Przeglądaj wg Słowo kluczowe "comprehensive defence"

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    Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka 2022, nr 3 (XLVIII): The Total Defence 21st century.COM – building a resilient society
    (Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2022) Lasoń, Marcin; Klisz, Maciej; Elak, Leszek; Jones, Derek; Love, J. Bryant; Borkowski, Robert; Reczkowski, Robert; Lis, Andrzej; Czarny, Roman S.; Kubiak, Krzysztof; Michalak, Artur; Bonomi, Nicola; Bergonzini, Stefano; Majchrowska, Elżbieta; Wiśniewska-Paź, Barbara; Polko, Paulina; Mehan, Brian; Fiala, Otto C.; Allers, Edgars; Śliwa, Zdzisław; Fabian, Sandor; Johanson, Terry; Grzela, Joanna; Bērziņš, Jānis; Stringer, Kevin D.; Issa, Alex; Grandi, Marco Massimo; Łazarek, Sławomir; Lipert-Sowa, Monika; Lakomy, Miron; Kuśmirek, Karolina; Marcinko, Marcin; Matyók, Thomas; Zajc, Srečko; Pieczywok, Andrzej; Czornik, Katarzyna; Urych, Ilona; Leśniewski, Zbigniew; Lech, Kamila; Laskowski, Mirosław; Pietrzak, Patrycja; Czernik, Paulina; Halicka, Barbara; Ostolski, Paweł Rafał; Marek, Michał
    Introduction: "When we started working on the issue entitled “The Total Defence 21st century. COM – building a resilient society”, we did not know then how topical this issue would become. We were aware of its importance, especially since 2014, which was the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, we did not think that the need to build an effective concept of total/comprehensive defence, and then its implementation, would become so pressing in February 2022. Two of the three general regularities in the history of international relations have also become extremely topical. We are talking about the clash between imperial and polyarchic tendencies, and nations’ desire to express their independence and identity, and as a result, to have their own state. It can be assumed that in order to achieve this goal, as well as for small and medium-sized states to be able to defend themselves against the forces of empires and effectively deter them, they must use the concept of total/comprehensive defence, in its improved, 21st century version."(...)
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    Latvia’s comprehensive defence approach
    (Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2022) Bērziņš, Jānis
    Russia has been employing old methods of warfare in innovative ways with the help of new technologies. At the same time, it has been looking to exploit non-military means to achieve political objectives. Among these are psychological, information, and influence operations, including financing pseudo-NGOs for achieving political goals, disinformation campaigns, and strong military posturing near the Baltic Countries’ borders. The Russian strategy for the Baltic States is multi-layered and chiefly determined by Russia considering them part of the West. As a result, since the threat is multi-layered and presents a comprehensive challenge, Latvia developed a comprehensive defence strategy. This article analysis the evolution of Latvia’s security and defence strategy towards a system that may be characterized as comprehensive defence. Its main features include several initiatives where society’s role is fundamental. The results are already noticeable. These actions have been focussing on both enlarging enlistment in the National Guard, but also in increasing the society’s awareness and resilience in case of military or non-military crisis.
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    Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers
    (Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2022) Jones, Derek; Love, J. Bryant
    Civil-defence resilience capacities focus on man-made threats to national security. While terror attacks like 9/11 drove civil-defence efforts throughout the 2000s, the Russian invasion of portions of Ukraine in 2014 forced nations to build resilience against new threats. These included covert grey-zone and disinformation operations. Additionally, the 2014 events forced nations bordering or within the sphere of influence of revisionist nations to begin to prepare for possible invasion and occupation. Recognition of these threats resulted in two multinational doctrinal concepts that set the stage for what is collectively referred to as resilience and resistance (R&R). Resilience is the efforts by a nation prior to a conflict to build pre-crisis capacity to resist a host of threats, including invasion and occupation, in hopes of deterring threat actions. If deterrence fails, then the efforts transition into resistance to invasion and occupation. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the need for R&R and the strengths and weaknesses of national resistance in action. This event is a strategic R&R inflection point. Nations developing R&R should reflect on and apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s efforts and ultimately establish R&R 2.0 as an irregular deterrent on par and mutually supporting conventional and nuclear deterrents.
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    Stronger together: the integration of a nation’s special operations forces and voluntary-based formations in comprehensive and total defence
    (Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2022) Jones, Derek; Mehan, Brian
    Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.