen, Streiks der Gewerkschaften; Konflikte inner- und außerhalb der Regierung um die Steuer- und Subventionspolitik- sowie eine hohe Neuverschuldung des Staates; Petitionen mit 100-tausendfacher Zustimmung gegen Krieg und Waffenlieferungen für Friedensverhandlungen; umfangreiche Regierungskritik in den sozialen Medien; Massendemonstrationen, politische Radikalisierungen und eine unkontrollierbare Eskalation (analog Corona-Protesten, „Gelbwesten“) sind nicht auszuschließen. Ähnlich, z.T. deutlich zugespitzter zeigen sich die Probleme in allen EU-Staaten. Ein anhaltender Russland-Ukraine-Krieg mit seinen globalen Auswirkungen destabilisiert auf Jahre die europäische und deutsche Wirtschaft und die Gesellschaften insgesamt.

Notwendigkeit politischer Lösungen

Der Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt hat eine jahrzehntelange Geschichte und ist durch seine Kriegszuspitzung einer Lösung nicht nähergekommen. Nüchterner Realismus ist angesagt.

Ansätze zur friedlichen Einigung waren durch die Minsk-Vereinbarungen 2014/15 gelegt (Waffenstillstand/-abzug, OSZE-Kontrolle, vertraglicher Sonderstatus für Lugansk und Donezk; Verfassungsreform der Ukraine), sind aber von den Ereignissen überholt. Teilnehmer waren damals die Ukraine, Russland, Frankreich und Deutschland. Die Initiative ging von letzteren aus. Die USA hatten nicht teilgenommen. Die Ukraine unter den Präsidenten Poroschenko und Selenskyj, wesentlich beeinflusst von den USA, sabotierten die Umsetzung und führten 2015–22 Kriegshandlungen gegen Lugansk und Donezk durch (über 10.000 Tote). Deutschland und Frankreich drängten die Ukraine nicht auf Erfüllung der Vereinbarungen. Russland war zunehmend desinteressiert, erklärte die Minsker-Vereinbarungen am 21. Februar 2022 für gescheitert und anerkannte Lugansk und Donezk als eigenständige Staaten. Auf Hilfssuchen dieser begann Russland am 24. Februar den Krieg gegen die Ukraine.

Selenskyjs Initiativen zur Aufnahme und Führung eines Dialogs im März/April 2022 mit Russland, in Belarus und der Türkei wurden von den USA, Großbritannien und der EU hintertrieben. Dennoch sind erste Inhalte kommender Verhandlungen ausgetauscht:

Künftige Neutralität der Ukraine, keine NATO-Mitgliedschaft; Krim-Moratorium für 15 Jahre im gegenwärtigen Status; Autonomie von Lugansk und Donezk. Nach Austausch der Positionen und Übergabe von Dokumenten zwischen der Ukraine und Russland, widerrief Selenskyj seine Vorschläge. Der Kriegsverlauf zuungunsten der Ukraine sowie drängende internationale Nahrungsmittelprobleme zwingen jedoch zu mehr Realismus. Die Vereinbarungen über die kontrollierte Lieferung von Landwirtschaftsgütern (Getreide, Düngemittel) zwischen der UNO, Türkei, Ukraine und Russland sind dafür ein herausragendes Beispiel. Auf militärischer und außenpolitischer Arbeitsebene werden laufende Kontakte und ein Informationsaustausch aufrechterhalten, auch direkt zwischen den USA und Russland.

Schlussfolgerungen

(1) Deutschlands Außenpolitik ist strategiefähig. Als ein hochentwickelter moderner Großstaat verfügt es über strategisches Denken, langfristige Programmatik und funktionierende Instrumente in den Hauptbereichen der Gesellschaft. Die Außenpolitik der vergangenen Jahrzehnte war im Wesen erfolgreich, das zeigen die Friedensordnung und der Lebensstandard Mitteleuropas.⁸ Gegenwärtige

⁸ Vgl. L. Kleinwächter, K. Kleinwächter, *Deutschland in EurAsien. Aspekte einer Strategie im multipolarem Zeitalter*. In: R. Krämer (Hrsg.), *Zwischen Kooperation und Konkurrenz. Europa und Asien im 21. Jahrhundert*, WeltTrends, Potsdam 2019, <http://welttrends.de/res/uploads/IIP-Papiere-26.pdf>.

Diffamierungskampagnen durch reaktionäre Kräfte außerhalb und innerhalb der Regierung sind ahistorisch.

(2) Notwendigkeit einer interessengeleiteten Realpolitik. Eine „Zeitenwende“ hin zu einer konfrontativen „Entkopplung“ Russlands (und Chinas) ist emotional verständlich, führt aber in eine historisch-strategische Sackgasse. Sie schadet den Interessen Deutschlands und der Mehrheit seiner Bevölkerung. Ernst zu nehmen sind Hinweise auf eine Wirtschaftskrise in Deutschland und Europa sowie eine deutliche Zunahme sozialer Konflikte.

(3) Handlungsunfähigkeit. Eine „Strategieunfähigkeit“ Deutschlands ist unwahrscheinlich. Fehleinschätzungen und Defensivpositionen sind offensichtlich und Normalität sowie zukunftsorientiert korrigierbar. Hauptursachen dafür sind zunehmende Tendenzen einer Deglobalisierung und Regionalisierung sowie aktuelle Anleihen an eine „Politik der Stärke“ der Ewiggestrigen. Der Krieg Russland/Ukraine und seine längerfristigen Folgen erschweren die Prognosetätigkeit und engen die Aktionsmöglichkeiten ein. Transatlantischen und eurasischen Versuchen einer Einmischung/Fremdbestimmung der Politik Deutschlands und der EU ist entgegenzutreten. Die Ampelkoalition läuft Gefahr in einen abgekartete „Putin-Biden-Falle“ zu tappen.

(4) Systemkonfrontation. Die mit „scharfer Sanktionspolitik“ beabsichtigte Destabilisierung Russlands bis hin zum „regimechange“ scheitert. Der bündnisartige Block Russland/China und seine Unterstützer sind militärisch sowie ökonomisch nicht besiegbar. US-Forderungen nach einem Totalboykott der Wirtschafts- und Energiebeziehungen gegenüber Russland und zunehmend Chinas haben auch das Ziel, die EU und insbesondere Deutschland als Konkurrenten langfristig zu schwächen. Die gegenwärtigen Scheinvorteile der USA/EU werden die machtpolitische Relativierung der USA nicht aufhalten und Europa/Deutschland müssen das in ihrer Strategiebildung berücksichtigen. Dahingehend erweist sich die SPD-geführte-Ampelregierung, unter dem Druck der neokonservativen Atlantiker, bisher nicht auf der Höhe der Zeit.

(5) Globale Probleme. Die existenziellen weltweiten Bedrohungen erzwingen, in partieller Interessenübereinstimmung der verschiedenen Systeme und strategischen Kulturen, in der Krieg-/Frieden-Problematik und den drastischen Folgen der Klimaveränderung, einen kooperativen und historisch zeitnahen Lösungsansatz. Erst nach Aufgabeder Konfrontation und einem Neueinstieg in die Dialogpolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 21. Jahrhunderts sind praktische Ergebnissen möglich.

(6) Multipolarität statt Systemkampf. Die Realitäten erfordern die Entwicklung globaler, gewaltfreier Streitkulturen – Kooperation und Wettbewerb, statt „Systemgegnerschaft“ und „Entkopplung“. Im Mittelpunkt der Interessenpolitik der EU/Deutschlands steht die Stärkung einer multilateralen polyzentristischen Stabilität. Das Hauptziel bleibt – trotz kriegerischer Zuspitzung – die Erzielung von stabilen Kompromissen zur Lösung zivilisatorischer Existenzprobleme.

Gesamtfazit: Die „Neue deutsche Verantwortung“ besteht nicht in einer konfrontativen rückwärtsgewandten „Zeitenwende“, sondern in der Schaffung einer gesamteuropäischen Friedensordnung unter Einschluss Russlands. Bei Fortsetzung der gegenwärtigen Außenpolitik der Ampelregierung ist sie wider besseren Wissens mitschuldig, dass auch das 21. Jahrhundert für die Lösung globaler Menschheitsprobleme wieder ein „verlorenes Jahrhundert“ wird!

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Zur Sicherheitsstrategie Deutschlands in der „Zeitenwende“

Zusammenfassung

Kanzler Scholz verkündete euphorisch eine „Zeitenwende“. Als Anlass dafür beanspruchte er den Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine. Der hastig formulierte Strategieansatz dieser „Wendezeit“ ist kritisch-realistisch zu hinterfragen. Mit Blick auf die ambivalente Entwicklung Deutschlands in der Vergangenheit und die absehbare Zukunft ist das Ergebnis offen. Analytischer Realismus und eine europäische Friedensordnung sind angesagt.

Schlüsselwörter: Deutsche Außenpolitik, Russland, Sicherheitsinteressen, Strategie, Ukraine, Krieg

On Germany's security strategy at the "Zeitenwende"

Abstract

Chancellor Scholz euphorically announced a "Zeitenwende" (lit. turn of the times, change of eras). He cited Russia's war against Ukraine as the reason for this. The hastily formulated strategy approach of this is to be critically and realistically questioned. In view of the ambivalent development of Germany in the past and the foreseeable future, the result is open. Analytical realism and a European peace order instead of war are necessary.

Key words: German foreign policy, Russia, security interests, strategy, Ukraine, war

From the history



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The origin of the Turkish Armed Forces: Kemalism and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic

The military has always played a significant role in Turkish consciousness. The first ever mention of Turks in global history refers precisely to the military structures from Central Asia. Following Albert H. Lybyer, the Ottoman Empire, which was “more an army than anything else,”¹ had been created in the course of conquests and was administered by military dependencies. Researchers estimate that both structures – the Ottoman state and its society – actually played a supporting role in relation to the armed forces.² Gareth Jenkins points out that “the role of the military in Turkey is rooted in Turkish society, history, and culture. The military became the basis for the Turks to define themselves, and the army, as the most respected institution, remains the embodiment of the entire nation’s virtues and values.”³ The Turkish army has a unique status in the state’s political and legal system, confirmed in many key legal acts, often becoming a major obstacle in terms of domestic

¹ A.H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913, p. 90.

² D.B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army*, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 43.

³ G. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 8.

and foreign policy.⁴ Although the initial ancestor of modern military and state institutions of contemporary Turkey can be found in the Ottoman Empire, in particular during the period of the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1871), and the first constitutional period (1876–1909), it must be acknowledged that the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey by the kemalist government in 1923 became the final farewell to the *ancien régime*.⁵

The goal of this article is to discuss the role and importance of proclaiming the Republic of Turkey, as well as the principles of kemalism in the process of creating the contemporary armed forces and civil-military relations in this country, which to this day constitute a unique example on the international arena. This specific research problem constitutes an attempt to answer two research questions. First, how did historical events and the direct participation of the army as a revolutionary and decision-making factor during the first two decades after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic impact the position and role of the armed forces in Turkey? Second, what role did the principles of the state ideology of Kemalism play and still play in building the political system and civil-military relations in Turkey?

The answers to the above questions require taking into account the following research methods: factorial and historical. The empirical method, in the form of identifying and describing the problem on the basis of a variety of materials and general technological methods: synthesis, induction and deduction, has also proved to be helpful. The essential elements in terms of researching the origins of the modern Turkish state and its army consist in monographs detailing the multidimensional history of the Republic of Turkey, as well as those that look at the functioning of internal policy and foreign policy, the whole political system, and core institutions of the Turkish state. It must be stated that the achievements of Polish researchers of this topic lack a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of civil-military relations and their reforms, as well as the consequences of this state of affairs on the functioning of the state. Therefore, the knowledge gained from foreign publications, devoted to a large extent to the role and position of the Turkish army in the country, has turned out to be an invaluable source that enjoys an equal research status.

Young Turks revolution

In opposition to the governance of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the conviction of the need to carry out the state's modernist reforms, in 1907 the Ottoman Freedom

⁴ Z. Sarigil, *Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military*, "Mediterranean Politics", vol. 12, issue 1, 2007, pp. 3957.

⁵ S.A. Cook, *Ruling but not Governing. The military and political development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, p. 94.

Association (Tur. *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) has been formed in Thessaloniki, which was headed by an official named Mehmed Talât, who was joined by young officers from the Third Army, including Major Ismail Enver, and the then captain Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. That same year, activists established cooperation with the Paris Committee of Unity and Progress (Tur. *İttihatve Terakki Cemiyeti*), an organisation of political emigrants whose members were also referred to as Young Turks (Tur. *Genç Türkler*), criticising the authorities for carrying out Tanzimat's policy in an authoritarian manner, chiefly the large-scale reforms announced by Sultan Abdülmeccid in 1839.⁶

As a result of external plans to take away the Ottoman sovereignty over the provinces in Macedonia by Tsar Nicholas II and the English king Edward VII, as well as initiating an investigation against the conspirators in Thessaloniki, an armed battle broke out in July 1908, also known as the Young Turks Revolution. The conspirators demanded to restore the constitution of 1876 and introduce multi-partyism as part of a two-tier electoral system. As a result of effective actions, the grand vizier was changed and a decree restoring the constitution was approved throughout the empire, which became the beginning of the Young Turks era in Turkey, which lasted continuously until the end of World War I.⁷

From the perspective of the conducted analysis, it is worth emphasising the fact that the two recurring problems for the state's system during this period consisted in the influence of the military on internal politics, as well as on the relations between the Committee and the parliament. The Committee had an undefined legal status, being a secret underground organisation until 1912 that never evolved into a political party. Until 1911, the Young Turks had informally controlled the parliament with only a few representatives in the government that was still run by members of the old civilian and military elite.⁸ The Committee had virtually unlimited legislative power, as long as its actions did not have a negative effect on the army's interests. Another threat to military discipline and unity consisted in the significant influence of relatively low-ranking officers on the political realities in the state, thanks to their position in the Committee of Unity and Progress. In fact, the situation was quite similar in terms of the second justified allegation against them, namely

⁶ D. Chmielowska, M. Sobczak, "Demokracja po turecku", *Studia Europejskie*, no. 4, 2016, pp. 205–206.

⁷ D. Kołodziejczyk, *Turcja*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2010, pp. 49–50; E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja. Od sultanatu do współczesności*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013, pp. 93–94; E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to Revolution of 1908*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 1–13.

⁸ G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire: A Study of War and Revolution during the Young Turk Period*, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, A Xerox Company, 1970, pp. 74–86.

the unofficial relations between the Committee and the parliament, influencing its decisions without taking political responsibility.⁹

In the parliament, dominated by representatives of the Committee, a new law on military service was passed, imposing the obligation for every man with an Ottoman citizenship, regardless of religion, to serve in the army. At the same time, the officer corps was reduced and reorganised, which resulted in early retirement and degrading soldiers.¹⁰ It is estimated that more than 10,000 officers were removed from the army over the next few years.¹¹ As a result of the army's deepening internal conflicts, an additional record was prepared to be introduced into the military code, recognising the participation of a soldier in the Empire's politics as a punishable act, which resulted in the Committee's expected opposition.

In the following years, three military men who were members of the Young Turks since its beginning, became political leaders – Cemal Pasha as the minister of the navy, Talât Pasha as the minister of internal affairs, and Enver Pasha, who headed the ministry of war in 1914.¹² The government regime established at that time, over 4 years after the original Young Turks revolution, is sometimes referred to as another “triumvirate” of young radicals; however, it is just a simplified label. The Young Turkish government gradually introduced a large-scale reform scheme. From an analytical point of view, it is necessary to mention the changes within the administration, especially concerning the armed forces, coordinated by Enver Pasha. In 1914, the reorganisation of the army took place primarily as a result of the several purges in the former officer corps. The German military mission under the command of General Liman von Sanders was involved in reforming the army's structure and functioning.¹³ Members of this mission were appointed to commanding positions, and their influence was strong, especially during World War I.¹⁴ However, the early end of the state reform program and the slow collapse of the Young Turks regime due to the military defeat in 1918 were inevitable. At the beginning of November, Enver, Cemal, and Talât sailed to Germany on a German warship, and during their absence in the Empire, the Committee of Unity and Progress was dissolved and their property confiscated.¹⁵

In sum, in the long-term perspective, it was not the lack of modern equipment or soldier training that constituted the greatest obstacle in developing the army during

⁹ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 100.

¹¹ M. Naim Turfan, *The rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the military and the Ottoman collapse*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 243.

¹² W. Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military*, London 1993, p. 45.

¹³ L. von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, Annapolis: MD: United States Naval Institute, 1972, p. 3.

¹⁴ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–127; U. Heyd, *The Foundation of Turkish Nationalism*, London: Luzac & Company Ltd, 1950, chapter 4.

¹⁵ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

that period, but rather the cultural, social and, of course, political elements. Thanks to the fierce fight to build a new order, officers of the Turkish military saw themselves from the very beginning as guardians of reforms and precursors of enlightenment. Radical political activism, which depended primarily on the army as the strongest revolutionary power in both 1876 and 1908, was born out of the conviction about the Empire's weakness resulting from political traditionalism and technical underdevelopment. Moreover, assuming the role of a political determinant of the Empire's future in 1908 and 1909, the military became completely involved in the state's political system, eventually losing its position as a national neutral institution.¹⁶

The proclamation of the Republic of Turkey with a modern army

Despite the defeat in World War I, the epidemic, and the numerous desertions, the Ottoman army still maintained unity in Anatolia, with the command structure especially intact. However, the military potential was not high – the army consisted of circa 35,000 soldiers, scattered over a large area of Thrace.¹⁷ The government administration gradually rebuilt itself after the fall of the Young Turks regime. As a consequence, military officers, bureaucrats, and landowners – the middle rank of the Young Turkish power structure – formed a leading layer of the new resistance movement.¹⁸ The period from May 1919 to 1923 can be described as an active war for independence or a liberation war (Tur. *kurtuluşsavaşı*), which went through two noticeable stages.

During the first phase of the liberation war, in June 1919, the building of a broad resistance movement began under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, one of the most popular war heroes at the time. He was appointed Inspector General of the 9th Army, responsible for Eastern and North-Central Anatolia, with its base in Samsun on the Black Sea. His competences included restoring public order and safety, securing Ottoman weapons and ammunition during demobilisation, as well as suppressing protests against the government. He was entrusted not only with authority over the army, but also over the civilian clerical staff in the region.¹⁹ A nationalist organisation by the name of the Association for the Defence Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, headed by Kemal, organised a congress in Erzurum and Sivas and announced the demand for complete and undivided sovereignty of the Empire's territories inhabited by Turkish people, in fact including today's territory of the

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 54–55.

¹⁷ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

¹⁸ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

¹⁹ M. Kemal, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic*, October 1927, t. 1–2, Leipzig: K.F. Kochler, 1929, pp. 28–30.

Republic of Turkey.²⁰ As a consequence, on October 22, 1919, Salih Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, during a meeting with Kemal in Amasaya, made a five-point agreement that assumed carrying out the nationalists' program, including guaranteeing a new election as well as establishing a new chamber of deputies outside the capital. The nationalists, on the other hand, were supposed to officially accept the sovereignty of power in Istanbul.²¹

At the same time, there was a growing dissatisfaction of the occupiers, especially the British, who finally led the Grand Vizier Ali Rıza to resign on March 3, 1920. The capital officially got under martial law and the parliament was dissolved.²² Kemal's call for deputies and activists to return to Ankara was finally answered by 92 deputies who, together with 232 representatives elected by local resistance movement organisations, established the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Tur. *Büyük Millet Meclisi*). The first meeting took place on April 23, 1920, when the parliamentarians appointed Kemal as the chairman and Mustafa İsmet İnönü, Kemal's friend, a deputy from Edirne, as the commander of the general staff.²³

The explicit measures undertaken against the nationalists by the authorities of Istanbul and the occupiers officially opened the second stage of fighting for the Empire's independence. The new nationalist government strictly separated itself from the Istanbul government, but remained loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. During the first session, a declaration was passed, assuming that the country's real power belongs to the sovereign people represented by the parliament, and that the Grand National Assembly constitutes the supreme authority.²⁴

The key campaigns of the second stage of the war for independence took place in western Anatolia during the summer of 1921 and 1922 against the Greeks, ending in victory for the Turks. Ultimately, the Entente states, whose superior goal was to prevent initiating another armed conflict, on July 24, 1923, signed the final document implementing the independence goals of the nationalists.²⁵ With the exception of minor concessions, the treaty restored Turkey's complete sovereignty under international law, abolishing capitulation privileges and the Western control of the straits that were supposed to be demilitarized.²⁶

The events of July 1923 marked the beginning of a series of major changes in the Turkish state. First of all, the power of Mustafa Kemal has been consolidated, the

²⁰ *Modern Turkey*, eds. E.G. Mears, New York: Macmillan, 1924, appendix III, pp. 627–628.

²¹ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

²² S.J. Shaw, E.K. Shaw, *Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i Republiki Tureckiej 1808–1975*, t. 2, 1808–1975, transl. by B. Świetlik, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2012, p. 528.

²³ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

²⁴ S.J. Shaw, E.K. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 529–530.

²⁵ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63; E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–156.

²⁶ D. Kołodziejczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

last political ties with the Ottoman Empire were broken, and the national culture was redefined on a non-religious level. As a result of the following election held in September 1923, the majority of parliament members included supporters of the reformist direction of changes proposed by Kemal, who registered the new People's Party (Tur. *Halk Fırkası*). In October 1923, as a result of a government crisis, the National Assembly officially voted to change the state capital to Ankara, and on October 29 the Republic of Turkey has been proclaimed. As expected, Mustafa Kemal has been elected as the first president, while İsmet Pasha İnönü was appointed as both the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. On March 3, 1924, the caliphate has been finally abolished, while Abdülmecid and the rest of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled.²⁷

The new constitution was adopted on April 20, 1924, and it reaffirmed the superior power of the parliament to elect the president and the government.²⁸ However, in reality, Kemal's personal power was absolute: he controlled the entire parliament through a legally operating party, which changed its name to the Republican People's Party (Tur. *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*), which he still headed, despite taking the office of president. Establishing the Republic of Turkey as well as his grand ambitions resulted in multifaceted and wide-ranging reforms aimed at radically modernising the country, understood in the Western way. However, it is worth emphasising that the president was not attached to such democratic values as the rule of law, freedom of speech and the press, or political pluralism.²⁹ The pattern of fighting for power and the transition from a pluralist to a two-party system, known from the second constitutional period, once again took place and ended with the authorities having monopoly to implement radical modernist and secular changes in the state. The Republican People's Party established a monopoly of power, which was officially announced in 1931 at a party congress, during which the most important elements of the Kemalist ideology were also elaborated. Kemal, together with his associates, tightened their control over the state by taking direct supervision over all cultural, social, and intellectual life.³⁰

The ideological and cultural image of Turkey, which also inextricably shapes the political, institutional, and the national security system, would not be complete without mentioning the phenomenon of the aforementioned set of ideas that make up kemalism (Tur. *kemalizm*, used by Western authors) or Turkish atatürkism (Tur. *Atatürkçülük*).³¹ Initial kemalism included six principles, symbolised by six arrows

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 122–123.

²⁸ S. Kili, *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961*, Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1971, pp. 197–208.

²⁹ D. Kołodziejczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–121.

³⁰ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 176–181.

³¹ A. Szymański, *Między islamem a kemalizmem – problem demokracji w Turcji*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2008, p. 56; E.Z. Karnal, *The Principles of Kemalism*,

(Tur. *Altı Ok*): republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism. These principles have been included in the Turkish Basic Law in 1937, thus becoming principles of the Turkish constitutional order. Moreover, they were also included in following Turkish constitutions – dated 1961 and 1982. To this day, these principles constitute the foundation of dogmatic kemalism, in the name of which there were four military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, as well as one failed attempt in 2015. Due to the purpose of the conducted analysis, attention should be pointed to the issue of two principles that are crucial for the Turkish army and used in confirming the legitimacy of actions interfering with the state's national policy – secularism and nationalism.

The question of nationalism (Tur. *milliyetçilik*) has raised many doubts since the beginning of the Turkish state. It was already during the liberation war that the idea of a nation-state appeared, along with the idea of political nationalism, binding the nation with the state and its territory. The presented view assumed that the term “Turk” meant every citizen of Turkey, regardless of that person's religion or ethnic origin, and thus a forced assimilation of minorities. However, Turkey stood out from the Europe of that time, with its rich political and social openness, which did not exclude any religious minority or ethnic *a priori*.³² Since the 1930s, the role of the second element of Turkish nationalism – “ethnic nationalism” – has been growing, with its base in the notion of a “cultural nation” based on a common language, history, as well as culture or origin, and a decade later also in Islam. Both elements of nationalism have been reflected in constitutions and other legal acts, as a consequence combining both elements into an inseparable whole. Contemporary Turkish nationalism stands for patriotism, attachment to national symbols, a sense of national pride, and territorial integrity, creating a kind of civil religion – the phenomenon of the nation's sacralisation, its symbols and Atatürk, as well as martyrdom.³³ Secularism (Tur. *laiklik*), in turn, was understood not only as separating the state from religion, but also as eliminating religion from public life and establishing state control over still operating religious institutions.³⁴ This principle has been included in all historical and currently binding constitutions.

It was often possible to accuse this ideology of a lack of consistency, but more importantly, also no emotional attractiveness. This gap was, without a doubt, filled by the cult of Mustafa Kemal, personally surrounding him during his lifetime and even more intensely after his death. At the same time, it should be admitted that the described principles were characterised by dynamism, flexibility, and the ability to adapt to the emerging conditions. As a result, the kemalism of the 1930s has

[in:] *Atatürk: Founder of Modern State*, eds. A. Kazancigil, E. Özbudun, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997, p. 16.

³² D. Kołodziejczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

³³ A. Szymański, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–65.

³⁴ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–182.

currently evolved into neo-kemalism, which has effectively grown into the political culture of Turkey. In particular, both principles of initial kemalism – nationalism and secularism – are still valid in domestic politics and resonate mostly in the area of security policy, although they have undergone transformation. Nationalism is not only based on the idea of a state nation, but also relates more strongly to cultural identity. In the Republic's history its importance has grown multiple times, especially during internal conflicts with Kurdish militants, or during foreign events, such as the Iraqi crisis, taking down relations with the US, or problems with the negotiation process with the EU, as well as the Cyprus or Armenian issues. Secularism still plays a key role as an element of the constitutional order, although its modification is visible, especially since the second term of the Justice and Development party's (Tur. *Adaletve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) rule. For decades, the issue of the state's secularisation constituted an element of military interest, and even a reason for entering into direct conflict, as well as a military intervention against the civilian authority.³⁵

Coming back to the period of building a new Turkey by Kemal Atatürk, it should be remembered that there was a parallel internal fight for influence and power within the nationalist camp, forming the position of the army itself in the state system. The greatest threat to Mustafa Kemal turned out to consist in the military and political elites in Ankara. As power was consolidated, the group of opponents grew, gathering also Kemal's former supporters or even associates and friends. They were primarily the deputies of the Grand National Assembly, whose views can be described as liberal. They expected the creation of a new Turkey in a model of a representative, multi-party democracy in a European fashion. The second group of opponents was motivated by Islamic conservatism. They were the supporters of preserving the sultanate and the caliphate for intellectual or sentimental reasons, who opposed such a drastic separation from the Ottoman Empire's Muslim past. The last group reluctant towards Kemal were his personal political competitors, especially members of the military elite, who, while fighting equally fiercely for Turkey's sovereignty, could not accept Kemal's personal domination. In many cases, all three motives – political liberalism, religious conservatism, or personal ambition – for opposing Mustafa Kemal were intertwined, so in the end, it is difficult to unequivocally identify the reasons for the attacks on Kemal.³⁶ In 1926, security services uncovered a real conspiracy to murder the president. These events led to two show trials that ultimately eliminated all of Atatürk's contemporary and potential rivals from the Republic's political life.³⁷

³⁵ A. Szymański, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³⁶ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³⁷ E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, p. 174; E.J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926*, Leiden: Brill 1984, pp. 144–158.

In the meantime, serious steps were undertaken to exclude professionally active officers from future political life. In December 1923, the National Assembly passed a law requiring all soldiers and officers to retire before their appointment to parliament, while military leaders who were members of the Assembly's at that time were deprived of the right to vote until they resigned from service. On March 3, 1924, immediately after abolishing the caliphate, the chief of the general staff has been deprived of his position in the government, and was held responsible for his actions directly before the president. The significance of Section 23 of the Constitution of April 1923 has been emphasised, which stated that it was forbidden to hold a deputy and government office at the same time, and which could legally apply to the terms of the military commissions at that time. Furthermore, Article 40 entrusted the supreme authority over the Turkish army to the Grand National Assembly, represented, of course, by the president of the republic. In legal terms, the army was to be completely removed from the legislative process in every dimension of the state's functioning. Additionally, the ban on serving political functions by active military was also secured by Section 148 of the Criminal Code, which recognised it as criminal to join a political party, organise or participate in political meetings, public appearances of a political nature, or prepare, sign, and send any political declaration to the press, by every member of the armed forces of the Republic of Turkey.³⁸ Furthermore, in order to complete the process of military influence in the parliament, Kemal personally forced most of his military associates to renounce their parliamentary seats or retire.³⁹

However, it is worth mentioning that despite the above reforms, civilian control over the state's defence policy or the performance of the military within their professional functions has been limited. However, a compromise with the military elite has been achieved, and provided for the prime minister's control over the chief of the general staff, as well as the possibility for the chief of staff to receive instructions directly from other ministers during exceptional or important situations. Additionally, he was to be appointed by the government, after a recommendation by the prime minister.⁴⁰ In practice, over many following years, the general staff remained largely independent in the field of the defence policy.

In conclusion, the words of researcher Georg S. Harris seem significant. He argues that the greatest concern of Kemal Mustafa was not to keep the military far from the state's internal politics, but to maintain their absolute loyalty towards the

³⁸ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

³⁹ W.F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*, Leiden: Brill, 1973, pp. 46–51; R.W. Olson, W.F. Tucker, *The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925)*, *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 18, issue 3/4, 1978, pp. 198–201; E.J. Zürcher, *Turcja...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–173, W. Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–75.

⁴⁰ G.S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics. Part 1", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 19, 1965, p. 63

president and the Republic.⁴¹ While the superior reason for the processes of isolating officers from political activity consisted in splits the army that turned into opposition groups. However, looking from a broader perspective, as an experienced soldier and commander, Kemal believed primarily that political commitment weakened the effectiveness and efficiency of performing military duties. Basically, the formal separation of the military from the most important state institutions was respected during the interwar period. On the other hand, the Ottoman tradition of including both civilian and military leaders in political bodies in the provinces was maintained, with officers acting also as governors in border regions.⁴²

The most important reforms concerning the functioning and organisation of the armed forces during the period of Kemalist reforms should also be discussed. In the summer of 1923, the position of the Turkish army as a whole was under dire threat. As a consequence of the crisis, the army has been demobilised and reorganised into nine territorial divisions under three inspectorates: in Ankara, Konya and Erzincan, with nine army corps. The first reforms strengthened the government's control over the army and distanced the most significant rivals from the central Turkish political scene.⁴³ The Supreme Military Council, which performed primarily advisory functions, acted under the leadership of the president, and also consisted of the chief of the general staff, the minister of defence, as well as three inspectors. The meagre air force, originally established in 1911, was created. In 1930, control of the gendarmerie was transferred to the minister of internal affairs, but recruits were able to carry out their civil service in the ranks of the gendarmerie, and in this regard, they were still perceived as part of the Turkish military.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, military modernisation during that period was neglected by the central authorities, thus making the Turkish army dangerously obsolete by the 1940s.⁴⁵ Therefore, military expenditure regularly decreased from 40 percent in 1926 to 23 percent in the years 1932–1933, only to increase to 30 percent in the following years.⁴⁶ This stagnation resulted in an intellectual and generational gap between experienced generals and a new fraction of officers who would take power over the Turkish armed forces in the 1950s.⁴⁷

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

⁴² D. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic", *World Politics*, vol. 11, 1959, pp. 546–550.

⁴³ M.M. Finefrock, *From Sultanate to Republic: Mustapha Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922–1924*, Princeton: Princeton University, 1976, pp. 107, 180–181, 218–219, 225–227, 237–238, 260–262; M. Kemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 589–590.

⁴⁴ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁴⁵ R.D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: The case study in National Development*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 239–240.

⁴⁶ Z.Y. Herslang, *Turkey, an Economy in Transition*, Hague: Uitgeverij van Keulen, 1958, pp. 113–114; G.S. Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61.

⁴⁷ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

However, from the political point of view, the military was to fulfil an extremely important function in the kemalist regime – promote the ideas of modernism and nationalistic secularism, especially among recruits. Indeed, every young man was obliged to undergo one to two years of military training. In terms of image, the army presented itself as a “school for the people”, in which every recruit received basic education and strengthened the love for his homeland, and additionally improved his condition and found passions.⁴⁸ However, from a legal point of view the roles and functions of the army were recorded in the Internal Military Service Act, which came into force in 1935. Section 34 of the Act provided that the duty of the army is to defend and protect the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as in the constitution. This record, repeated in the legislation of 1960, was used multiple times by following military activists to authorise interventions in the political sphere when the existence of the state was seriously threatened. In fact, Kemal himself took advantage of a broad interpretation of this provision, convincing young recruits that in terms of world history, the military generally stood in opposition to development, but not in the case of Turkey. The Turkish military has always presented the highest level, thanks to heroic soldiers who made laudable national ideas real. Such a doctrinaire approach to building a soldier’s identity was reinforced by a radical system of military education, which is used to this day.⁴⁹

Conclusions: the importance of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic and Kemalism in the evolution of the armed forces

The state’s revolution and reform, designed and carried out by Kemal Atatürk and his successors, laid the foundations for a modern Turkish military, taking the form of a supreme guardian of the new republic’s system, at the same time largely separating their influence from civil power. However, this tradition was first redefined in 1960, then in 1972 and 1980, when the military elite intervened effectively to overthrow the legally operating government. Referring to the legacy of kemalism as well as the ideological foundations of the Turkish Republic, an attempt was also made to seize power by a fraction of rebellious military men against the currently ruling AKP also in 2015. During all military interventions, the Turkish military took advantage of its role as well as formal or informal tools of influence, legitimising its actions with a specific kind of consent resulting from the general provisions of law, history, the role of the guardian of the principles of kemalism, and the society’s expectations. It is possible to define this attitude as an image of hegemony based on dispersing the values and principles in society as well as the bureaucratic process

⁴⁸ L. Linke, *Allah Dethroned: A Journey through Modern Turkey*, London: Constable, 1938, p. 329.

⁴⁹ W. Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–81.

through the domination of the military in the political system, in tactical terms.⁵⁰ Ersel Aydınli believes that this is precisely the result of the centuries-old historical experience of the Ottoman Empire, the war for independence, the Young Turks era and the Cold War, as well as many grand modernisation projects in modern Turkey, which have been largely and effectively implemented in the Turkish military.⁵¹

What is important is the fact that, as a result of the permanent introduction of multiparty parliamentary democracy in 1946, the army never exhibited classic politicisation or political participation with or as an instrument of an active parliamentary party. However, in setting itself up as a supra-systemic guardian of the principles of kemalism, the military has never limited itself to serving merely a defensive function of the armed forces known from the mature democracies of the Western world. Turkish generals constantly participated in managing and governing the state, especially in areas considered as most important to Turkey's security and defence, and in strong political and social crises, when the generals decided four times to take civil power from politicians and to temporarily introduce a military regime. However, the appropriation of absolute power over the state administration was each time temporary and limited by the organisation of a following general election, after which the army officially withdrew from politics, giving freedom to the new government and parliament. However, it must not be forgotten that also every military intervention, the subsequent military regime, as well as the following period of restorative reforms were used by the military to strengthen its autonomous position as well as the instruments of influence in the constitutional and legislative order.⁵²

Mentioning the most important examples, thanks to the strong position of the military, which had derived from the republican period, the generals secured the key privilege of intervening in the National Security Courts under the Military Service Act, the right to elect one member of the Higher Education Council, as well as the right of the General Secretary of the National Security Council to nominate a member of the Radio and Television Supreme Council. With the help of reforms assuming the direct sovereignty of the prime minister over the army, holding the position of a president by a representative of the military community and the high precedence in the diplomatic protocol of the chief of the general staff, for decades guaranteed sufficient autonomy for generals, and thus a strong position in relations with political leaders of the civilian authority, which was often used not only

⁵⁰ M. Gurcan, *Opening the Black Box. The Turkish Military before and after July 2016*, Warwick: Helion & Company Limited, 2018, p. 22.

⁵¹ E. Aydınli, "A paradigmatic shift for the Turkish Generals and the End to the Coup Era in Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 63, no. 4, 2009, pp. 581–596.

⁵² A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, *Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Demokrasi*, Bilge Adamlar Stratejik. Araştırmalar Merkezi, Rapor No: 33, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, 2011, p. 8.

in the area of security or state defence, but also in matters concerning the judicial and legislation issues, state budget, the education system, and public media.⁵³

Also, one cannot ignore the issue of the attitude of society itself towards the Turkish army, which is in a way a phenomenon in the modern world. For decades, the military has been regarded as the most trustworthy institution. Explaining this state of affairs partially relates to the cultural aspect. In the Turkish collective national identity, coming from both history as well as religion, military service is firmly and deeply rooted. For most citizens, the obligation to undergo military service is considered an honour, a sacred duty, and also as part of becoming a full-fledged man.⁵⁴ The army's popularity is also explained by its widespread perception as meritocratic, successful, altruistic, and not corrupted.⁵⁵ The image of the military as an altruistic and honest social group is gaining momentum because it is created largely as a counterpoint to politicians, businessmen, and the media – the elements of civil society, assessed in research as the most corrupt, selfish, and untrustworthy.⁵⁶ What must be said is that the Turkish army is considered so trustworthy, because the propaganda machine that creates this institution's image, conveyed to citizens at every possible step, is extremely effective – both throughout the entire educational path, in individual media, through the information channels of the army itself, as well as by many supporters in society itself. Moreover, despite the army's extremely respected position, the public in fact knows very little about its actual functioning, capabilities, current activities, and impact on the functioning of the state.⁵⁷

On the whole, since the establishment of the Republic the Turkish army perceived itself as the guardian of the Turkish state, which has a moral and legal obligation to defend the Turkish Republic against threats or dangers that may threaten its existence and contradict the principles of kemalism that are indisputable for the army, especially secularism, republicanism, and nationalism. Researcher Mevlut Bozdemir suggests that the idea of a guardian of state values constitutes a type of "elite revolutionism," fuelled both by high military self-esteem resulting from significant participation in the proclamation of the Republic, as well as a sense of the lack of trust from "Others" – mainly uncontrolled masses, populations in general. Hence, the need to protect the principles of kemalism stands primarily for the need to have

⁵³ K. Akkoyunlu, *Military Reform and Democratization. Turkish and Indonesian experience at the turn of the Millennium*, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 23.

⁵⁴ G. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁵⁵ M. Heper, The Military-Civilian Relations in Post-1997 Turkey, [in:] *Globalization of Civil-Military Relations. Democratization, Reform and Security*, eds. G.C. Maior, L. Watts, Bucharest: Enciclopedica Publishing House, 2002, p. 58.

⁵⁶ B. Aliriza, *Turks Have an Unavoidable War To Fight Against Corruption*, The New York Times, 16 March 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/16/opinion/IHT-turks-have-an-unavoidable-war-to-fight-against-corruption.html> [accessed: 1 April 2021].

⁵⁷ G. Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

supervision, and ultimately a monopoly in controlling the fate of the Turkish state and society.⁵⁸

In conclusion, the analysis carried out on the basis of the author's research in terms of the impact and significance of the Kemal Atatürk era on the evolution of the Turkish armed forces, has led to the following conclusions, which correspond with the aim and research questions formulated in the introduction.

First, the revolution and reform of the state, designed and carried out by Kemal Atatürk and his successors, laid the foundations for a modern Turkish military taking the form of a supreme guardian of the system of the new republic. Second, since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish army has had a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policy of the state due to the unique model of civil-military relations, based on the kemalist state ideology, regarding the army as a guardian of the state's principles of secularism and kemalism. This position resulted in that the armed forces did not serve the state, but *vice versa* – they supervised the political class. If necessary, the military overthrew governments and changed the legal order. Third, at the same time, during the discussed historical period, no real restrictions and control mechanisms were introduced in terms of the armed forces, providing the army with both formal and informal tools to interfere in political matters, which was used multiple times by generals over the following decades. Also, due to its strong Kemalist identity, the military has traditionally gathered political, clerical, and economic elites, as well as opinion-forming environments. This way, it constituted the keystone of the entire system, in which political (and with it also economic and cultural) hegemony was exercised by the elites dating back to the late Ottoman Empire. Finally, the army's control function, resulting from the ideology of kemalism, is additionally rooted in the Turkish society, history, and culture, and gives a social legitimacy to the army's decisions.

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⁵⁸ M. Bozdemir, *Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Kaynakları*, Ankara: S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1982, p. 157, [after:] K. Akkoyunlu, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

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The origin of the Turkish Armed Forces: Kemalism and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic

Abstract

The goal of this article is to discuss the role and importance of proclaiming the Republic of Turkey, as well as the principles of kemalism, in the process of creating the contemporary armed forces and civil-military relations in this country, which to this day constitute a unique example on the international arena.

Key words: Turkey, Turkish Armed Forces, Kemal Atatürk, kemalism, civil-military relations

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Building civil society in post-1989 Poland by implementing the principle of openness of public life in non-governmental organisations in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship

Introduction

The concept of civil society is an ambiguous idea, which explains why the literature on the subject offers a variety of definitions of it. The key factor in defining civil society is the perception of this concept through the prism of various areas of life. Nowadays, the cornerstone that upholds the idea of civil society is active participation in public life, which is a voluntary action performed for the benefit of society. Giovanni Sartori believes that civil society is one of the types of democracy in a country, thus being a manifestation of citizens' freedoms.¹ Here, freedom is

¹ K. Podemski, "Społeczeństwo obywatelskie w Polsce 25 lat po wielkiej zmianie", *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny*, vol. LXXVI, no. 2, 2014, p. 90, <https://doi.org/10.14746/rpeis.2014.76.2.8>.

understood as the right to fully participate in the public life of a democratic state. All this makes civil society a pillar of democracy.

The goal of this article is to discuss the ways in which access to public information in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship has been operating since 1989. Based on specific research carried out by the authors, it looks at the extent to which one of the basic elements of civil society – the principle of transparency in public life – has been enforced in non-governmental organisations more than 30 years following the political and economic transformation of 1989. The subject of the analysis are selected issues that attempt to provide an answer to the questions of whether the concept of civil society and the transparency of public life related to it are currently a mere slogan of political propaganda, or whether they are a truly important element in a democratic state. An attempt has also been made to look at the extent to which NGOs implement and use the right of access to public information, and the role of non-governmental organisations in contemporary communities.

The article presents issues related to the revival of social participation after 1989, which will be confronted with its present situation, i.e. over thirty years later.

Civil society and the right to information in Poland

Admittedly, the second half of the twentieth century saw an unexpected renaissance of civil society. At that time, it became a kind of social phenomenon. Civil society revived mainly in the countries of the Eastern European bloc, including Poland.² Nowadays, civil society is identified with the ideas of participatory democracy, which is steeped in the idea of voluntary participation in public life. The political transformation was a breakthrough time and gave Poles the opportunity to fully participate in building a democratic state. An important moment on this time line were the so-called Round Table talks of 1989, whose participants had high hopes for opening up new areas for civil society to thrive in Poland. During the sessions, negotiations and talks were held in search of a social consensus, as well as in the area of the right to information and civil society. Those talks gave hope that a society of active citizens would be able to function in Poland, in line with the principle of acting not for a particular profit, but in the interest of the common good.³

In the assumptions of the then government and the then opposition, the Round Table talks were driven by rather opposite goals. For Polska Zjednoczona Partia

² K.Z. Sowa, "Społeczeństwo obywatelskie a polityka – uwagi o historycznych uwarunkowaniach i perspektywach społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce", *Państwo i Społeczeństwo*, no. 1, 2008, p. 5.

³ Z. Woźniak, "Pokłosie Okrągłego Stołu – Przeszłość Dla Przyszłości", *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny*, Year LXXI, issue 2, 2009, p. 363.

Robotnicza (PZPR, the Polish United Workers' Party), the talks were to be a summary of the process leading to an agreement resulting in the admission of more representatives of "Solidarność" (lit. "Solidarity") people to the ruling elite. It was assumed that over time such a representation of the opposition could be effectively neutralised. However, the opposition's goal was different. In fact, they called for the re-legalisation of "Solidarność." Moreover, the Round Table was to be an impulse for profound systemic changes and an indication of the main directions of prospective reforms. According to the participants of the talks, they were to become the guarantor of building democracy in Poland. The opposition activists emphasised the necessity to create space for building a civic society and the activity of Poles. The political legacy of the "Solidarność" opposition was the democratisation of life, self-governance, transparency, truth and morality in politics, as well as greater accessibility and subsidiarity of the state. The changes in political and social life that took place as part of the political transformation after 1989 and the events related to them resulted in a lively discussion on civil society in Poland.⁴

As mentioned above, civil society is an ambiguous concept, which implies that the literature on the subject offers several definitions of the idea. A general explanation of civil society suggests that it ought to be referred to all non-state institutions, organisations and associations operating in the public sphere. These are structures that are relatively autonomous from the state: they arise from below and are generally characterised by the voluntary participation of their members.⁵ An important element in the definition of civil society is the inclusion in its activities of the possibility of making choices in social, political, economic and personal life.⁶

A key factor in defining civil society is the perception of this concept through the prism of various areas of life.⁷ Nowadays, the basis of the idea of civil society hinges around participation in public life, which is a voluntary action for the benefit of society. It is an expression of the freedom of citizens. This freedom is understood as the right to fully participate in the public life of a democratic state. Civil society is thus a pillar of democracy.

A survey conducted by Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS, Public Opinion Research Center), a major Polish opinion poll centre, in the years 2001–2020 shows an upward trend in the involvement of Poles in a wide range of activities for NGOs. According to the research release no. 37/2020, the activity

⁴ K. Kocurek, "Istota i kształtowanie się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego", *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie*, no. 806, 2009, p. 16.

⁵ E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2005, p. 119.

⁶ A. Siciński, Społeczeństwo obywatelskie jako przedmiot badań społecznych w Polsce, [in:] *Socjologia polityki w Polsce. Materiały konferencji naukowej*, ed. O. Sochacki, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Gdańskie, 1991, pp. 39–48.

⁷ K. Kocurek, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

of Poles in different types of civic organisations and their currently declared involvement in the activities of non-governmental organisations is stable and even higher compared to the beginning of the twenty-first century: the percentage of “yes” answers to the question “Do you devote your free time to activity in any organisation, association, movement, club or foundation?” in 2002 was 1 percentage point, while in 2020 it was 15.⁸

The Office of Analyses and Documentation of the Polish Senate has prepared a thematic study on civil society and its institutions. The idea of civil society rests on the conviction that there should be specific mechanisms in place to enable the development of civic attitudes and social self-organisation, independent of politics. Does civil society in Poland have a strong position? According to the study *Spoleczeństwo obywatelskie i jego instytucje* [Civil Society and its Institutions], the reasons for the weakness of this type of society should be sought in the formation of a democratic state governed by the rule of law (e.g. the dissolution of the Komitet Obywatelski “Solidarność” [Solidarity Committee], or the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus operating at the level of local and regional authorities).⁹

More than 30 years after the political transformation, it is possible to claim that it was a breakthrough time, which gave Poles a chance and a full catalogue of instruments (tools) to create a civil society. In this study, focus is placed on how NGOs function and analyse how access to public information functions in these institutions. The review of the literature on the subject and the doctrine shows a multitude of studies on the concept of civil society. However, it also points to the lack of an exhaustive study that looks at the matter in question on the basis of the Access to Public Information Act of 6 September 2001 (Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o dostępie do informacji publicznej) in NGOs.¹⁰ Therefore, the basic elements that make up civil society have been thoroughly scrutinised, pointing to the correlations between them.

In the literature on the subject, the concept of social participation is defined as the participation of citizens in managing the affairs of the community of which they are members. In a broad sense, social participation is the basis of civil society, whose members voluntarily take part in public activities. This form of work in the social domain plays a particularly important role in local communities. Thus, civil society is a society that is active and self-realising. It is a society that operates independently of state authorities, but within the limits of the law. The main pillar of the development of civil society is the principle of transparency in public life, guaranteed by

⁸ *Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich*, research release no. 37, CBOS, Warszawa 2020, p. 2.

⁹ A. Krasnowolski, *Spoleczeństwo obywatelskie i jego instytucje*, Kancelaria Senatu, Warszawa 2014.

¹⁰ Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o dostępie do informacji publicznej, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] 2001, no. 112, item 1198, consolidated text.

the Constitution. The openness of the operation of public authorities is a key condition for the functioning of democracy in the state and a fundamental value of the rule of law.¹¹ The essence of the right to public information is the fact that it is regulated in the content of the fundamental act, which is the highest ranking act in the Polish legal system. Establishing the right to public information in the Constitution has made it possible for citizens to apply it directly.¹² In fact, under article 61 section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (*Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*), the activity of public authorities in Poland is open, and every citizen has the right to access information.¹³ The concept of transparency in public life and the right to access information are understood as the citizens' privilege to be informed about matters concerning the activities of the authorities, the performance of public tasks and the functioning of the state. Access to public information is also one of the forms of civic activity that contributes to the development of democracy, both at the local and central level.¹⁴

Looking at the concept of NGOs, reference should be made to the United Nations, where this concept was used in Resolution 288B (X) of 27 February 1950 to define non-state actors "every civic, voluntary group of the type a non-profit that is organized locally, nationally or internationally. It is task-oriented and run by people with similar interests."¹⁵ They provide analyses, expert opinions, serve as an early warning mechanism, help monitor and implement international agreements. Some NGOs have specific issues such as human rights, the environment or health.¹⁶ In the case of the provisions of Polish law, i.e. the Public Benefit and Volunteer Work Act of 24 April 2003 (*Ustawa z dnia 24 kwietnia 2003 r. o działalności pożytku publicznego i o wolontariacie*), the definition of non-governmental organisations can

¹¹ M. Dalka-Noga, "Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej jako forma dostępu do informacji publicznej", *Studia Iuridica Toruniensia*, vol. XIII, 2013, p. 16.

¹² A. Jabłońska, Udostępnianie informacji publicznej jako podstawowe prawo społeczeństwa informacyjnego, [in:] *Dostęp do informacji publicznej. Wybrane aspekty teorii i praktyki*, eds. A. Lusińska, A. Kalinowska-Żeleźnik, Gdańsk: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, [cop. 2014], p. 81.

¹³ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r. uchwalona przez Zgromadzenie Narodowe w dniu 2 kwietnia 1997 r., przyjęta przez Naród w referendum konstytucyjnym w dniu 25 maja 1997 r., podpisana przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 16 lipca 1997 r.*, Dz.U. 1997, no. 78, item 483.

¹⁴ A. Surówka, "Prawo dostępu do informacji publicznej w orzecznictwie sądów administracyjnych", *Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego*, no. 3, 2013, p. 145, <https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2013.03.07>.

¹⁵ K. Rogaczewska, *Organizacje pozarządowe w polityce międzynarodowej*, Wrocław 2015, p. 5. It then abandoned the assumption that organisations need to have an international dimension; they can operate at the regional, national and international level. D. Moroń, *Organizacje pozarządowe – fundament społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, Wrocław 2012: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, p. 16.

¹⁶ D. Moroń, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

be found in article 3 section 2. It reads that “non-governmental organisations are: 1) not units of the public finance sector, within the meaning of the Public Finance Act; 2) not operating for profit, i.e. legal persons or organisational units without legal personality, to which a separate act grants legal capacity, in including foundations and associations [...]”.¹⁷ Thus, they are legal entities not created by public authorities, by way of normative and legal acts.

NGOs are an important factor in the functioning of the state. They not only create a civil society, but also activate and integrate local society. They were established to pursue important social goals. The NGO sector is diversified in terms of legal features. There is no single definition of “non-governmental organisations” in the literature on the subject, which indicates that researchers are interested in this subject. Dorota Moroń points out after Lester M. Salomon and Helmut K. Anheier their constitutive features. First, they need to have an organisational form: some of them have a legal personality regulated by the statute (associations and foundations) and others do not (e.g. ordinary associations). Second, they ought to be independent from public authorities, not belonging to the public sector: NGOs are not public administration bodies, although they cooperate actively with the local and regional authorities. Third, they conduct a non-profit activity: once an NGO had received income, it allocates it for the implementation of its statutory goals; at the same time there is a ban on transferring it to its members and founders. Fourth, a major component of their functioning is self-governance, which consists in making independent decisions within the limits of the law. Fifth, a key element that defines them is voluntariness: belonging to NGOs is a form of development and activity for citizens, not an imperative.¹⁸

Even before the Public Benefit and Volunteer Work Act came into force, Piotr Gliński presented a comprehensive definition that stressed independence and non-profit activities, which are primarily private initiatives, independent and non-profit, as well as those based on a significant participation of volunteering with a major role in shaping human attitudes off those who take part in NGOs’ schemes.

According to these assumptions, non-governmental organisations are private organisations – also in the social sense, i.e. as group institutions; “non-public” ones – i.e. non-governmental, non-local governmental and non-state bodies; not-for-profit operating organisations; independent organisations (primarily from government agencies, but also from business, sponsors, etc.); largely voluntary [...]; and those focused on changing people’s mindset and behaviour patterns.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ustawa z dnia 24 kwietnia 2003 r. o działalności pożytku publicznego i o wolontariacie, Dz.U. 2010 no. 234, item 1536, consolidated text.

¹⁸ D. Moroń, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁹ P. Gliński, Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych z innymi sektorami, [in:] *Opiekuńczość czy solidarność? Obywatelskie formy współpracy z władzami lokalnymi oraz pomocy społecznej*, ed. G. Skąpska, Kraków: Fundacja „Międzynarodowe Centrum Rozwoju Demokracji”, 1998, p. 55.

For political and administration sciences, NGOs are the basis for local activities and civil society. Bryant A. Hudson and Wolfgang Bielefeld claims that “NGOs are organisations that (1) provide useful (in a certain sense) goods and services, thus serving specific social goals, (2) cannot distribute profits on their own behalf, (3) are voluntary, which means that they are created, maintained and disbanded by a voluntary decision and on the initiative of its members or management, and (4) whose operation is rational and often rests on strong ideological foundations.”²⁰

The principle of openness and the right of access to public information, set out in the Constitution, comes to the fore in the Access to Public Information Act of 6 September 2001. It defines what constitutes public information, distinguishes the entities obliged to disclose it, and presents the forms of disclosing and requesting public information.²¹ Taking into account the wide scope of the concept of public information, it is assumed that it is any information that relates to public authorities, actual activities of public bodies and persons holding a public function. Therefore, there is a rather broad catalogue various types of content that constitutes public information. The Act begins with the definition of public information. The legislator defines public information as “any and all information on public matters” (cf. the Act, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] 2020, item 2176).²² In the light of the provisions of the Act on access to public information, the authorities obliged to disclose public information are also public organisations, provided that their activities are – albeit in part – financed from public funds. Moreover, the constitutional principle of transparency in public life is the basis for building a civil society in which the activity of NGOs plays a significant role.

Methodology

As part of the research conducted by the authors of this study, a questionnaire was administered on the functioning of the right to access public information in non-governmental organisations.

There are 21,000 NGOs registered in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. The survey has been conducted via e-mails and messages sent on the social networking site Facebook (584 messages in total). It was a difficult task due to the lack of contacts, including e-mails, in the Internet and the inability to obtain them from the county councils (referring to the General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR). Therefore, an important element of the study has been the creation of a database of e-mail addresses and/or profiles on Facebook, which is very time-consuming. Through the county council offices, the authors obtained only basic data on NGOs: their

²⁰ D. Moroń, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

²¹ Ustawy z dnia 6 września 2001 r., *op. cit.*, art. 1 section 1.

²² *Ibidem*.

name, address, and date of registration. The survey was anonymous and consisted of 24 questions, including 10 open questions (only selected results are presented in the article).

The research findings are a form of communication about the results so far. These are preliminary results of empirical research, but they allow to draw certain conclusions.

The aim of the survey was, *inter alia*, to show the structure of NGOs in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and the areas of activity of these organisations. In addition, one of the main assumptions of the study was to determine the knowledge of the right to access information in non-governmental organisations and how access to public information functions in these organisations.

The survey began on 8 November 2021. The respondents were all NGOs of the Mazowieckie area and were dominated by non-governmental organisations which operate in such fields as education and upbringing (45.2%), culture and arts (41.9%) as well as local development in the social and material dimension (35.5%). As the main addressees of their activities, the surveyed NGOs indicated the inhabitants of local communities (71%), as well as “children and youth” (61.3%).

The dominant source of financing the activities of the surveyed entities is a membership fee (48.4%). In an open question regarding the purpose of the activities of NGOs, the respondents indicated that:

- “in order to change the immediate environment with our actions for the better,”
- “fighting the local system,”
- “cultivating customs, integrating the local community,”
- “adding new jobs for people at risk of exclusion.”

The open question “What impact, in your opinion, does the activity of your non-governmental organisation have on the environment?” allowed the surveyed NGOs to evaluate their own activities: “Very big – we facilitate training programmes for players from smaller towns, as well as participation in competitions and tournaments in the country and abroad. Our players represented our country in the international arena at the European Championships,” “we are the only social organisation in the region. The local social assistance centre (MOPS) sends its clients to us with the slogan ‘they will help you’. We have often provoked a large social discussion about the management of the commune,” “Positive – we have created new jobs in the countryside, we provide meals of proven quality to nurseries, schools, and kindergartens.”

Referring to the transparency of public life, one of the questions was “Does your organisation have knowledge of what is public information?” 87.1% of the respondents replied “yes,” and 12.9% provided a negative answer. The respondents indicated how they understood “public information.” For them, “it is information issued by the government, sometimes, in some countries, by courts and other bodies,

including associations or foundations”; “these are all kinds of information on the organisation and activities of the Club, with particular emphasis on the public funds that the Club acquires. Providing public information equals openness of action”; “this is the information that should be referred to anyone interested, e.g. a bus timetable, information about the statute of the Association and its Management Board, etc.” 74% of the surveyed NGOs indicated that they did not receive an application for disclosure of public information, which shows little interest of citizens in access to information on the activities of the organisation in the application procedure. The analysis of the answers to the question where the NGO publishes information about its activities has allowed to draw the following conclusions. First, 45.2% of surveyed organisations publish information on a social networking site. Second, 9.7% of the surveyed organisations do not publish any information about their activities. Third, almost one third (32.3%) publish information about their activities on their website.

The study has shown a new form of providing public information that is not mentioned in previous studies, i.e. social networks, which have turned out to be the most common and popular channel of public communication. Considering the growing number of users of social networking sites and the age range of users, this method of disclosing information about one’s activity can be very effective.

As regards, the frequency of publishing information, 42% of respondents disclose information once a month, 32% once a week, and some organisations do it once a year, so the frequency is not high. The survey has revealed a large variety of information published mainly on social networks, including:

- the bad situation of the commune’s education system, state of indebtedness of the commune, or propaganda of success;
- information about the competition “SHARE YOUR MEMORIES ABOUT Elektryczne Koleje Dojazdowe (EKD, Electric Commuter Railway) / Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa (WKD, Warsaw Commuter Railway)”;
- a concert;
- a project for old-age pensioners;
- information on the latest social/cultural event with the participation of members of the association;
- organisation of a sports event: Amateur Volleyball League;
- announcement of some delays; the last one concerns local and social tourism;
- preparations for the international volunteer day;
- food tasting festival;
- reports of workshops;
- a public fundraising initiative organised for a boy suffering from leukaemia;
- fire-fighting activities in a building;
- getting a grant from the “Strengthen your surroundings” scheme;

- theatrical activities, such as e.g. a puppet theatre;
- “Depression in children and adolescents” conference;
- debt;
- promotion of physical activity and fitness;
- organisation of a concert;
- current activities and vacancies;
- summaries of summer camps and other types of trips;
- promoting karate as a sport that teaches and educates;
- other types of public information disclosed by the organisation in cooperation with its partners.

Conclusions

The Round Table talks have undoubtedly paved the way for civil society, providing the possibility of launching a vast array of non-governmental organisations. They have also contributed to the increase in the transparency of public life. However, the question should be asked whether the potential of rights and privileges obtained at that time is being fully used. It would seem that today we have a full catalogue of legal tools for participating in public life. Yet the activity of citizens is not yet high enough to stop its development. According to Zbigniew Woźniak, the chance for the completion of the systemic transformation in Poland for contemporary society is to carry on with the big project of socialisation of the state. According to the author, the development of civil society can take place through the development of democratisation and the expansion of various areas of real social dialogue, clarifying what the principle of subsidiarity is, completing the full process of decentralising state structures and decision-making by authorities at various levels of government, and enhancing social participation and initiatives of active citizens by giving them the opportunity to expand the areas of meeting the needs of society, especially where this help is most needed. Nowadays, a democratic state guarantees the activity of active citizens, which manifests itself in many different forms of participation. Nevertheless, the third sector is a complementary activity of the local and regional authorities or it “fights with the local system”, as pointed to in one of the answers provided to the open question “Why was your non-governmental organisation established?” in the survey conducted for the purpose of this study.

The basic form of NGOs operating in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship is an association. Foundations and sports clubs are also a significant part. NGOs have a wide spectrum of activities. The areas of their activity are, among others, culture, sport, education, health protection, or local development.

The survey has allowed the authors to draw the conclusion that the activities of NGOs covered by the survey are addressed to all citizens. At this moment, the

study allows us to conclude that access to public information in non-governmental organisations may fulfil several functions. First, it can be an organisation's control tool over other public entities. Second, the activity in publishing information can act as a PR tool. Another function is the reporting function on the activities of a given organisation. An important conclusion is that the activity seen in the field of public information is rather low. Also, the activities of NGOs seem to dominate at the local level.

Another important conclusion is the instrumental use of the GDPR to hinder contacts with NGOs. Covering the GDPR by council counties causes complications in finding e-mail addresses or profiles on Facebook for the third sector. Currently, there is no database of non-governmental organisations that would be systematically run, for example, by one public entity.

The results of the analysis presented in this article will be the starting point for further research in this area. The research is in progress given the preparation of the database of contacts between NGOs in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. Subsequent areas of the analysis will relate to the transparency of public life and the definition of the roles of non-governmental organisations.

The essence of the relationship between access to public information and NGOs in general terms of the issues of civil society and participation is also noticeable. It turns out that most of the organisations covered by the research are obliged to publish information about their activities, which is due to the method of their financing. Being active in informing about their activities – even for organisations that do not have such an obligation, but are still public – could have a positive effect on the perception of this activity among people. Education from an early age can be crucial in developing civil society. Educating children and young people, as well as activating them and working for the benefit of their “small homelands,” may play a huge role in their civic awareness in the future. Civic education is extremely important and may be forgotten or overlooked in school curricula. What is also important in the development of civil society is the way in which the relations between the rulers and the citizens function. This is of particular importance at the local level.

Admittedly, open and willing to help public authorities become a driving force for civic activity. Their legal support would also be of great importance here. When transferring public funds to NGOs, it would be worth informing these organisations about the effects of the obligation to disclose public information. A major example of active information about its activities from the authorities could also contribute to active information about its activities by NGOs. Disclosing public information about publicly funded activities could strengthen public confidence in a given organisation in a major way. It is about the active promotion of information on the activities of the organisation. Such information, based on the idea of transparency and clarity of purpose, can play a large role in the development of these organisations.

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Building civil society in post-1989 Poland by implementing the principle of openness of public life in non-governmental organisations in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship

Abstract

Nowadays, civil society is often regarded as tantamount to participatory democracy, which rests on the idea of voluntary participation in public life. The political transformation of the early 1990s was a watershed time that gave Poles the opportunity to participate fully in building a democratic state. The starting point for the thoughts and findings shared in this text are the results of a survey conducted among non-governmental organisations that operate in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship in Poland. The authors have conducted quantitative research on the functioning of the right of access to public information in NGOs. The first part of the study presents the origins of modern civil society, followed by an analysis of the extent to which public participation and openness of social life were an important element of the Round Table Talks held in 1989. The second part of the text is devoted to the description of the research methodology applied. The third part outlines the results of the research carried out so far, pointing to the major areas of NGO activity, as well as to the way in which access to information functions in these organisations. The text highlights the impact of the political changes of 1989 in Poland on the contemporary possibilities of citizens in participation in public life, and the extent to which society is active and willing to exercise its rights. Emphasis has also been placed on the interrelationship between the two core elements of civil society: openness of public life, i.e. access to information, and the activities of NGOs.

Key words: civil society, non-governmental organisations, public information, openness of public life, Mazowieckie Voivodeship

Varia Forum



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Die Ukraine zwischen Neutralität und westlicher Allianz*

Nach der Auflösung der Sowjetunion und der Unabhängigkeit des Landes verfolgten die Regierungen in Kiew in den 1990er Jahren eine neutrale, „multivektorale Außenpolitik“. Nach allen Seiten sollten gute Beziehungen zum Vorteil des eigenen ökonomischen, politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Status entwickelt werden. Angesichts der Unzufriedenheit Moskaus mit der ersten Erweiterungsrunde der NATO um Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn 1999 wurde die eigene Position der Neutralität und der Ablehnung eines Beitritts zu Militärbündnissen eher noch stärker hervorgehoben.

Offiziell war die Ukraine bis 2014 neutral. Dieser außenpolitische Konsens bröckelte allerdings schon in der ersten Hälfte der 2000er Jahre. 2002 erklärte Washington eine umfassende Erweiterung der Allianz in Europa zu einer außenpolitischen Priorität. Einige Parteien in der Ukraine griffen dieses Thema auf und versuchten mit einer dezidierten „Westorientierung“ ihr Profil zu schärfen. Die „Orange Revolution“ 2004 und der damit verbundenen Wechsel in der Präsidentschaft verstärkte die Debatte über einen möglichen NATO-Beitritt.

Zusammen mit den USA brachte die Kiewer Führung (wie auch Georgien) auf dem NATO-Gipfel in Bukarest 2008 einen Antrag ein, der auf eine Mitgliedschaft zielte. Für eine solche Neuorientierung gab es zu diesem Zeitpunkt weder eine Mehrheit in der *Werchowna Rada*, dem ukrainischen Parlament, noch in der

* WeltTrends. Das außenpolitische Journal, 187, Mai 2022, 30. Jahrgang, S. 34–39.

Bevölkerung. Auch Frankreich und Deutschland lehnten das Projekt mit Blick auf die absehbare Vertiefung des politischen Grabens zu Russland ab. Die Abschlusserklärung von Bukarest stellte einen Kompromiss dar. Es wurde keine Aufnahmeprozedur eingeleitet. Aber beiden Ländern wurde eine „Beitrittsperspektive“ zugesichert.

Mit dem neuerlichen Wechsel der Präsidentschaft in Kiew nach den Wahlen 2010 kehrte man dezidiert wieder zur Position der Neutralität und Multivektoralität zurück. Viktor Janukowytsch betonte simultan mit der Absage an eine denkbare NATO-Mitgliedschaft eine Annäherung an die EU. Nach der rechtlich umstrittenen Machtübernahme durch die Opposition im Februar 2014 vor dem Hintergrund massiver, teilweise gewaltsamer Proteste polarisierten und radikalisierten sich indes nicht nur die innen-, sondern auch die außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Ansichten der beteiligten Akteure. Während die einen mit Unterstützung vor allem aus Washington und Warschau die Hinwendung zur NATO forderten, begannen andere mit Schützenhilfe aus Russland, sich im Süden und Osten des Landes von der Ukraine zu separieren. Das Ergebnis war der Beginn einer engen politischen und militärischen Kooperation der neuen Kiewer Führung mit den USA auf der einen und die russische Annexion der Krim sowie die Gründung zweier „Volksrepubliken“ im Osten des Landes auf der anderen Seite.

Wechselspiel von internen und externen Gegensätzen

Von diesem Zeitpunkt an wurde innen- wie außenpolitisch die Verständigung zwischen den beteiligten Parteien und die Kompromissfindung immer schwieriger. Beide Lager in der Ukraine versuchten nur umso intensiver, auswärtige Unterstützung für ihren Kampf gegen den Gegner zu generieren, und die auswärtigen interessierten Parteien mischten sich mehr und mehr mit ihren eigenen Motiven ein.

Letztlich standen sich in einem Dreieck Kiew-Moskau-Washington unversöhnliche Positionen gegenüber, die in ihrer identitären und geopolitischen Verschränkung zu einem immer explosiveren Gemisch wurden: Innenpolitisch stand das Konzept einer Ukrainisierung der Verteidigung ukrainisch-russischer Multiethnizität und -sprachlichkeit gegenüber. Außenpolitisch ging es um den Anspruch auf NATO-Integration versus Beibehaltung des Status quo bzw. Wahrung des Einflusses Moskaus. Die Stellung, die die Ukraine, das größte Land Europas (außer Russland) als historischer und kultureller Raum wie als geopolitischer Raum zwischen NATO und Russland innehat, ist der Hintergrund für die Explosivität, die dieser Konflikt entfaltete.

Marksteine der Zuspitzung waren nach der Annexion der Krim die Streichung des 2010 eingeführten Gesetzes über Regionalsprachen im Jahre 2018, die Festschreibung der NATO-Mitgliedschaft in der Verfassung im Jahre 2019, der

immer schneller voranschreitende Aufbau militärischer Strukturen, die auf eine „Wiedervereinigung“ und eine Abwehr möglicher russischer Gegenmaßnahmen gerichtet waren, mit Hilfe der USA, und die Annäherung der „Volksrepubliken“ an und ihre Absicherung durch Moskau. Schließlich zeigten immer massivere russische Militärmanöver und militärische Drohungen sowie im Dezember 2021 Ultimaten, auf jegliche NATO-Osterweiterung zu verzichten und eine „Entnazifizierung“ in die Wege zu leiten, dass die Lage zunehmend eskalierte. Moskau setzte Ukrainisierung mit der rassistischen Politik der Nazis gegen Russland und den vorhandenen, aber inzwischen marginalisierten Nationalistenparteien und -milizen gleich.

Identitätssuche und geopolitische Positionierung

Sowohl in der Ukraine als auch in Russland wurden nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges eine nationalistische Identitätssuche und eine zunehmend polarisierende Außenpolitik zu einem Ersatz für eine erfolgreiche interne Entwicklung. Russland blieb in seiner ökonomischen und infrastrukturellen Entwicklung hinter den westlichen Staaten und China zurück. Die Frustration über das verlorene Imperium und die Nostalgie wurden in dem Maße stärker, wie diese Diskrepanz zu anderen Akteuren und damit der weltpolitische Abstieg deutlich wurde.

Der Aufstieg des Nationalismus war die falsche Antwort auf diese innere und äußere Entwicklung. Die nationalistische Identitätssuche bediente sich völlig überholter und extremer Ideen von einer besonderen Stellung des Russischen, von der Sammlung russischer Erde und von der Größe Russlands, die der Westen zu zerstören suche. Ein ethnisch-kulturelles Superioritätsdenken verband sich mit irridentistischen Ideen und einem Großraumdenken à la Karl Haushofer. In der damit verbundenen Geschichtskonstruktion spielte die Ukraine als vermeintlicher Ursprung des Russischen eine immer stärkere Rolle. Von höchster Stelle autorisiert wurde diese ideologische Fokussierung durch den berüchtigten Aufsatz Putins vom Juli 2021 über drei Völker in Russland, Belarus und der Ukraine, die eine Einheit darstellten.

Auch in der Ukraine fand nach dem Kollaps der Sowjetunion ein Nation-building-Prozess statt, der nicht nur die Autonomie historischer Wurzeln und Entwicklungen und die sprachliche Besonderheit in Abgrenzung von der Zentralmacht betonte, der man noch vor Kurzem unterstanden hatte. Sondern in dem Maße, wie die Ukraine von einer der reichsten Republiken der Sowjetunion auf ein in Europa präzedenzloses Niveau heruntergewirtschaftet wurde, machte ein Teil des politischen Spektrums Identitätspolitik zu einem Mittel des Kampfes um die Macht und zu einem Ersatz für die Suche nach adäquaten Mitteln der Problemlösung im Innern. Im Human Development Index 2019 war die Ukraine auf Platz 74 zurückgefallen; zum Vergleich: Türkei 54, Albanien 69. Im Jahre 2021

rutschte die Ukraine im Korruptionsindex von Transparency International auf Platz 122 und nahm damit (außer Russland und Aserbaidschan) den mit Abstand letzten Platz in Europa ein (Türkei 96, Albanien 110).

Diese Identitätssuche hatte eine umso polarisierendere Wirkung, als sie sich nicht gegen eine Minderheit richtete, sondern in hohem Maße mit der Realität der ukrainisch-russischen Gesellschaft im Land kollidierte. In der Ukraine spricht der überwiegende Teil der Bevölkerung beide Sprachen, im Ostteil und im Süden des Landes ist Russisch vorherrschend. Die Identitätspolitik knüpfte von Seiten einiger extremer Parteien und diverser paramilitärischer Formationen an frühere Formen, Organisationen und Personen des ukrainischen Nationalismus an, die sich im Krieg des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands gegen die Sowjetunion durch Kollaboration ausgezeichnet hatten.

Teils von den gleichen, teils von konkurrierenden politischen Kräften wurde die Auseinandersetzung um die innenpolitische Macht mit dem Anspruch zu führen versucht, dem Land zu einer europäischen Identität verhelfen zu wollen. Allerdings erschöpfte sich die Behauptung einer Westorientierung vielfach in der Proklamation, in die EU und in die NATO aufgenommen werden zu wollen. Wenn sie wie nach 2005 und nach 2014 an der Macht waren, setzten die „Proeuropäer“ kaum europäische Werte um. Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit blieben vielfach Worthülsen, deren Gebrauch helfen sollte, sich gegen die als „prorussisch“ qualifizierte Konkurrenz durchzusetzen und Unterstützung im Westen zu generieren.

Identitäts- und Statuspolitik als Politikersatz

Sowohl im Fall der Ukraine als auch Russlands wurden Identitätspolitik und außenpolitische Selbstzuschreibung zum Ersatz für wirkliche Politik, wenn man diese als Mittel erachtet, vorrangig die ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Probleme eines Landes zu lösen. In der Ukraine übernahmen 2014 jene Kräfte die Macht, die das Ukrainische auf Kosten des Russischen überhöhten und die mit der NATO-Zugehörigkeit eine neue internationale Statusbestimmung vornehmen wollten, ohne dass notwendige und lange geforderte Veränderungen im Innern erfolgten. Im Gegenteil, nach 2014 wurde die Ukraine immer abhängiger von westlicher finanzieller Unterstützung, ohne die der Staatsbankrott drohte.

Die politischen Eliten beider Länder, der Ukraine wie Russlands, versagten bei der Transformation nach dem Zusammenbruch des kommunistischen Systems, wengleich Russland vor dem Krieg gegen die Ukraine ökonomisch erheblich besser dastand als das Nachbarland (HDI Plätze 52 bzw. 74). In beiden Ländern wurden Identitäts- und internationale Statuspolitik zu einem Surrogat für eine problem- und lösungsorientierte Innenpolitik. Sowohl für die interne als auch für die externe Entwicklung war die Entscheidung Kiew, militärisch keine neutrale

Position zwischen einem Russland einzunehmen, das immer aggressiver auf die fortgesetzte NATO-Erweiterung reagierte, und einem westlichen Militärbündnis, das Washington folgte und auf seinem Erweiterungsrecht bestand, wenig hilfreich. Denn die immer engere militärische Zusammenarbeit vor allem mit den USA, die Waffenlieferungen und der Aufbau von NATO-Trainingslagern erhöhten die Spannungen zwischen Kiew und Moskau, ohne dass damit ein wirklicher Zugewinn an Sicherheit für die Ukraine im Falle einer militärischen Eskalation einherging. Es gab keine symmetrische Absicherung dieser ukrainischen Westorientierung im militärischen Bereich. Eine Ausdehnung des Beistandsartikels 5 des NATO-Vertrags auf die Ukraine kam nicht in Frage: eben wegen der Moskauer Haltung, eine Aufnahme der Ukraine in die Allianz nicht zu akzeptieren, wegen der ungelösten Territorialprobleme in der Ukraine, die die NATO sofort zur Konfliktpartei gemacht hätten, und damit zusammenhängend wegen des fehlenden Konsenses unter den Allianzmitgliedern.

Wie auch immer der Krieg ausgeht: Für Russland bleibt dieser Angriffskrieg und Völkerrechtsbruch ein dauerhaftes ökonomisches und politisches Desaster, das simultan den geopolitischen Statusverlust beschleunigt. Für die Ukraine könnte das Ergebnis eine Art militärische Neutralität sein. Allerdings wäre dies eine oktroyierte Neutralität, keine aufgrund rationaler Überlegungen und vom Gedanken einer gemeinsamen Sicherheit und eines produktiven Miteinanders getragene Entscheidung. Dazu kommen ungelöste territoriale Probleme, die sich mit diesem Krieg und der erzwungenen Neutralität nur vertiefen.

Dies ist indes die optimistische Variante eines möglichen Ausgangs. Die pessimistische bestünde darin, dass der Krieg weitergeht, weil beide Seiten glauben, den Krieg gewinnen zu können oder zu müssen. Letztlich würden die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen infolge Erschöpfung in einen Waffenstillstand oder eine Art Friedensabkommen münden – mit noch mehr Opfern, noch weitgehender Zerstörung der Ukraine, Abermillionen Vertriebener und der noch gesteigerten Selbsteliminierung Russlands als Staat, der als zu Europa gehörig betrachtet wird. Beide Varianten bedeuten alles andere als gute Aussichten für eine Friedensordnung in Europa.



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Die Neutralität Österreichs könnte ein Modell für die Ukraine sein^{*}

Drei Wochen nach Beginn des Krieges am 24. Februar 2022 brachten sowohl Russland als auch die Ukraine den Vorschlag einer Neutralität ins Spiel. Verschiedene Modelle wurden erwähnt: Österreich, Schweden, Finnland und ein ukrainisches Modell. Neutralität erschien als möglicher gemeinsamer Nenner für eine Lösung. In diesem Beitrag wird das österreichische Modell diskutiert, weil es das am stärksten abgesicherte Neutralitätsmodell ist. Die österreichische Neutralität ist sowohl in der Verfassung verankert als auch völkerrechtlich legitimiert. Sie kann nicht leicht durch innenpolitische Beschlüsse beseitigt werden. Auch die Ukraine hatte Neutralität in der Verfassung, diese aber mit der Orientierung auf die NATO-Mitgliedschaft seit dem NATO-Gipfel 2008 außer Kraft gesetzt.

Neutralität bedeutet Nichtbeteiligung des Staates an einem Krieg oder einem bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen Staaten oder anerkannten Parteien in einem Bürgerkrieg sowie die Nichtmitgliedschaft eines Staates in einem militärischen Bündnis; sie beinhaltet das Verbot für einen neutralen Staat, sein Territorium fremden Truppen zur Stationierung oder für die Austragung von kriegerischen Handlungen zur Verfügung zu stellen.¹ Insbesondere darf der dauernd Neutrale keinem militärischen Bündnis – auch nicht mit anderen dauernd neutralen

^{*} WeltTrends. Das außenpolitische Journal, 187, Mai 2022, 30. Jahrgang, S. 28–33.

¹ Gärtner, Heinz (2008): Internationale Sicherheit: Definitionen von A – Z. Nomos, Baden-Baden (zweite, erweiterte Auflage).

Staaten – angehören, aber auch keine Abkommen über kollektive Verteidigung schließen.² Neutralität ist niemals eine notwendige Bedingung für Frieden gewesen, aber sie vermied in der Geschichte eine der möglichen Kriegsursachen: die Teilhabe an kriegsbereiten Militärbündnissen.

Seit Beginn des Kalten Krieges verlagerte sich der Schwerpunkt der Definition von Neutralität, von der Auffassung der Neutralität als Nichtteilnahme an fremden Kriegen und militärischen Konflikten auf die Nichtteilnahme an militärischen Bündnissen. Die Mitgliedstaaten eines Bündnisses verpflichten sich individuell und gemeinsam Mitgliedern, falls sie von außerhalb des Bündnisses bedroht oder angegriffen werden, unter Einschluss militärischer Mittel zu Hilfe zu kommen. Gerade die Bestimmungen über die Nichtteilnahme an einem Militärbündnis verbietet einem neutralen Staat die Mitgliedschaft in der NATO, da deren Gründungsvertrag eine explizite Beistandsverpflichtung (Artikel V) enthält. Die neutralen Staaten waren nicht Teil, sondern die Ausnahme von der Blockbildung des Kalten Krieges.

Die Ukraine vor dem Krieg

Nach Ende des Warschauer Vertragsbündnisses 1989 wurde das westliche Militärbündnis schrittweise bis an die Grenze Russlands ausgeweitet, obwohl der russische Präsident Putin 2007 bei der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz deutlich davor gewarnt hatte. Der Westen hatte seine Warnungen ignoriert. 2008 wurde eine weitere NATO-Erweiterung um die Ukraine und Georgien angekündigt, ohne jedoch einen genauen Zeitplan anzugeben. Russland betrachtete den Sturz des ukrainischen Präsidenten Janukowytsch, der die Ukraine in die Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion führen wollte, als von außen gesteuerten „*regime change*“ und Bedrohung. Russland besetzte daraufhin 2014 die Halbinsel Krim und begann die Milizen im ostukrainischen Donbass zu unterstützen. Das Übereinkommen von Minsk von 2015 über Truppenentflechtung, Dezentralisierung und Autonomie der Ostgebiete konnte nicht implementiert werden, weil die NATO-Frage nicht gelöst war.

Ende 2021 verlangte der russische Präsident in zwei Briefen den Stopp einer weiteren Ausdehnung der NATO und den Rückzug der NATO-Infrastruktur aus den Staaten, die nach 1997 Mitglieder geworden waren. Um seinen Forderungen Nachdruck zu verleihen, stationierte Russland an die 100.000 Soldaten in der Nähe der ukrainischen Grenze. Russland hat zudem Luhanzk und Donezk als unabhängige Republiken anerkannt. Um seine Forderungen durchzusetzen und die ukrainische militärische Infrastruktur zu schwächen, startete Russland am 24. Februar 2022 einen weitgehenden Angriff auf die Ukraine.

² Neuhold, Hanspeter / Hummer, Waldemar / Schreuer, Christoph (1991): Österreichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Bd. 1: Textteil. Manz Verlag, Wien, S. 477.

Diese militärische Aktion war eine völkerrechtswidrige Verletzung der staatlichen Souveränität und Integrität der Ukraine, und ist nicht mit dem Gewaltverbot von Artikel 2.4 der UN-Charta vereinbar.

Die russische Rechtfertigung, dass Russland nach dem Prinzip der Selbstverteidigung des Artikels 51 der UN-Charta handelte, ist nicht zutreffend. Dazu müsste ein unmittelbar bevorstehender Angriff nachgewiesen werden. Ein Krieg ohne Nachweis, dass die Ukraine eine unmittelbare Bedrohung darstellte, ist nicht nur völkerrechtlich, sondern auch ethisch-moralisch fragwürdig. Russland handelte, wie Großmächte das regelmäßig tun, ohne Autorisierung des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen. Dort gab es im Februar 2022 wegen des russischen Vetos keine Verurteilung Russlands, wohl aber betonte die Resolution der Dringlichkeitssitzung der UN-Generalversammlung mit 141 Stimmen die Unverletzlichkeit der territorialen Integrität und Souveränität sowie das Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in innere Angelegenheiten der Mitgliedstaaten.

Das Modell Österreich

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war Österreich während der Blockbildung gefangen in einem Großmachtkonflikt. Österreich war vierfach von den Siegermächten besetzt. Indem sich Österreich 1955 für permanente Neutralität und gegen eine NATO-Mitgliedschaft entschied, vermied es permanente Besetzung und Teilung. Die ausländischen Soldaten verließen 1955 das Land. Österreich bekannte sich im Neutralitätsgesetz, seine Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität „mit allen zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln“ zu verteidigen, was Österreich als „bewaffnete Neutralität“ interpretierte. Allerdings waren Österreich offensive Lenkwaffen verboten worden; das wurde Mitte der 1990er Jahre aufgehoben. Wenn Russland von der Ukraine eine „Entmilitarisierung“ fordert, könnte mit einem Verzicht der Ukraine auf offensive Raketen ein Kompromiss gefunden werden.

Österreichs permanente Neutralität war im Gegensatz zur selbsterklärten Neutralität der Ukraine völkerrechtlich abgesichert. Die Ukraine hat ihre Neutralität de facto mit ihrer Absichtserklärung, der NATO beizutreten, beim Gipfel der NATO in Bukarest 2008 aufgegeben. Ein neutraler Staat muss schon in Friedenszeiten seine Neutralität glaubhaft darstellen; das bedeutet, nicht einen Beitritt zu einem Militärbündnis anzustreben. Begleitet wurde Österreichs Neutralitätserklärung 1955 von dem Staatsvertrag, worin Österreich untersagt wird, sich Deutschland anzuschließen („Anschlussverbot“). Ein derartiges Verbot würde für die Ukraine und den Nachbarn Russland gelten.

Großmächte wollen, dass etablierte Neutralität von anderen Großmächten respektiert wird. Präsident Eisenhower signalisierte während des Ungarnaufstandes 1956, das neutrale Österreich zu verteidigen. Österreich, das den Flüchtlingen aus

Ungarn Hilfe leistete, wurde von der Sowjetunion beschuldigt, Ausbildungslager für die Aufständischen zu unterhalten und Waffen über die ungarische Grenze zu schmuggeln. Moskau würde diese Art von Neutralität nicht akzeptieren. Das US-Außenministerium drohte, dass „ein Angriff der Sowjetunion auf Österreichs Neutralität den dritten Weltkrieg bedeuten“ würde.³ Es war dies ein eindeutiges Bekenntnis zur österreichischen Neutralität. Ein Dokument des Nationalen Sicherheitsrates, das 1961 von Präsident Eisenhower gebilligt wurde,⁴ formulierte als Ziel, „jegliche Verletzung der Integrität Österreichs, seines Territoriums oder seiner Neutralität als schwerwiegende Bedrohung des Friedens zu behandeln“.

Das Modell Österreich für Deutschland

Deutschland wählte einen alternativen Weg. Westdeutschland wurde NATO-Mitglied, Ostdeutschland wurde sowjetische Einflusszone. Deutschland blieb geteilt. Es gab durchaus Versuche, das zu ändern. Sie schlugen fehl. Nachdem Österreich 1955 neutral wurde, gab es eine Reihe von Vorschlägen, die ein vereinigtes Deutschland in eine neutrale Zone vorsahen. Einer dieser Vorschläge kam von George F. Kennan, der nach 1947 als US-Botschafter in Moskau das Konzept der Eindämmungspolitik entwickelte. Er schlug 1956 und 1957 eine Neutralität Zentraleuropas und eines vereinigten Deutschlands vor, weil er insgesamt nicht an die Haltbarkeit der Teilung Europas und Berlins glaubte.⁵ Die US-Senatoren Hubert H. Humphrey und William F. Knowland arbeiteten ebenfalls Vorschläge über eine neutrale Zone in Mitteleuropa nach dem Vorbild Österreichs bei gleichzeitigem Rückzug amerikanischer und sowjetischer Truppen aus. Auch der Vorsitzende der britischen Labour-Party Hugh Gaitskell entwickelte ähnliche Ideen. Der polnische Außenminister Adam Rapacki verband 1957 das „Disengagement“ der Truppen aus Zentraleuropa mit dem Vorschlag einer „atomwaffenfreie Zone“ in Mitteleuropa. Diese Pläne wurden von der westdeutschen Regierung abgelehnt. Konrad Adenauer wollte nicht die Wiedervereinigung für den Preis der Herauslösung aus dem westlichen Block. Er war der Auffassung, dass eine feste Verankerung Westdeutschlands im Westblock einen Rückzug der Sowjetunion aus Mitteleuropa und ein vereinigtes Deutschland zur Folge haben werde. Die unmittelbare und mittelbare Folge war allerdings die Verfestigung der Blöcke.

³ Bild-Telegraph, 7. November 1956.

⁴ National Security Council, Draft statement of U.S. Policy toward Austria, 332. Paper Prepared by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 6020, Washington, December 9, 1960, approved by the President on January 18, 1961. Übersetzung: HG.

⁵ George F. Kennan (1982): Im Schatten der Atombombe: Eine Analyse der amerikanisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1947 bis heute, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln, S. 21.

Das „ukrainische Modell“

Eine Teilung der Ukraine war schon seit 2014 abzusehen. Die russisch unterstützten Milizen im Donbass sollten sicherstellen, dass die Ukraine nicht der NATO beitrifft. Der Krieg seit dem 24. Februar 2022 verschob diese Grenze immer weiter in den Westen der Ukraine. Für die Ukraine stellte sich die Alternative: permanente Neutralität oder permanente Teilung. Die mögliche Teilung der Ukraine würde vielmehr der Teilung Koreas nach dem verlustreichen Krieg 1950 bis 1953 ähneln.

Die Ukraine forderte ein „ukrainisches Modell“, dass internationale Sicherheitsgarantien einer Neutralität beinhaltet. Rechtlich sind einseitige Sicherheitsgarantien mit einem neutralen Status vereinbar, soweit sich die Ukraine nicht verpflichtet, selbst derartige Garantien abzugeben. Politisch-militärisch müssten diese Garantien nicht nur von Russland, sondern wiederum von NATO-Staaten gegeben werden, was das Bündnis direkt involvieren würde. Im Konfliktfall würden diese die Eskalationsdynamik auslösen, die die USA und die NATO in diesem Krieg vermeiden wollen. Eine Garantie kann aber auch durch das Völkerrecht erfolgen, vielleicht auch mit von den Vereinten Nationen autorisierten Friedenstruppen.

Eine vollständige Garantie, dass Großmächte das Völkerrecht nicht verletzen, kann es nicht geben. Dafür ist aber nicht das Völkerrecht verantwortlich, sondern die Staaten.

Ein neutraler Status kann eine Garantie sein. Das russische Motiv für die Invasion in der Ukraine war nicht deren neutraler Status, sondern ihre Absicht, einem aus russischer Sicht feindlichen Bündnis beizutreten. Daher ist es für neutrale Staaten wichtig, auch in Friedenszeiten immer auf ihren Status hinzuweisen und zu bekunden, dass es im Krieg neutral bleiben werde. Historisch gesehen wurde Neutralität immer dann militärisch verletzt, wenn auch Bündnismitglieder angegriffen wurden. Schließlich war es der Angriff Deutschlands auf das neutrale Belgien, das England dazu veranlasste, in den Ersten Weltkrieg einzugreifen. Präsident Eisenhower drohte der Sowjetunion mit Krieg, sollte sie die Neutralität Österreichs während der Ungarnkrise 1956 verletzen.

Ausblick

Neutralität und der Verzicht der Ukraine auf die NATO-Mitgliedschaft sind eine Möglichkeit, dass russische Truppen abziehen. Sonst droht der Ukraine permanente Besetzung oder permanente Teilung. Wäre dieser Vorschlag 2014⁶

⁶ Gartner Heinz (2014): Kiew sollte sich Neutralität Österreichs ansehen, Bündnisfreiheit zwischen EU und Russland als interessantes Modell für die Ukraine. Kommentar der anderen. In: Der Standard, 3. März 2014. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/1392686995883/kiew-sollte-sich-neutralitaet-oesterreichs-ansetzen>.

aufgegriffen worden, hätte der Krieg wahrscheinlich verhindert werden können, und die Ukraine hätte den Donbass mit einer starken Autonomieregelung, wie im Minsk-Übereinkommen vorgesehen, behalten können. Ein anderes Szenario könnte der zehnjährige Abnutzungskrieg der Sowjetunion in Afghanistan sein. Präsident Carter hatte nach dem Einmarsch die Neutralität Afghanistans gefordert, was den Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen bedeutet hätte.

Wenn die NATO-Erweiterung das Hauptmotiv Russlands für den Einmarsch in die Ukraine war, dann könnte Neutralität die Lösung sein. Wenn das Motiv die Errichtung eines russischen Imperiums oder der Wiederbelebung der Sowjetunion wäre, dann gäbe es keine Verhandlungslösung, sondern nur eine Entscheidung auf dem Schlachtfeld. Die Szenarios permanente Neutralität und permanente Teilung würden um ein weiteres ergänzt: permanenter Krieg.

Reviews



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Parag Khanna,
Move: Das Zeitalter der Migration

[Berlin: Rowohlt, 2021, 446 pp.]

Parag Khanna – just like Pankaj Mishra¹ and Raghuram Rajan² – represents a generation of young Indian observers of global change. Their popularity and recognition stems from the reflections on the key role of Indian soft power, the importance of talented migrants in promoting the image of their homelands, and the fate of migrants who decide to build their future abroad. Khanna's book, titled *The Future is Asian*, was published by Vector Publishing House in 2020, while the book dedicated to his academic supervisor David Held, titled *Move: How Mass Migration Will Reshape the World – and What It Means for You*, was published in German by Rowohlt publishing house as *Move: Das Zeitalter der Migration*.

The introduction to the book is accompanied by the author's several predictions, one of them being Khanna's reflections on where people will live in 2050. At the end of the book, there is an extensive list of sources and references to the

¹ See: P. Mishra, *Age of Anger. A history of the present*, London: Penguin Books, 2018.

² See: R. Rajan, *The Third Pillar. How markets and the state leave the community behind*, London: Penguin Books, 2019.

works cited. The core of the book consists of 15 chapters, the titles of which reflect the research field specified above: 1. Mobility is destiny; 2. The global struggle for young talent; 3. Nationalism and the lost battle for talent; 4. Generation move; 5. The next American dream; 6. Countries of Europe; 7. Bridges between regions; 8. North; 9. Will the South survive; 10. Asians arrive; 11. Retreat or renewal in the Pacific; 12. Quantum man; 13. Find your own identity; 14. *Pax urbanica*; and 15. Civilization 3.0.

As a strategic thinker, the author is interested in socio-economic geography – chiefly in political, demographic, technological, and climate issues – and applies this field of knowledge to demonstrate that mobility is the destiny of humanity, especially when it is faced with the need to tackle various threats and crises, such as pandemics, or catastrophes. Khanna also looks at the growing importance of the gig-economy in China and emphasises the role of not only migration to other countries, but also internal migrations, e.g. those that are taking place in China. He believes that “maybe today’s masses of international migrants are the most influential group in the world” (p. 36) and notes that the globe has been covered by zones (red, green, and blue), whose nomenclature refers to the conditions of functioning, the possibility of moving around, and the quality of life. In this way, J.R. McNeill’s hypothesis of the “great acceleration” and the growing relationship between man-technology and nature is confirmed. These bonds seem to have affected the silent generation (i.e. those born between 1922 and 1945) less and more, but play an increasingly bigger role on the next generations of Baby Boomers (born 1946–1964), Generation X (born 1965–1979), Generation Y (millennials), and Generation Z (the so-called “iGeneration”). Khanna points to the fact that while national identity was the element that dominated in the past, the importance of generational identity is what is coming to the fore these days. He refers to the research of Karl Mannheim and Ulrich Beck, who prove that intergenerational identity is built on the basis of common experiences. Such experiences can be the feeling of belonging to the precariat, or living according to the 996 model, which rests on the idea of working from 9 to 9, and getting 6 hours of sleep. The interdisciplinary value of the publication is further enhanced by the observations that not only the literary and the film world both participate in the transmission of intergenerational experiences, as evidenced by the overt reference that the book makes to the film *Parasite*, directed by Bong Joon-ho. Other common intergenerational experiences have become: global activism, endorsed by Greta Thunberg, protests against seniors (hashtag okboomer), the actions of cosmopolitan writers (Ian McEwan, Kazuo Ishiguro, Elif Shafak) and politician Sadiq Khan. Technological changes have paved the way for futuristic reflections and outlooks, in which the quantum epithet dominated, in relation to considerations about man, the world, the future, or physics. Global cities, such as Hong Kong and Dubai, have become habitats for all nations,

clusters of civicism. Having said this, despite the growing number of relationships of people from different parts of the world, the problems of ethnic ghettos still remain to be solved.

In light of the ongoing changes and processes pointed out from a sociological perspective, Khanna has decided to indicate four possible scenarios of the future: 1. The scenario of a regional fortress – similar to the *status quo*, where the rich countries from North America, Europe and Asia want to limit interactions and strive for closed systems; 2. The scenario of the new Middle Ages – with low migration, lack of investment in sustainable development, confiscation of energy resources, a wave of deaths caused by natural disasters, and the survivors of clusters in feudal urban regions, reminiscent of Hanseatic League; 3. The “Barbarians *ante portas*” scenario, in which civil wars are fought over water and other resources; 4. “The northern lights lovers” scenario of aurora lovers, which rests on a vision of solving problems, creating an archipelago of sustainable settlements, built on the basis of innovation, assimilation culture and demographic development. The analysis of these scenarios has given rise to the question of how Khanna defines assimilation and integration, and what tasks and challenges he sees for these processes.

Khanna notes that the consequences of the impact of population growth on security were analysed in the US already in the 1970s. For example, the *National Security Study Memorandum. NSSM 200: Implications of Worldwide Population Growth* (December 10, 1974) by Kissinger made recommendations for addressing the challenges of demographic change. Many of them, e.g. those related to the situation of women, should be implemented further, for example in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has caused an increase in violence in a number of areas (e.g. family issues, as well as professional and residential areas). Khanna also draws attention to the problems of stateless people (e.g. Palestinians, and Kurds). He cites Jonathan Haidt’s research, which shows an increase in a trend dubbed “anchoring globalization” among the mobile youth. He boldly and provocatively calls the generation of Erasmus children “the first generation of post-national Europe” (p. 92) and expresses the opinion that globalists accept realism more than nationalists. He takes a critical approach to populists – e.g. Latin American socialists, or Arab Islamists – and notes that liberals are winning in large cities, e.g. in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, or Bratislava. He also points to the fact that many countries are reviving discussion on the obligation of military service, and the role of the army, mentioning the example of Mexico, where there is an ongoing debate about the use of uniformed forces to combat drug addiction and crack down on crime.

Khanna has become interested in the ways of using common goods and has referred extensively to the achievements of Michael Bauwens, an expert on technology and the impact of Peer-to-Peer technology on social movements, and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, who deals with the methods of solving common

problems by local communities. He has also been inspired by the research of Alasdair MacIntyre, who looks at the importance of local communities, and Indian economist Raghuram Rajan, who focuses on inclusive localism. The essence of Rajan's reflections can be found in his conclusion that the state and the market should not dominate local communities.

In order to point out the positive role of mobility in improving the standard of living of American society, Khanna has referred explicitly to the views of Raj Chetty, an Indian-born professor at Harvard University. The trailer, the unquestionable symbol of American mobility, reflects the lifestyle of many Americans who have made bold decisions to find a place on earth for themselves, due to various circumstances of an economic, social or climatic nature. In American society, the story of Gloria Steinem, feminist whose autobiography *My Life on the Road* was cinematized in *The Glorias* in 2020, has become commonly known. Also in other countries, there has been a growing awareness that immigration policy is an element of economic policy, if only because of the growing shortage of caregivers of seniors. Among the people coming to Europe, there are not only many immigrants from the South, but also a large number of Americans. The arrival of migrants onto the Old Continent is often associated with the transfer of disputes from their countries of origin to new places of residence, including Turks living in Germany, who keep arguing about the policy of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another thing is that Khanna is critical of German politics, claiming that anti-capitalist populism prevails in Berlin. The expert underestimated the policy of the Alternative for Germany, accusing it of "political and economic Darwinism", reminded about the slogans like "children instead of Indians" spread across Germany, which accompanied the debate on immigration policy. Khanna notes that in the opinion of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, German society is not tolerant. A closer observation of the attitudes towards migrants in Europe has led the strategist to conclude that other countries, such as Switzerland and Austria, are also adopting a stronghold attitude, their communities showing hostility towards outsiders. At the same time, the researcher noticed difficulties in the implementation of migration policy and is mainly concerned with assimilation policy, not integration policy. Mr. Khanna recalled that after the admission of people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to Europe in 2015, violence and resentment against migrants intensified, attacks on asylum centres increased and support for right-wing extremist parties went up. An example of actions taken towards immigrants presented in the book is the functioning of the Academy of Integration in Bergamo, Italy, where immigrants participate in courses that get them ready to start work.


The lack of water in Syria, Iraq, Iran or Pakistan and the rise in temperatures in many regions of the world have provoked Khanna to reflect on how people will use the Arctic in the future. The author has made reference to the *Climate Resilience*

Screening Index, considering the possibility of greening the ever-white territory of Greenland, and building a new Hanseatic League in the northern hemisphere. He has also wondered if the South would survive. He stresses the fact that a 2019 survey of the communities of Lebanon and Iraq shows that people expect the government to focus on economic policy, not religious policy. He warns that Egypt is becoming a civilization close-circuit territory, doomed to collapse as a result of the water deficit, and that the basic institutions in Egypt, such as the family, have been facing many crises, such as an increase in the number of divorces. Egypt's problem is the loss of importance of the Suez Canal. As in Egypt, Iranian youth are protesting because of their belief that there is no strategy for the future. Khanna also draws attention to the problems of South American countries, including Argentina, Venezuela and Chile. He focused not only on the challenges posed by the rise of populism and the migration crisis, but also analysed the actions taken in relation to the melting of the glaciers in the Andes. The water collected as a result of the warming process is essential for the life of people migrating to Santiago de Chile. The population of the capital of Chile exceeds half of the population of the state. The scale of migration in other regions of the world, e.g. in Asia, is also going up as a result of climate issues, along with the struggle for talent and growth opportunities. As a real futurist, the author points to the economic and demographic relations between Saudi Arabia and India, reminding the readers that about 4 million Indians live in Saudi Arabia. Khanna delves into economically motivated migration waves, whose major goal is to improve the comfort of life (e.g. better medical care); he also looks at the emotional motives, which include, among others, the need to build interpersonal ties. He explains that talent is characterised by statelessness: it can foster promotion, and it can be sold. In this way, he has taken up the topic of identity search, postulating the notion of "global passports," and implementing the *ius doni* scheme, based on the idea of citizenship through investments.

The book, undoubtedly characterised by outstanding erudition and filled with several insightful observations about the changes taking place in the world, has been written from the perspective of an Indian scholar who is interested in the fate of Indians scattered around the world. Khanna reminds the readers, among others, about the families of Sikhs from Punjab, who live in Northern Italy, and who are engaged in the production of Parmesan cheese. However, the author has also included a series of observations about the situation of families, generations, demands of protest groups and political parties from other countries. By reading the chapters, the readers get an opportunity to learn about the author's views on a number of issues, as on the one hand he draws attention to the growing importance of mega-cities, and on the other hand sees the advantages of living in small towns. The analysis of the content featured in the book confirms that as an expert on Indian matters, Khanna advocates the pursuit of a global community in which technologies will be

used to overcome the destabilisation caused by human and natural activities. He argues that we need innovation, which would connect the populations living in smaller communities, including small towns. He sees the future through the lenses of what he labels as “diplomacy”, a merger of diplomacy done among cities and believes that the future may be moving towards *pax urbanica*. He has also been involved in using innovations to combat high temperatures in mega-cities, such as the “Cooling Singapore” project, launched in Singapore.

According to the author, the bonds established may be conducive to building tolerance and attitudes of openness. This said, the expert is aware of the conflict potential resulting from the growing insurmountable threats and deficits that the inhabitants of the global village are currently facing. Khanna expresses his deep understanding for the migration decisions of people who decide to look for a better place to live. He points to both the negative and positive consequences of emigration decisions. It seems that he himself – a migrant, a citizen of the world, and an observer of global phenomena – has collected many testimonies about the risks and challenges of migration processes, which he has decided to share from both an academic and an emotional perspective. The book has become a true bestseller, and the author’s voice has been recognised as one of the most potent voices that testifies to the great activity and understanding of the need to share one’s views with the audience. It is doubtful that Khanna’s arguments will convince the supporters of building walls and fortresses, but one can still trust that because the book contains so many observations referring to current discussions and because it fits well into the ongoing discourse about the changes taking place and the threats that need addressing, it may be a real eye-opener – at least to some.



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NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives, ed. by Michele Testoni

[Routledge: Abingdon, Oxfordshire; New York, NY:
Routledge, 2021, xiv + 230 pp.]

Michele Testoni, the editor of *NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives*, a publication made up of 12 articles written by his students under his supervision, is a prominent expert on international relations and security issues with a deep interest in US security and military relations in the modern world. He has been Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations at IE University since 2013, and Visiting Professor at the “Global Economy and Social Affairs Master set up by the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice” programme, and the International Labour Organisation. His career has always been oriented towards international politics, as evidenced by his cooperation with the top academic institutions in Rome and beyond specialising in International Relations, such as the University of Bologna, Dickinson College, and John Cabot University. His educational achievements include a PhD in Political Sciences awarded by the University of Florence, and a Master’s degree in International Relations received from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Michele Testoni is the author of many articles featured in *European Security* and

Quaderni di Scienza Politica journals. In the Spanish Political Studies Association and the Transatlantic Studies Association, he is an active member and a part of the academic managing committee. In the years 2010–2012, Testoni was Associate Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe, where he cooperated with Transparency International.

Testoni's *NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives* is a collective effort of the editor and his students, who have shared their national perspectives on NATO. In light of my personal interest in the Polish-American bilateral relations, I have found it challenging to review two chapters of this book. The first one is chapter one – “The US role in NATO: past, present, future”, which describes the dubious future of maintaining the leadership of the United States; the second one is chapter seven entitled “Poland's role in NATO: toward a transatlantic bargain 2.0?”, which refers to Poland's desire to put NATO at the forefront before all the other entities and organisations, which proves the country's firm belief in a rather outdated vision of the US as NATO's key player.

In chapter one “The US role in NATO: past, present, future”, written by Michele Testoni's student Jack Thompson, the reader gets a chance to find out about the essence of NATO's transformation from an “unquestioned cornerstone of the US grand strategy” represented by Harry Truman's efforts of strengthening allies between member states toward disintegration with other members during Donald Trump's presidency and his purchasing “unfair trade policies within a security policy perspective”. In this chapter, Thompson attempts to apply both the observation method and the comparative analysis method to look at the chronological sequence of events from the formation and launch of the community to its final disintegration. He refers to role of the US in the North Transatlantic Treaty Organisation as an agent that keeps spiralling down other leaders' position. Nevertheless, the author argues that NATO as an organisation continues to be the primary institution responsible for ensuring peace and stability across Europe and North America. At the same time, he mentions the pressure exerted on NATO with regard to the pace of strengthening its members, which has a major impact on the future of the organisation. In my opinion, this fact is best represented by the quote “if it is the member states that make the Alliance work, then it is the member states that one needs to look at to explain the strengths and weaknesses of the Alliance itself.” The coalition of the member states has weakened gradually, which the author has referred to and has rightly interpreted as alarming signals that he was afraid would prove NATO's helplessness in the event of escalation of conflict from the American point of view.

In Chapter seven titled “Poland's role in NATO: toward a transatlantic bargain 2.0?”, the author, Wojciech Michnik, shows a naive outlook that the Polish governments have had toward one member of NATO, i.e. the US. The author seems to understand the reason that makes Poland bond with the US in such a major way.


It is a real concern in light of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and has increased significantly since this publication was written. Michnik looks for a legal method and notices the growth that can be seen in the field of defence strategy. He also refers to the military forces deployed in Warsaw during the operation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Poland is willing to host the American soldiers cause it strengthens bilateral relations and guarantees protection in case conflicts spread. According to historical facts, American troops were allocated to Poland due to the geographical location during the Kosovo operation 1998–1999. After the 2001 attacks on the WTC in New York and on the Pentagon, during the presidency of Kwaśniewski in Poland, the United States developed strategies to prevent potential terroristic attacks and engaged allies in the war in Afghanistan by sending CIA representatives to detention canthers in Europe, including Poland.

The author shares a positive example of the well-balanced cooperation between Poland and NATO, where he highlights Poland's visible efforts of spending 2% of the Polish GDP on the army, which is a factor that helps to guarantee better Poland-NATO relations. He also mentions the Newport summit, which stressed the fact of the Alliance's Eastern flank becoming more real than before. Nevertheless, all these manifestations, directed by Poland towards America were, in his opinion, unilateral – especially during the Trump administration. He argues that overly active gestures toward America are Poland's strength in the opinion of the government, but the unlimited pursuit of good relations with the transatlantic partner is risky from the point of view of preserving one's own European identity and dignity, and self-interest. Poland is shamefully known for failing to fulfil its obligations to the European Union – author dwells it is maybe because too much attention and financial effort is being devoted to pleasing the US. For example EU's initiative, the National Reconstruction Program, has been suspended for Poland due to a lack of respect for independent law-making process. In turn, Poland ignoring the Regional European Organizations not only is viewed as an unstable country in the region and across the Atlantic Ocean, but is also compared with states with autocratic governments like Hungary. Hence Poland is losing its reputation – and a chance of potential aid in case of the crisis. Michnik states that the Polish government has been trying desperately to maintain good relations with the United States, neglecting its relations with geographically closer allies, such as Germany, or Brussels. As the author rightly notes, Poland, arguably the closest pro-Atlantic ally around, has been counting on the fact that after NATO's enlargement to include the Czech Republic and Hungary, due to its proximity, Poland would be a strategic partner in the NATO 2.0 negotiation process. Nevertheless, even though Poland is an important member of the eastern flank, it requires the support of other members in ensuring peace, and it does not seem to cope with this task in the best possible way, as Michnik points out. In fact, he sees the issue of Poland's attempts to maintain a strong collaboration

with its neighbours, like e.g. Germany, which can lead to a further disintegration of NATO. As an example of a diplomatic error, Michnik mentions the withdrawal of 9,500 American soldiers from Germany and their transfer to Poland. He is also sceptical of the Polish plans to make Poland responsible for sponsoring the maintenance of American troops in Poland with USD 2 billion. This, in his opinion, creates an image of ingratitude, and could be taken as a *faux pas* towards Brussels.

To sum up, this publication rests on the assumption that currently scholars devote more time to NATO as an organisation than to its individual members, an assumption which the author tries to corroborate. The publication is different in many respects: it is a breath of fresh air in this subject area, and at the same time, the author looks at the criticism expressed by the Member States towards NATO in case of a confused role of the US, or an excessive enthusiasm on the part of Poland, thus showing that that NATO's member perceive the organisation differently.

Admittedly, there are far deeper divisions within the Alliance itself than it seems, and they have been recently exacerbated by a number of events, such as e.g. Brexit, the presidency of Donald Trump in the US, Emanuel Macron's claims that NATO is experiencing a "brain death", or the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. All these factors have pushed Michele Testoni to consider the future of the strained transatlantic architecture. What I find interesting in this publication is the reality seen through the eyes of a younger generation of academics who criticise the "Western" core values and democratic principles, a trend that tends to be neglected by Polish experts and law makers. Hence, the text brings forward a clear point of view reviewed by a few generations who are citizens of different states that make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The analysis of the two chapters mentioned above represents totally different points of view and shows that the author is right: there is no unanimity within the organisation and/or alliance of its member states. The perception from the point of view of its members, the so-called second image, allows to get to know organisations and their challenges in a much better way – in a way that allows readers to look at the interests of countries that come together to achieve their own goals, but also to learn to control the strengths and weaknesses of other countries. On the whole, what really matters is the future, and NATO needs a united voice to answer the question of whether or not its expansion to the east was the right decision. Is the question of Georgia and Ukraine waiting in line to join the Alliance justified? And, last but not least, what is the top threat in modern transatlantic relations – terrorism, global warming, or the militarisation of Russia?



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Frédéric Grare, Jean-Loup Samaan, *The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region*

[Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022,
xii + 232 pp.]

The book *The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region* has only recently been published by Palgrave Macmillan, which means that it will offer readers the most current perspective on the topics that have been subjected to scrutiny.

The book has been co-authored. The first author is Frédéric Grare, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in Paris, where he works on Indo-Pacific issues; and Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his research focusses on Indo-Pacific dynamics, the search for a security architecture and South Asia Security issues. Grare has a wealth of expertise in the topic thanks to his professional experience at the French embassy in Pakistan, where he served as Director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities in New Delhi, as Advisor at the Centre for Analysis, forecasting and strategy of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as Head of the Asia bureau at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defence. The other author is Jean-Loup Samaan, Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore, and

Associate Research Fellow at the French Institute of International Relations, and Adjunct Lecturer at Yale-NUS College. His research focusses on Middle Eastern strategic affairs – in particular the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, and the evolution of the Gulf security system. His professional experience includes the position of policy analyst at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defence (2008–2011), research advisor at the NATO Defence College (2011–2016), and associate professor in strategic studies detached by the US Near East South Asia Centre to the UAE National Defence College (2016–2021).

Both authors have released several books and other publications on related topics of their interest. Given such profound background of the authors, readers can count on highly informative and skilled research presented in the book, which consists of nine chapters. The first chapter is the Introduction, which is followed by the authors' suggestion to delve deeper into the discourse, as they start with a chapter that looks at China's Indian Ocean strategy. What follows is a shift to India's interests, to the role of the US and Europe in the region, and finally to the engagement of Arab countries, Australia, ASEAN countries, and Africa. Finally, the last chapter offers a summary of the comprehensive overview of the regional issues discussed, and the region's relations with other regions and world powers. The book has 240 pages. Each part has been neatly structured to include an introduction, a main part with the relevant subtopics, a conclusion, and a detailed list of bibliographical references.

The resources used for the research are numerous and diverse, and they include monographs, internet resources, thinktanks' releases, a wide array of documents and reports, and other materials. Such diversity guarantees the objectivity of the authors and shows their comprehensive approach to the research done. There are no illustrations in the book, which could be regarded as a drawback, as some maps would have been useful to back up the analysis of the geopolitical regions and help readers to gain better insight into the topics at hand.

Chapter 5, titled "The UK and France: An European Struggle for Regional Influence", expands on the topic of European engagement to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and explains the strategies of the UK and France in terms of military presence and diplomatic efforts. The common feature and trend of the foreign policies of these countries during the last decade is the return to the Indian Ocean region despite their withdrawal before the 2010s, regarded as a relic of the colonial era. Nowadays, both countries are trying to play the role as external powers in the region and gain influence in the local governance. France has a number of overseas territories there, which is why it has a military and naval potential in coastal Africa, and some islands, like Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean, as well as the tiny French sub-Antarctic and Antarctic Territories (Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands, Amsterdam and Saint-Paul Islands). In 2012 Admiral Dufourcq, back then

an influential voice within the French naval circles, argued that “the Indian Ocean presents two major focal points of military interests for France. The first goes from Djibouti to the Persian Gulf. The second is the region of Mascareignes, a region of the south Indian Ocean.” When it comes to the diplomatic approach, France preferred to build its relations with India, a former British colony, with whom the British have not managed to build diplomatic bridges despite the huge Indian diaspora in the UK. Moreover, observers say that French and Indian foreign policies are very similar, as they both rely on the axiom of strategic autonomy – the desire to avoid systematic alignment on US policies in terms of national defence. France also made attempts at engaging Australia into the first Paris-Delhi-Canberra trilateral dialogue in 2020, articulated as an official Indo-Pacific strategy through diplomatic and military measures, thus in sharp opposition to China’s maritime ambitions. Nevertheless, France’s position is still very vague and somewhat poorly articulated, as France supported EU-China trade agreement in December 2020, contrary to its previously made statements in this matter.

The UK’s territories in the IOR are not that numerous and only include the Chagos archipelago, where they do not have a formal military representation. Moreover, the British control over the archipelago has been disputed for a while by Mauritius, but not successfully, as the UK and the US military presence has remained unchanged there. Still, the UK’s main strategic goal in the region is the strong impact of local crises on the stability of maritime commerce, as maritime trade is one of the key sectors of the British economy. In terms of diplomacy, the UK previously saw China as its main partner, which contributed to the lack of trust in UK-India relations, especially taking into account their colonial past. However, as soon as Boris Johnson took office as Prime Minister, this sector of UK politics changed dramatically, as the 2021 Integrated Review evidenced the British shift on China in comparison with the previous document of 2015. The designation of China as a *partner* was replaced by a new label attached to the country – this time naming it *a systemic competitor*. Nevertheless, when it comes to the cultural influence, the UK can still boast an undisputed prevalence in the IOR, this includes the English language, and the presence of offices of the British Council, British media (the BBC), and the attractiveness of British schools – in fact, many political leaders and influential elites of the region have completed their education at British universities or their branches, which are numerous in the IOR. This proximity of decision makers of the region gives the UK an exclusive funding capability, the authority of schooling local military staff, coupled with the influence on strategic thinkers through organisations like the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Also, one should not forget the Commonwealth, which is a powerful tool, although apparently the UK has not been taking advantage of it too much.

Chapter 7 “Australia and the ASEAN Member States: From Interest to Commitment?” underscores the fact that these countries control all the choke points between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and that is why they are extremely sensitive to all the developments and changes there. These changes are mainly happening because of the China-US confrontation, especially China’s ambitions to go beyond the Pacific and its aggressive attitude in the South China Sea, and also because of its willingness to project power beyond the Malacca Strait. Because of this, Australia and the ASEAN states have begun to reassess their involvement in the IOR, as they have started to see it as a source of real insecurity, and a cause for major concern. As a result, the region is witnessing a transition to the emergence of multilateral arrangements in the Indian Ocean: the ASEAN states have gradually reinforced their own coordination, in the Malacca Strait in particular, in order to prevent the need for great powers’ interventions, while Australia has, in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, helped to enhance their capacity. At the same time, all the countries around the eastern Indian Ocean have developed naval ties with India.

This development of intra-Asian security networking could imply a drift of Eastern Indian Ocean countries into the India-China rivalry, as most of the new formats have emerged as a result of growing tensions between China and Australia on the one side, between China and ASEAN member states, while border tensions between India and China soon translated into lethal confrontations. Finally, East Asian countries are simply aiming at protecting themselves from the global US-China rivalry, and the regional China-India rivalry, as its consequences could be destructive for all.

Overall, the trend remains epitomised by permanent tensions between the unity and the fragmentation of the IOR, the area no longer being perceived as a mere gateway between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. We can be sure that the security vacuum is not possible there due to China’s rise, and the fact that the US, European, Asian or Middle Eastern countries have all increased their presence. The rise of China has also changed the nature of the strategic landscape – the focus is no longer exclusively on naval predominance, but it has been extended to include comprehensive maritime security, where the need to address predatory practices goes hand in hand with the need to manage the growing militarisation of the region.

On the whole, the book is undoubtedly a valuable source of detailed and credible research of the Indian Ocean Region, a topic that has not been given enough academic attention thus far. This is why, it is a useful and instructive source of knowledge for students of International Relations, and for those who wish to understand the ins and outs of this particular region. The issues discussed have been scrutinised from various angles, and the authors have provided the readers with a comprehensive analysis of not only the local geopolitical infrastructure, but also the relations of the region with other political actors, regions, and associations. The book looks

at several key faces of the issues – economic, military, cultural, geographical, historical, and others. Surely, it is an interesting source of information for those who have already studied the topic, but it also encourages others, less acquainted with the issues, to know more. With all this in mind, it is fair to say that the book is a truly informative publication that makes a major contribution to the current base of studies and other research materials available on the Polish publishing market.



Publication ethics

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