Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie po Euromajdanie

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dc.contributor.authorBonusiak, Włodzimierz
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-05T12:04:05Z
dc.date.available2019-04-05T12:04:05Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractSince condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a „strategic partnership” policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn’t hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fi ghters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for ”Przegląd” and “Nie”). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by “Przegląd” – “How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?” – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, “Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest”. In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very diffi cult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven’t obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki “the prestige of Poland asa supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems”. Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that “the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity”. In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.pl
dc.identifier.citationKrakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe 2015, nr 2 s. 132-140.pl
dc.identifier.issn1733-2680pl
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11315/23035
dc.language.isoplpl
dc.publisherOficyna Wydawnicza AFMpl
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/*
dc.subjectEuromaidanpl
dc.subjectVerkhovna Rada Ukrainepl
dc.subjectact inspection pro banderapl
dc.subjectpolitices Polandpl
dc.subjectperspectivepl
dc.subject.otherStosunki międzynarodowepl
dc.subject.otherPolitologiapl
dc.subject.otherBezpieczeństwo narodowe i wewnętrznepl
dc.titleStosunki polsko-ukraińskie po Euromajdaniepl
dc.typeArtykuł
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